Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability
(February 2001)
Summary
- The Government’s Defence Policy Framework states that the NZDF must be able to offer a range of
capabilities which are realistically sustainable in order to meet defence policy objectives. This review
of the options for New Zealand’s air combat capability assesses the value of that capability in meeting
Government’s policy objectives in a fiscally sustainable manner. The review identifies the strategic,
military operational, foreign policy and financial consequences of three broad options.
- Retention of the force at the current level of capability.
- Retention of a reduced air combat capability, involving a smaller operational force and/or outsourcing flying training.
- Disbanding the air combat force.
- The decision paths for these options are as follows:
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The implications of the options are summarised in the table below:
| Implications | Option 1 Retain Air Combat |
Option 2 Reduced Air Combat |
Option 3 Eliminate Air Combat |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic / Foreign Policy | Air combat force available to respond to local, regional and global security challenges. No foreign policy implications. ENA could continue as long as needed by Australia. Air combat force continue to participate in FPDA. This would be welcomed by FPDA partners, particularly Australia, as a demonstration of New Zealand commitment to regional security. |
A limited but effective capability retained which could be expanded if there is a deterioration in New Zealand’s security situation. No major foreign policy implications. Air combat force could still take part in FPDA and provide support to Australians under ENA. |
Remove choice of committing air combat force in response to future security challenges. Our participation in FPDA activities would be reduced. Unable to continue to provide training support to Australians under ENA. Australian’s concern would be heightened if support was terminated before they could replace us with their new Hawk trainer. Could be perceived by Australians as a sign that New Zealand is backing away from defence responsibilities. Likely to be unwelcome news in the United States. FPDA partners would regret the elimination of our air combat force. |
| Military Operational | The favourable reaction would help secure training and exercise support from our defence partners. Retention of an indigenous capacity to provide essential training support for the Navy and Army. |
Retention of air combat expertise that provides a base to build on in the future. Retention of an indigenous capacity to provide essential training support for the Navy and Army. Savings would be generated to address operational deficiencies in other areas. |
Air combat training support for the Navy and Army would have to be acquired from others at a cost. Loss of indigenous air combat expertise. Negative impact on recruitment and retention. Air Force may be able to be consolidated on one base in the North Island. Considerable resources would be freed up to address operational deficiencies in other areas. |
| Financial | The NZDF baseline would have to be increased by $293-$329 million over the next 10 years to accommodate the rising cost of maintaining the air combat force. Capital investment in the region of $840-1,100 million would be required to replace the A-4s. No savings would be generated for rebuilding the rest of the NZDF. |
Baseline savings of about $128 million a year commencing in 2002/3 until the A-4s are replaced in 2010/11. Air Force personnel reduced by about 340. Capital investment in the region of about $680 million would be required to replace A-4s with 14 aircraft. Savings would be generated, but insufficient for rebuilding the NZDF unless accompanied by major cuts elsewhere. |
There would be an immediate baseline saving of $39 million, rising to $96 million per year from 2004/05. Total savings over 10 years of $870 million. Air Force personnel reduced by around 700. These savings and the avoidance of capital investments in the air combat force would assist in rebuilding the NZDF, significantly reducing the need for additional funding. Possible impact on ability to generate export earnings of some of the major contractors involved in supporting the air combat force. |
Key Considerations
- The air combat force equipped with the A-4 Skyhawk in its current state would be a marginal asset to any multinational coalition, and its operational utility will continue to decline. Should the Government wish to retain an air combat capability with some useful operational utility, then it would have to make a significant investment in new aircraft, more modern weapons, and improved combat systems.
- In the absence of a foreseeable military threat, it is unlikely a New Zealand government would use the air combat force to respond to a low level security challenge around New Zealand or the South Pacific.
- The air combat force plays a useful role in confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region through its involvement in FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. This is part of the architecture that helps maintain stability in the region. These activities also contribute to our foreign policy objectives. A New Zealand government, however, has not used the air combat force in response to a security challenge in the region for over 25 years. The outlook in Strategic Assessment 2000 makes it difficult to visualise a situation where a government might do so in the foreseeable future.
- The foreign policy impact of disbanding the air combat force needs to be cast in the wider context of the other decisions the Government will be making on our defence effort. The Australians will want to see New Zealand maintain a range of capabilities needed to continue to play a role in the region and to be able to work jointly with Australia. In the absence of air combat, these would include naval and land combat forces and maritime surveillance. If a decision to eliminate the air combat force was taken, they would wish to see it timed so that it would not leave them with a gap until they were able to have their new Hawks take over from our A-4s in providing training support for the RAN.
- For Singapore and Malaysia, as well as other South-East Asian partners, the key will be maintaining capabilities that can effectively contribute to FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. Our major contributions are the air combat force, the P-3 Orions and our frigates. The effect of eliminating the air combat force could be dampened by assurances that the other force elements will continue to participate.
- The air combat force supports the RNZN and New Zealand Army in maintaining their operational standards, as well as contributing important expertise to the joint force environment. There are other options for meeting these requirements satisfactorily if an air combat force was not part of the NZDF force structure. These would require the cooperation of our defence partners and there would be costs involved.
- Because of the uncertainty of the security environment in the medium to longer term a decision to eliminate the air combat force carries with it the risk that New Zealand may not have a force structure that is able to cope with future challenges. But it is hard to visualise any circumstance where New Zealand would face a future serious threat on its own; we would do so as part of a multinational grouping.
- In these circumstances, each country would contribute what it could and smaller countries like New Zealand would not be expected to have a full spectrum of capabilities available. What would be expected was that our contributions would be relevant, well trained and well equipped and thus able to play a useful part. It would not be in anybody’s interest for us to maintain a breadth of capabilities that could not be properly developed and sustained.
Option 1 – Retain the Air Combat Force
- Retaining the air combat force at its current level of capability would not carry any strategic, foreign policy or military operational risks. It would be available to respond to security challenges and participate in FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. Training support could be provided to the Australians as long as it was needed. This would require baseline increases over the next 10 years totalling in the region of $300 million. Capital investment about $840-1,100 million would also be required.
Option 2 – Retain a Reduced Air Combat Force
- Retaining a reduced air combat capability would balance the strategic and foreign policy risks of eliminating the capability with the financial risks of maintaining air combat as part of the NZDF structure.
Option 3 – Disband the Air Combat Force
- Elimination of the air combat force entirely carries strategic, foreign policy and military operational risks. Disbanding the air combat force would free up considerable resources and avoid the need for significant capital investment. These cost reductions would go a long way to achieving a fiscally sustainable defence effort within the Government’s financial setting.
- The cost of the Air Combat Force Output is about $150 million annually, excluding capital charge. This is about 13.5% of the cost of NZDF Outputs (excluding capital charge). The $870 million reduction in operating expenses over the next ten years that would be realised if the air combat force was disbanded, and the avoidance of between $680 million and $1 billion in capital investment over the same period, could be used to address the needs of the rest of the force structure within the level of resources that are likely to be available for defence in the current financial setting.
- It is to be expected that recruitment and retention problems could arise in the RNZAF as a result of a decision to disband the air combat force. The impact could be reduced if the decision were seen in the wider context of using scarce resources wisely in those areas of the RNZAF where there is a demonstrable need, such as utility helicopters and strategic airlift. This would require an assessment that those capabilities we choose to retain in the force structure would be properly resourced to maintain professional standards and operational readiness.
- If it were decided to eliminate the air combat force, there is a choice as to timing. The choices would involve, on one hand, how soon cost reductions are achieved; and on the other, accommodating the Australian wish to retain our training support.
