Current press releases and speeches

PDF adobe graphic. View the Independent Review of the Safety and Functionality of HMNZS Canterbury in pdf format (127kb)

Report of the Review of the Safety and Functionality of HMNZS Canterbury

Contents | Previous | Next

Part 2 - Saftety and Functionality

  1. In this part of the report, we address the safety and functionality of HMNZS CANTERBURY. HMNZS CANTERBURY is intrinsically safe although some essential remedial work will be required to demonstrate safety, in particular for undertaking some military tasks. Sea keeping performance, however, is likely to be poor in higher sea states. As regards functionality, some operating limitations may have to be accepted but these are not inconsistent with the requirements of the Functional Performance Specification. Some requirements that should have been delivered under the contract may not be deliverable at all. We expand on these views below.

Safety

  1. Safety is rarely an absolute – it is nearly always relative. There are three principle requirements to satisfy ship safety – assurance of the material state, safe operating procedures, and the associated training.
  2. There is currently a lack of clarity concerning the assurance of the material state of the HMNZS CANTERBURY arising from some confusion on the status of the Lloyd’s Register certification, the collective impact of the waivers granted by the Naval Authority (acting as the Flag State Authority), the actual sea keeping characteristics, the damage and loss of RHIBs and the fatal incident. Such lack of clarity has engendered a loss of confidence in the safety of the ship – this is misplaced.
  3. The design of the MRV is based on the hull form and associated main machinery of a commercial Ro-Ro design. Both the MRV and Ben my Chree were designed by Merwede in the Netherlands. These ships were subjected to the same certification process for both design and construction - indeed both ships have almost identical Lloyd’s Register classification. The MRV incorporates a number of specific military features and where such features are outside the formal certification process, (and most are), they are approved or certified by the either the Flag State Authority or the RNZN acting for the project team.
  4. We have considered the safety of the MRV, firstly as if it were a RoRo Ferry – ignoring the military features and secondly as a military vessel – including the military features.

Safety of the MRV as if it were a Ro-Ro Ferry – ignoring military features

  1. Lloyd’s Register certification to class is not a certificate of safety. It is, however, a comprehensive statement about the quality of the design process and the subsequent construction phase – including for example compliance with the SOLAS requirements. For the Ben my Chree4 and the MRV5 identical processes were followed by Lloyd’s Register under contract to Merwede to ensure that the appropriate design rules were followed, that production drawings reflected the design intent, and that systems and equipments were correctly installed for the required certification, or amended and approved by the Flag State Authority. Practically all ferries around the globe are procured under very similar procedures – although not always under Lloyd’s Register certification – with qualified surveyors undertaking the certification. It is this application of process that permits a ship to be classified and thus provides intrinsic material safety.
  2. There are two material conditions that affect safety that must be addressed before HMNZS CANTERBURY could be regarded as operating as safely a RoRo Ferry. In addition, it is essential to obtain operational advice on ship handling and the propulsion chain when operating in extreme sea conditions from the ship designers.
    1. The Sea Boat Alcoves. The MRV’s sea boats are located in open alcoves port and starboard, some three metres above the waterline and about three quarters of the ship's length from the bow. Sea boats in such a position would be vulnerable to damage from the ingress and exit of green seas whenever the ship was operating in higher sea states – as the project team was advised pre-contract, during design reviews, witnessed during the MARIN tests and experienced on passage from Rotterdam to Melbourne, before acceptance.
    2. In general, ships’ boats are whenever possible located amidships and as far away from the waterline as practical and rarely in alcoves. The reasons are obvious – amidships to limit the effect of pitch during launching/recovery operations, well above the waterline to avoid the ever present possibility of boats being washed away under extreme weather conditions and not in an alcove because in addition to initial shipping of green seas over the boats, a backwash will be generated when trapped green water exits the alcove as the sea falls away, thus increasing the risk of damage or loss of the sea boats.
    3. We found it very surprising that remedial action was not taken to re-site the boats during design development, or if that proved impractical to provide some physical protection for the alcove opening and hence the sea boats.
    4. The loss and damage to the ship’s RHIBs on a routine passage in Sea State 6/7 was not surprising and has been the subject of a Court of Inquiry6 - we agree with its recommendations. Loss of a sea boat would render the ship unable to complete its role. It has been suggested to us that the RHIBs were lost primarily because of the RNZN’s failure to operate the ship prudently. It is certainly true that the MRV is a new capability but it is not fundamentally different to other surface vessels with which the RNZN is experienced. We did, in the course of our review, interview those involved in the Court of Inquiry and reviewed the documentation from the latter. We found no evidence of poor seamanship. The main factors contributing to the loss of the RHIBs were the low position of the alcoves in which they were placed, together with prevailing sea conditions. We understand a design solution is being developed to provide protection to the sea boats in their alcoves – if relocation is not practical.
    5. The Sea Boats themselves. The sea boats delivered by Tenix with the MRV were accepted by both Tenix and the MoD as fit for purpose. During a routine training exercise a sea boat capsized following the premature release of the boat rope and the inability to disengage the boat from the lowering gear. Tragically this incident led to the drowning of a member of the ship’s company, Bryon Solomon. Other members of the crew were also injured. A Court of Inquiry7 made findings as to the cause of the incident but could offer no explanation on why the boat rope prematurely released. We fully endorse the recommendations of the Court of Inquiry which identified a number of material and training shortcomings. The Court’s recommendations effectively require the whole system including the boats themselves to be subjected to a review and where necessary re-engineered and re-certification of equipment, in addition to improved training.
    6. While a coroner has yet to establish the cause of the death of Byron Solomon, there is in our judgement no correlation between this fatal incident and intrinsic safety of HMNZS CANTERBURY. The premature release of the boat rope, the difficulty in releasing the sea boat quickly from the hoisting mechanism, coupled with the failure of the self-righting mechanism to operate were an unlikely combination of circumstances.
    7. There is currently a requirement for a rescue boat to meet the SOLAS requirements for HMNZS CANTERBURY. We believe that once the sea boats have been rectified or replaced, they should be able to perform this role. The Naval Authorities should, therefore, consider granting themselves a waiver for the rescue boat requirement.
    8. Propulsion. Under more extreme weather conditions – above Beaufort scale 9 (mean wind speed 45 knots and wave height of 7-10 metres), ferry operators generally seek shelter or delay sailing – principally to avoid damage to the cargo and passenger discomfort. In the case of the MRV, while operating in higher sea states (greater than Beaufort scale 8) and dependent upon speed and heading, extreme pitching and heeling will occur, leading to partial or complete propeller emergence in excess of recognised (NATO) standards. In such circumstances one or both main engines could trip and depending on generator configuration, electrical power could be lost at the same time, and hence potentially cause broaching8. While the standards to which the MRV and its machinery systems have been designed and materially assured are identical to that for a commercial ferry, the risks of loss of electrical and propulsive power when operating in more extreme weather conditions should have been formally assessed by the ship designers. We believe that Tenix should be formally requested to provide comprehensive advice on issues such as preferred headings/speed combinations or machinery state/line up/modifications, when operating in adverse weather conditions.
  3. Given that HMNZS CANTERBURY has been certified by Lloyd’s Register, has waivers granted by the Naval Authority, approved safe operating procedures and adequately trained personnel (noting that technical training was provided by the contractor), the ship can be considered as safe and seaworthy as any other vessel in her class. The ship is safe to operate in the same manner as the Ben my Chree i.e. as if it were a commercial Ro-Ro Ferry. Subject to the comments on the provision of suitable sea boats, the ship is materially safe to operate now within say 150-200 miles of land. Sea keeping performance in the higher sea states is, however, likely to be poor. It would be prudent to seek shelter and/or change course in the higher sea states and avoid Beaufort scale 9 and above entirely.
  4. On receipt of advice from the ship designer on the propulsion chain, configuration/changes and heading/speed combinations for higher sea states could be considered without the need to seek shelter – but we would strongly recommend that the ship should be ballasted, as outlined below, when planning operational patrols where such conditions might be encountered.

Recommendations:

Safety as a military vessel

  1. To undertake military functions in a safe manner, some key issues remain to be resolved. These are principally associated with equipment performance and sea keeping, and, in particular, the limitations of the ship to shore transfer system. The safe operation of the military functions is an indirect responsibility of Tenix or Merwede but the operating authority – the RNZN - is the responsible authority for the safe operation of each subsystem and where appropriate for systems operating simultaneously. We have commented below on safe procedures for the key issues and sub systems.
    1. The Rear Door. The rear door/stern ramp of a ferry or the MRV serves both as a watertight barrier and a ramp across which cargo may be loaded or unloaded. For a ferry, such operations are undertaken whilst the ship is berthed with the ramp accurately positioned onto a firmly secured pontoon. For the MRV, the rear door also acts as watertight barrier but for unloading or loading operations, in the absence of fixed shore facilities, it will be open while the ship is underway.
    2. The ship to shore transfer system requires the Landing Craft (Medium) (LCM) to lower its bow ramp on to the lowered rear door - forming a continuous roadway permitting cargo to be transferred from the MRV to the LCM while underway. There will be unpredictable dynamic movement of the two hulls dependant on the sea state and changes in the displacement of the LCM as it is progressively loaded.
    3. The loads on the MRV ramp are more variable than for a conventional ferry and there is also the risk of mishaps in aligning and positioning of the LCM ramp. While the strength of the rear door (ramp) was examined at an earlier stage, two concerns must be addressed before this system is used operationally – the loads that could be experienced on the MRV’s rear door during operations should be re-examined and accepted (including LCM berthing accidents) and the operational conditions and procedures under which the rear door may be open at sea must present risks that are ALARP – as low as reasonably practicable. We advise that operational procedure should be critically re-examined as the consequences of inadvertently flooding the cargo deck are potentially disastrous.
    4. The Ship to Shore Transfer System. Based on our observation of the ship to shore transfer system, it has yet to be demonstrated to be “a safe system”. Control of any lateral movement of the LCM, once suspended on the crane hook, is practically zero.
    5. The proximity of a swinging crane hook to the coxswain’s wheel house is potentially dangerous, as is manual engagement of lifting strops to the crane hook. During our observations of the transfer system, the MRV was at anchor and yawed significantly even in moderate winds, making alignment of the LCM and lowering of the rear door, virtually impossible. Transfer of loads could not be demonstrated. During re-hoisting, the LCM presented the same hazards and an LCM damaged its seating during re-embarkation.
    6. We doubt that it would possible to operate the current ship to shore transfer system much beyond sea state 2. Considerable limitations will need to apply for safe operation of the Ship to Shore Transfer system relative to the contract requirements. We also are aware that there are some outstanding issues on the certification of the LCM and some cracking of seam welds in the aluminium ramp.
    7. Sea Boats for Boarding. The provision of satisfactory sea boats together with their lowering and hoisting gear is a necessary condition for conducting boarding operations. We would expect this to be addressed as part of the Court of Inquiry’s recommendations (see para 7 e above).
    8. Aviation. The operation of helicopters has already been partially demonstrated but, the assessment of the operation of two helicopters simultaneously must await the planned First of Class Flying Trials. We note that the inability to track helicopters on radar at the required range and height is a warranty claim item.
    9. Gunnery and Ordnance Safety. For the primary armament, the magazine arrangements have been adequately addressed by the Naval Authorities and can therefore be considered safe, as has the stowage of ordnance in containers within the cargo space. We note the warranty claim on the alignment of the gun and the searchlight.
    10. Certification for operating in Global Seas. The Lloyd’s Register’s certification of the MRV is for unrestricted operations in Global Seas. Such certification is based on the understanding that the MRV does not operate in a particular sea area for a disproportionate amount of time, and that the vessel is operated in a prudent manner – minimising slamming loads, propeller emergence and the effects of green seas on the exposed equipments. Lloyd’s Register would need to provide advice to NZ MoD once the operating pattern for the ship has been established to ensure the Certification in Global Seas has not been compromised by the proposed operational profile. We do not believe this to be a serious issue.
    11. Additional Ballasting. The vertical accelerations experienced by the Ben my Chree following delivery were of such a magnitude that its owners located permanent ballast high up to raise the centre of gravity that in turn attenuates such motions. Similar action for HMNZS CANTERBURY would reduce vertical acceleration and improve crew comfort and the ability to operate helicopters in all sea states.
    12. For much of the ship’s operational time it will be “lightly loaded” i.e. the cargo load will be small. In such a configuration, the ship will experience more extreme motions in all sea states. Such conditions would be reduced if the ship were ballasted to the design draught. In this configuration the ship’s roll damping system should perform in a satisfactory manner – in the lightly loaded condition it is practically ineffective.
    13. Such changes are indirectly related to safety as they would improve the effectiveness of the ship’s company and the embarked civilian or military staff. For the RNZN, a more user-friendly ship is likely to be beneficial in view of its planned use for training.
    14. Replenishment at Sea. We understand that a safe operation to act as both a receiving and donor ship has yet to be demonstrated. The location of the fluid RAS point well aft will be challenging and require the development of appropriate procedures.

Recommendations:

Functionality

  1. The MRV’s functionality as required by the NZDF and other government agencies is detailed in the Functional and Performance Specification. HMNZS CANTERBURY was not contracted or built to the FPS, but to the Contract between MoD and Tenix. We had expected the NZDF to have conducted a formal review of actual performance against the FPS as opposed to compliance against the contract deliverables – but were advised this had not been undertaken. Theoretically, the contract should mirror the FPS but, as reported below, this is not always the case. In the absence of such a review, this task was undertaken under the direction of the Review Team by staff seconded from the NZDF. An edited version of the report is at Annex D. The compliance of the ship’s performance against the FPS (which should be regarded as preliminary) has been forwarded to AC Dev who should now see the process through to its formal conclusion.
    1. This report identified about 600 clauses containing a capability requirement for the MRV expressed as mandatory (shall) non-binding (should) or permissive (desirable). Of these about 71% of the functionality has been achieved, 9% partially achieved, about 10% not achieved, and 9% not yet demonstrated; the remainder do not have an identifiable deliverable.
    2. Of the 9% partially achieved some cannot yet be fully evaluated, others are none binding or permissive requirements, others will be resolved following installation of sea boats or resolution of warranty issues. The very small number of failing mandatory requirements is not judged to be significant (bar one) in the overall context of the MRV’s functional capability. The significant requirement that appears not to have been met is the strength of the accommodation ladder to permit a fully laden soldier to embark from the shore. It is not clear if this remains a current requirement or not.
    3. Of the 10% that have “not been achieved” practically all are covered by warranty claims, or should be achieved once the necessary changes detailed elsewhere in this review are completed (boat alcoves, sea boats and hoisting/lowering gear, machinery/changes etc).
    4. There are a few items where the functionality required by the FPS is also a deliverable under the contract but has not been delivered. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the project team has accepted a lesser capability as a contract deliverable. A huge number of contract deliverables associated with verification were accepted without the full rigour necessary just prior to formal acceptance. It is probable that some specific requirements may have been inadvertently overlooked in the run up to formal acceptance off contract.
    5. About 9% of the required functionality has yet to be demonstrated – largely due to warranty items not being resolved or HMNZS CANTERBURY not yet having undertaken sufficient operational proving. We would expect such functionality to be achieved.
    6. Compliance of contract deliverables should have ensured compliance with the FPS. However the acceptance of contract deliverables was prescribed by the verification and acceptance plan that defined the acceptance methodology to be adopted for each deliverable – some by analysis, others by testing. From an examination of this matrix, it is evident the vast majority of deliverables were finally agreed post acceptance. As previously mentioned, the Verification and Acceptance component of the project team was considerably over-stretched.
  2. Our overall view is that the functionality required by the NZDF has or will be achieved. HMNZS CANTERBURY will, following remedial work as outlined elsewhere, be able to discharge all her operational roles as required in the FPS. The ship will exhibit poor sea keeping qualities for ocean patrolling in the higher sea states but, over time, the RNZN should be able to develop practices and procedure to accommodate the sea keeping performance. Some of the deliverables required under the contract may never be delivered - and this will need to be resolved as part of the settlement of the warranty claim.

Recommendation:

  1. Ben my Chree is classified by Lloyd’s Register as +100A1, RORO Passenger Ship, , +LMS, UMS
  2. HMNZS Canterbury is classified to Lloyd’s Register as + 100A1, Ice Class 1C, IWS, +LMC, UMS
  3. Court of Inquiry into the loss of the Canterbury’s port RHIB on 10 July 2007
  4. Court of Inquiry into the death of AHSO Byron Solomon on 5 October 2007
  5. To veer or yaw dangerously so as to lie broadside to the waves. Broaching can capsize even a large ship.

Top | Previous | Next

Page contents Accessibility (list of Access Keys) Sitemap Homepage About us Defence Policy Acquisition Activities Reports & Publications Links Contact Us Search box New Zealand Government websites homepage