Reports and Publications

• Defence Capability and Resourcing Review (DCARR)
  • Contents
  • Executive Summary
  • PART 1 - Background
  • PART 2 - The Operating Environment
  • PART 3 - The Condition of the NZDF and Ministry of Defence
  • PART 4 - Capability Gaps, Funding Options and Implementation
  • PART 5 - Conclusions and Recommendations
  • Appendix 2: Distribution of Increased Appropriation in First Five Years

Final Report
Defence Capability and Resourcing Review (DCARR)

Contents | Previous | Next

PART 2 - The Operating Environment

1. The government’s Defence Policy is set out in a number of documents:
   1. the Defence Policy Framework, published in June 2000, which lays out the five defence policy objectives, and the eighteen required roles and tasks for the NZDF;
   2. the May 2001 government Defence Statement, A Modern, Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand’s Needs, which sets the direction to attaining a sustainable and affordable force structure to meet those roles and tasks; and
   3. the Defence Long-Term Development Plan (and subsequent revisions), which addresses the capital investment requirements necessary to achieve the government’s objectives.
2. The main components of the Defence Policy are:
   1. a joint approach to structure and operational orientation;
   2. a modernised Army with two motorised battalions, capable of deployment in smaller task forces, and a special forces capability;
   3. a practical Navy fleet matched to wider security needs;
   4. a refocused and updated Air Force; and
   5. a funding commitment to provide financial certainty.
3. The government has also endorsed structural reform, through the establishment of the Joint Forces Headquarters, decisions consequent on the Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and NZDF (RASA), and the establishment of the Capability Management Framework (CMF) to ensure effective oversight of investment decisions in defence capabilities.
4. The DCARR was required to establish the likely future tasking of the NZDF over the next ten years, in the context of the government’s existing strategic policy guidance. Tasking is not solely related to operational deployments – but relates also to the development and maintenance of a “force in being”, capable of undertaking a range of operations if required. The assessment of likely tasking involves both what will be performed and how much will be performed.
5. The nature of deployments has changed markedly in the last 15 years. Throughout the 1990s, the NZDF generally deployed small numbers of land forces to a range of missions, while sea and air forces have also conducted operations overseas. From the early 1990s to 1999, the level of commitment of personnel to operational deployments ranged between 2% and 6%, including deployments to Bougainville, and frigate deployments to the Multinational Interception Force. This low level of commitment helped to conceal the extent to which capability was declining.
6. Since 1999, the continuing strain on capability has become more evident as the level of deployment to peace support operations has ranged between 14-25% of the regular force, with the Army at times having deployed 35% of its regular force complement. Following on from large-scale (battalion) operations over a number of years in Timor Leste, the NZDF has continued to deploy significant numbers of land forces, albeit split over a number of locations, to peace support and humanitarian operations, and in support of the international campaign against terrorism which has been ongoing since late 2001. At the same time, sea and air forces have been deployed to multiple locations. In the future, there will be new ships, and upgraded aircraft, and the continued introduction to service of a range of new equipment for the Army, including new weapons and transport.
7. Over the last fifteen years, higher operating tempo, fiscal constraints and declining personnel numbers have slowly increased pressures on the NZDF. The outcome is that capability in some areas is below the requirements of government policy. It is a measure of the quality of the personnel of the NZDF and the Ministry of Defence that they have continued to achieve operational and policy successes despite those pressures. It is clear however that if current trends persist, the risk of operational failure will increase. The range of issues facing the NZDF is outlined in Part 3 of this report.
8. Over the coming years, the NZDF will be simultaneously involved in preparing force elements for deployment, undertaking operational deployments (sometimes at very short notice), and reconstituting force elements which have been deployed. Additionally, it will be developing new capability for some force elements, either through implementing government approved acquisitions on the LTDP, or through training and development of its personnel. It must also continue to manage itself as a corporate entity. In doing so, it will be drawing from a finite pool of resources, and therefore will need to maintain an appropriate balance of effort between the various tasking streams.
9. Government priorities will vary from time to time, having regard to New Zealand’s sovereign interests, treaty obligations, international relationships, and commitments to international institutions such as the UN. Typically, the government’s priorities will be influenced by the geographical location of the theatre of operations, and the size and immediacy of a perceived threat or benefit. In very general terms, priority is likely to correlate with proximity – the closer the threat, the higher the priority. It is also true that in general, the further away the deployment, the greater is the cost of deploying and sustaining the deployed forces.
10. The Government’s Defence Policy Framework established it’s primary defence interests as protecting New Zealand’s territorial sovereignty, meeting shared alliance commitments to Australia and fulfilling obligations and responsibilities in the South Pacific. The wider Asia Pacific strategic environment, of which we are a part, is also relevant.
11. A balance must also be achieved between the contingent benefits of maintaining forces on standby for local requirements, against the benefits of committing them to United Nations and other multinational operations. A significant long-term deployment overseas creates a risk of being unable to meet contingencies closer to home; on the other hand, maintaining forces in New Zealand limits the options available to meet broader foreign policy objectives.
12. In summary, DCARR notes that the NZDF should have the capacity to be able to conduct essential tasks in and about the South Pacific, to continue to be committed to a number of small scale military operations, and to be able to commit a larger force to medium intensity deployment(s) within the agreed response time.
13. Given the existing level of organisational stress that the DCARR investigation has revealed and that is reported in more detail in Part 3, there are significant challenges in managing an operational tempo while simultaneously reconstituting force elements that are below the required levels of capability and developing planned capability as set out in the LTDP. Those challenges must be met in the context of a tight labour market and ongoing fiscal restraint.
14. In Part 4 of this Report, options for managing the NZDF, and its future operational tempo, are set out, and related to the government’s fiscal strategy.

Top | Previous | Next