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• Comparative Highlights and Points of Note

Hunn Review: Annexes (30 September 2002)

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Annex D (continued)

Comparative Studies: Higher Defence Structures in Australia, United Kingdom, Canada and the United States

Political Oversight

67. The US Constitution establishes significant and powerful roles for the US Congress in national security and defence affairs. Congress (the Senate) is the only political body that can ratify treaties and Congress, not the President, is empowered to declare war. The Congress is also empowered to "raise and support Armies and provide and maintain a Navy, and to makes Rules of Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces". The Senate also has the authority to examine and approve (or not) the President's nominees for appointments within the Department of Defense.
68. These responsibilities and obligations are primarily exercised through the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. Professional staffs support each committee. For example, the House Armed Services Committee has a staff of 48 members, including 23 professionals and 5 legal counsels. In addition, Congress has two independent research agencies that it can task - the General Accounting Office, and the Congressional Research Service.
69. Congressional Committees primarily carry out their oversight functions through passage and negotiation of the annual defense authorisation bills. These bills cover the breadth of Departmental operations in minute input-oriented detail. While suiting the American democratic process, this process involves a level of micro-management by legislation that places significant impediments upon managerial efficiency, and continues to focus more on what is spent rather than what is delivered.
70. Congress has also influenced the formulation of defence policy and strategy in recent years through mandating the Quadrennial Defense Review process. Under this process, the President and the Secretary of Defense is required to provide every four years an assessment of defence policy and strategy, and the appropriateness of military capabilities that are being maintained and acquired to support that policy and strategy. Congress has instituted a National Defense Panel, drawn from independent experts, to assess the Department's self-review.
71. As in the UK and Australia, the US Secretary of Defense has also sought to facilitate other forms of public consultation and alternative policy advice to official sources of defence policy advice. An example is the Hart- Rudman Commission set up by Secretary Cohen in 1998 as a Federal Advisory Committee tasked to (a) conduct a comprehensive review of the early 21 st global security environment; (b) develop a comprehensive overview of American strategic interests and objectives; (c) delineate a national security strategy appropriate for that environment and the nation's character; (d) identify a range of alternatives to implement the national security strategy; and (e) develop a detailed plan to implement the range of alternatives proposed.
72. Despite the significant differences in resourcing levels, size, and resourcing and management models, the US defence system has a number of positive and informative lessons for New Zealand:
    • a continuous trend over the last fifty years to achieve an integrated Department of Defense structure that concentrates responsibilities and authority under a single political head -the Secretary of Defense (equivalent to the New Zealand Minister of Defence);
    • a continuous trend to achieve greater integration of civil and military staffs, the latest efforts being made by Secretary Rumsfeld to reduce vertical silos in the Departments of the Navy, Army and Air Force between military staffs and the civilian Secretariats;
    • the use of a higher, political and officials-level integrative multi-agency structure -the National Security Council -to bring together key national- level decision-makers to consider and provide co-ordinated political direction on matters of national security and foreign policy, in both a proactive strategy-making process, and in response to security crises and emergencies;
    • the development of cascading strategies and policies for each Government department and agency involved in national security, flowing from the National Security Strategy of the US, for example, to the National Military Strategy for the US Department of Defense;
    • the evolution by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of joint doctrine and operations 'visioning' documents to complement employment scenarios as key inputs into processes for formulating strategic policy and strategy, and assessing and selecting required capabilities, force structures and military equipment;
    • the development of an empowered Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an effective joint staff structure; focused on developing joint perspectives and concepts; and, the re-alignment of work practices and structures in the Military Departments to conform with joint-oriented structures and work practices;
    • a strong focus on rigorous, qualitative and quantitative analytical processes to support business cases for force modernisation, and robust and diverse capabilities for environmental scanning, and analysis;
    • the separation of responsibilities, command authorities, resource delegations and assets between "strategic national" (with the Service Chiefs of Staff raise, train and sustain functions, in the Military Departments), and "strategic theatre" (with the combatant commanders)
    • highly refined and interactive information relationships between the Department of Defense and the Congress; and
    • embedded public consultation and public debate processes through independently and federally-funded research institutions and panels and groups to provide policy advice alternatives.

Comparative Highlights and Points of Note

73. Relating the above comparative discussion to the Review Terms of Reference, the following observations can be made.

74. In comparison with his Australian, UK, Canadian and US counterparts, the New Zealand Minister is less well supported. In comparative countries, Ministers of Defence (or their equivalent) are part of a clearly- mandated Cabinet-level National Security Committee structure to consider political, foreign policy, economic and trade objectives and supply high level 'whole of government' political guidance on security and defence objectives. Subordinate Ministers with specialist defence portfolios support most overseas Ministers. Australian, UK and Canadian Defence Ministers particularly also have the advantage of a fully integrated stream of advice coming to them that incorporates the points of view of all the Services and other agencies within Defence. In New Zealand, by contrast, the Minister can be, and often is, presented with multiple points of view that he then has to reconcile, with very little support.

75. The Australian, UK, Canadian and US higher defence structures are designed to bring together the different points of view within the various parts of Defence and present the Government with options that represent the considered advice of all the participants. Integration of that advice takes place at all steps in the chain rather than just at the top, where in the New Zealand case, an unsupported the Minister is often not well supported to consider the technical merits of different advice streams.

76. In all four of the overseas examples studied, the approach taken has been to move to fully integrated structures where the advice of single Service representatives and joint staff advice and civilian officials is integrated into a single vision of what needs to be done. In none of the examples studied are Departmental-level separate streams of advice to the political authorities encouraged.
77. A comparison of current wiring diagrams for New Zealand vis a vis Australia, the UK, Canada and the US shows a broad convergence amongst our overseas partners towards a model that brings military and civilian staffs together to work collegially on issues. The details differ, with Canada, for example, showing the least integrated structure (after New Zealand) and the UK perhaps furthest down the path to a seamlessly integrated organisational structure.
78. In Australia, the overall philosophy guiding their structure is that irrespective of the actual detail, the main aim must be to arrive at a structure in which the different experiences and skill sets in the civilian analytical community are brought to bear in a manner that complements and augments the operational experience and knowledge of military officers.

79. The key point to note is that in all the countries studied, the trend is towards increasingly unified civilian and military staff structures. Even as far back as 1990, in setting up a separate civilian and military structure, New Zealand was moving against the trend elsewhere.

80. The creation of a separate Joint Forces Headquarters in New Zealand is fully consistent with overseas practice. It is very clear that New Zealand's overseas peers have moved significantly over the last fifteen years to establish a wide range of joint organisations and supporting management practices for joint doctrine, culture, and leadership. From this perspective, the HQ JF is a strong beginning, but only a beginning nonetheless.

81. Each of New Zealand's international peers offers innovations and successful model components that could be incorporated into options for improved structural arrangements and accountabilities for New Zealand higher defence structures. No one particular model offers a complete paradigm. For example, while the US model because of its size, scope and resourcing levels supports a number of inefficiencies and duplication that cannot be sustained in New Zealand. At the same time, there are many components of the guiding philosophy of the US model that have direct relevance to options for future New Zealand higher defence structures. To a much greater degree, the Australian and UK models both offer a vision of what can be accomplished by fully integrated, civilian and military, joint defence organisations and higher national security structures.

82. In the countries examined, each had a wide variety of alternative sources of advice, opinion and information on defence and security matters. Equally, each had a number of tertiary level research and teaching institutions that specialise in educating both the next generation of scholars and researchers on defence and security matters, and the next generation of defence officials and military officers. For example, in the United States, in Washington DC alone, there are over 100 research "think tanks" working on defence and security issues. Furthermore, in each peer country, the Defence Organisation directly funds a number of tertiary level public and semi-private research organisations to carry out independent research on issues ranging from highly technical and specific defence management matters through to alternative security futures analyses. For example, the Australian Government has most recently established an Australian Strategic Policy Institute to provide a source of high quality alternative advice to the Government.
83. These sources of advice serve to provide both alternative avenues of information for members of the political community, and also enrich and support the policy and staff work of the defence organisations in each country.
84. Similarly in each country, greater resources are devoted to knowledge gathering initiatives in the political community -with staffs supporting the research efforts of the US Congress's or the UK or Australian Parliamentary Committees. Furthermore, senior politicians in these peer countries are similarly supported by professional staffs to provide analysis of the variety of advice, particularly from extra-departmental sources that is being brought forward.
85. In the broader public policy advice arena in the New Zealand, the avenues for obtaining high quality policy advice outside government are very limited. Few universities providing high quality, demanding educational and research programmes on defence and security affairs. This significantly reduces the future pool of talented persons qualified for Departmental positions. It limits the pool of similar persons qualified to act as specialist staffs to the Parliament's Select Committee. Furthermore, it limits the amount of competent, value-added research that is being undertaken on New Zealand defence and security matters.
86. New Zealand's peers clearly place significant importance (as demonstrated by diversity of sources and resourcing levels) to encouraging and supporting robust and diverse capabilities outside government. The degree of diversity ensures avoidance of institutional capture or offsets eccentricities that can flow from the encouragement of anyone source of advice.

87. Each of the models studied maintained significant levels of staff support for Parliamentary/Congressional committees. For example, the UK Defence Select Committee, which handles Defence only (i.e. not Foreign Affairs and Trade also) has 5 permanent staff and several specialist advisers retained on a contracted basis to assist it in the conduct of its oversight work. The Australian Parliamentary Research Committee also has several permanent staff members available to it to assist Select Committee members in their enquiries. Each US Congressional Committee has a staff of upwards of 40 personnel. Moreover, in each of these international peers, the relevant defence organisations also maintain staff positions that are focused on liaising with and meeting the information needs of the Parliamentary/Congressional Committees.
88. In light of this international experience, the best and most effective way to strengthen the New Zealand Select Committee would appear to be to provide additional staff support to it to enable the development of an independent, in-depth, analytical, research and technical capability. While consulting expertise can be purchased for specific topics, international experience suggests that the Select Committee needs a permanent expert staff capability of its own.

89. Of the countries studied here Canada in the past went the furthest in seeking to eliminate competition between the Services by creating a unified Canadian Force. While this experiment generated a number of efficiencies, it produced a number of less than satisfactory results, leading to a re- establishment of the single Services and their unique value-added cultures and expertise.
90. Other countries have learnt much from the Canadian experience, including moving towards jointness rather than unification approaches. New Zealand's other peers have worked consistently and with determination to foster jointness, establish an over-riding shared and common vision, and strengthen the underlying policy processes so that the individual services have increased confidence in the robustness and fairness of the various outcomes. Initiatives have included amalgamating educational experiences for military personnel from all Services at the technical, professional and staff and command levels, joint and integrated staff structures at strategic and operational levels of their defence organisations, the design and implementation of joint force capabilities and packages; capability-based, rather than equipment-based force development and planning processes; a strong focus on writing and promulgating joint doctrine publications; the development and promulgation of joint vision statements.

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