Reports and Publications

• Hunn Review
  • Contents
  • Executive Summary
  • Chapter 1
  • Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3
  • Chapter 4
  • Chapter 5
  • Chapter 6
  • Chapter 7
  • Chapter 8

Within this section

• Areas of Agreement
• Areas of Disagreement
• Summary of Submissions

Hunn Review: 30 September 2002

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Chapter 4

Summary of submissions made to the review

1. In both written and oral submissions made to the review, there was a wide area of agreement both in terms of the nature of the problems confronting the Defence Organisation, and the possible solutions. For example, there was a broad consensus that current structures in defence are not working, and that separation has failed to deliver the key objectives sought in the 1990 reforms. There is also agreement that the most practical solution to current problems lies in structural reform. Views differ on how far structural reform, including integration of civilian and military staffs, can be pressed within the current legislative framework. While it appears that most of what needs to be done in the short term can be initiated without running into conflict with the legislation, the advice of some is that legislative reform would be desirable if the Government wishes to make its intentions clear, and bring the legislation governing the defence organisations into line with its policy and practice intentions.

Areas of Agreement

2. The main issues around which there was a convergence of view are summarised below.

Nature of the Problem

3. There is a general view, echoing that of the Select Committee, that current structural and accountability arrangements are not working well. Organisational separation, and its associated separation of responsibilities and accountabilities while contributing to some key objectives of the 1990s reforms, has failed particularly to deliver on the provision of contestable defence policy advice. The arrangements have reinforced existing organisational "stovepipes" and created artificial new ones that have handicapped effective management of the defence function and reduced responsiveness to Government's needs and expectations.
4. The Defence Act 1990 is seen by most observers as a key part of the problem. The Act fragments into two parts an organisation that needs to be responsible for one set of outcomes. Structures are at odds with the processes required to deliver high quality defence policy, purchase and operational decisions. The Act also reinforces pre-existing structural divisions between the three Services that, even in 1990, were being recognized by partner defence establishments as impediments to trust and effectiveness¹.
5. There is a consensus that to address the structural problem, strategic level change is required in accountability and structural arrangements between the MoD and the NZDF, and within the NZDF itself.

Governance Arrangements

6. A number of submissions considered that current governance arrangements and structures need to be comprehensively overhauled. The case for creating a Cabinet-level National Security Committee to provide comprehensive national security policy guidance and direction is overdue. It is anomalous that of all the countries examined, New Zealand does not have a senior standing or permanent committee of Ministers to address security, defence and foreign policy issues from a whole of government perspective. Current structures are seen as unduly limited and crisis-oriented. There is a need for national security governance structures at both Ministerial and senior officials' level that can manage New Zealand's external interests more pro actively on a continuous basis.

Structural Requirements

7. There is broad agreement that at the departmental level the requirement is for integrated, high quality, independent advice from a single civilian and military staff working to whole of Government outcomes rather than segregated advice from two staffs (or five, on some issues) with different visions and, potentially, divergent leadership goals.
8. At the heart of any such arrangement there needs to be a strong, highly competent, strategic-level civilian/military staff agency responsible for long range strategic, capability and resource planning as well as for support services.

Underlying Attributes

9. There is also wide agreement that making relationships work at the top of Defence is critically dependent upon a clear defence strategy, agreed common purposes, mutual respect and trust between military and civilian staffs and clear role definitions. Transparency of information across the Defence-wide organisation was also identified as a key requirement, both as between the MoD and the NZDF and between the NZDF and the single Services. The need to continue fostering a joint and shared approach wherever possible was also identified as a key ingredient.

Need To Remove The Distinction Between Civilian And Military Advice

10. The need to move towards a joint, fully integrated, organisational structure at the highest level, implies a requirement to develop a more sophisticated view of the nature of policy making in defence. There is a need to draw clearer distinctions between what makes up defence policy and strategy on the one hand, and defence management and operational policies on the other. It was widely agreed at the same time, that no clear or useful distinction should be made between the terms "civilian" and "military" advice. The attempt to draw such distinctions should be dropped. Because of the different professional competencies that each brings, it is not inappropriate to continue to refer to CDF as the Minister's Principal Military Adviser (because this distinguishes him from other military advisers), and the Secretary as the Principal Civilian Adviser (because this distinguishes him from other Public Service advisers). Their advice, however, should not be circumscribed by labels that defy definition and lead to constant boundary riding.

Supporting processes

11. Submissions recognised an urgent need for a defence planning system that reflects agreed processes. These processes need to be facilitated by appropriate management and organizational structures. Structures should reflect these processes. In process-oriented organisations, rigid divisions between 'policy' and 'implementation' are unsuitable.

The Role Of Information Flows Within The Current Organizational Structure

12. The importance of encouraging better information flows throughout the Defence Organisation was stressed. A number of observers² noted that the policy work of the Ministry could only be as good as the information from which it is drawn and there are difficulties in accessing information from the NZDF that is critical to effective defence policy advice. However, this information block is not seen as being one way or even simply as an external problem. Other observers drew attention to the NZDF's difficulty on occasions of accessing critical information from the Ministry, while the CDF commented on the reluctance of the single Services to provide information he needs. Each organisation must take responsibility for developing and maintaining, to a high standard, their particular corpus of information. Many submissions noted that each organisation is not an island, both requiring access to critical pieces of information from each other in order to deliver their respective outputs.
13. A number of submissions were of the view that as long as they continue as separate organizations, the MoD and NZDF need equivalent institutional powers to access information essential to the performance of their functions. This is not the case in current legislation, a fact that is remarked on as a key issue in Annex F. It was also noted by submissions that information flows are constrained by the size and scale of information technology requirements of each organisation that have impeded the development of effective technical support.

Reform Of Committee Structures

14. Within Defence, existing committee structures need to be overhauled. There was general agreement that the role and functioning of the Office of the Chief Executives needs to be rethought, as does the role and composition of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. (Over the past few years, the latter has been virtually dysfunctional -a situation which is now being rectified).

Incentive structures within Defence

15. A number of submissions to the review have drawn attention to the need to rethink incentive structures. Performance evaluation should be aligned to integrated civilian and military structures, and driven from the centre rather than from the Single Services. Officers serving in the joint environment need to be assessed and evaluated against joint requirements. The underlying requirement is to design incentive structures that lead to goal congruence between the various staffs in defence. There was widespread agreement that senior level appointments (i.e. in both the MoD and the NZDF) need to be consulted on and agreed more widely.

Recognising And Fostering Key Inter-Relationships

16. There was wide agreement that there needs to be closer, more symbiotic, relationships between policy, development, resource planning and acquisition staffs. The case for bringing together and fully integrating defence policy, planning and resource management staffs, force development (including war-gaming and operational analysis research staffs) and acquisition staffs, needs to be examined and acted upon.

Quality Advice to Ministers

17. A number of submissions drew attention to issues that affect the ability of the Minister to make sound decisions. The Minister's practical exercise of his functions depends on his knowing what the key issues are, especially in the policy and purchase area. There must also be a balance of well informed opinions available to the Minister when he makes recommendations to his colleagues concerning the deployment of New Zealand forces overseas, defence diplomacy initiatives or capital investment in defence capabilities. Submissions recognised that weaknesses particularly in MoD staff experience and knowledge, fragmented advice, and shortcomings in the MoD's ability to access required information would be reflected in the Minister's ability to perform effectively. Other issues identified as impacting on the Minister's ability were: a need by the Government to demonstrate greater trust and confidence in its key advisors; and, the need for the Minister to satisfy himself that he has been able to traverse all policy options before Government decisions are made.

Strategic Capacity Issues

18. A number of submissions raised matters that concerned the shortcomings and difficulties in maintaining and enhancing the overall strategic capacity of both organisations (size of staffs to handle workloads, and depth of staff expertise, experience, qualifications, knowledge and competencies for their duties). These included: high rates of staff turnover in both organisations, difficulties in building up specialist policy, analytical and management competencies in the MoD, and the provision of effective and appropriate educational experiences and career development opportunities for staffs.

Need for Greater Jointness in the Defence Force

19. A number of submissions, and other papers such as the Controller and Auditor General's Report and the Ansell-White Inquiry identified a range of dysfunctional relationships within the Defence Force. There was a high level of agreement that such relationships could be significantly improved by greater emphasis on jointness (i.e., the integrated results that can be achieved by combinations of personnel and forces from maritime, air and land force backgrounds) at the strategic as well as the operational level of the Defence Force. In this regard, submissions recommended: a greater joint emphasis in training; strengthening promotion criteria for senior staff to include joint experience as a prerequisite; a joint approach to senior officer career planning and promotion; the amalgamation of the existing single Service Colleges and Institutes into a Joint Defence College with a joint professional military education scheme; development of joint doctrine and giving the Chiefs of Staff joint duties in addition to their single Service responsibilities.

The Role Of Core Values And Attitudes

20. Supporting all of the above, many submissions saw a need to redefine and embed a new set of core values and attitudes within Defence. In effect, what is sought is a comprehensive shift in the existing culture and attitudes within Defence towards those required in a joint and fully integrated civilian and military organisation.

Areas of Disagreement

21. Areas where views diverged were more restricted in number. They included a current organizational capacity issue; CDF's command arrangements vis-a-vis the Service Chiefs, including their right of access to the Minister; a range of structural and governance issues; and, how best to make progress on design and implementation of the Defence Planning System.

Capacity Issues

22. The core issue is that external observers do not support the Ministry's view of its performance. The MoD believes that its policy work is carried out to a good standard. This assessment is not supported in submissions to the review, either by external stakeholders (e.g. the State Services Commission) or from senior stakeholders within the Defence Organisation itself. A range of reasons has been identified for the difficulties the Ministry has experienced (some of them by the Ministry itself). These include problems experienced with accessing the full range of operational information needed to inform policy development; retaining and building greater expertise and experience amongst the relevant staffs; and, building appropriate levels of trust and confidence amongst key stakeholders, including at the political level.

Command Arrangements

23. CDF's command arrangements vis-a-vis the single Service Chiefs were raised by a number of submissions. While the great majority drew attention to what they saw as an anomalous arrangement whereby the CDF, in terms of the 1990 Defence Act, is required to command the NZDF through the Chiefs rather than directly, one or two submissions thought that there might be advantage (e.g. in terms of greater contestability) in continuing to dilute the authority of the CDF in this way. Most observers however saw this arrangement as one of the chief contributing causes to the dysfunctionality in Defence, characterised by lack of trust; confusion over who is in charge; uncertainty about what the overall vision for Defence is; and, difficulty in deciding who can be held accountable for what.
24. A related issue is the question of the retention, or not, of separate access to the Minister by the Service Chiefs. Some submissions saw the existing right of separate access as an outdated provision in the Act, being both unnecessary in practice and harmful to the authority of the CDF.

Structural And Governance Issues

25. Some submissions saw strong advantage in recombining the two Defence Organisations into a single Department of Defence while others favoured retention of two separate entities, but with new structural, governance and incentive mechanisms. A difficulty with the single Department of Defence model is the issue of who should head such an organisation: the Secretary or the CDF? Most submissions felt that the time had not yet arrived for an organizational model based on a single chief executive. The focus therefore was on improvements that might be made to current structures along the lines of greater staff integration, revised committee structures and new incentive mechanisms. The logic of the position of those who saw the need for a single organisation but not a single Chief Executive, was that some form of joint leadership would be required (bearing in mind that only the CDF can have the operational command responsibilities).
26. One governance issue that received some support was the proposal that the current Office of the Chief Executives (OCE) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) should be overhauled and augmented by a Defence Board modelled along private sector lines. The suggestion was that the Minister could chair such a board, with membership made up of the Secretary and the CDF plus directors chosen from the private sector to provide some assurance that NZDF/MoD management practices followed best practice. Chiefs of Staff and the Chief Financial Officer could be ex officio members, and the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Treasury and PM&C invited to attend the Board for discussions on policy Issues.
27. Others thought that unless accountability issues were carefully addressed, and the roles and responsibilities of Board members carefully defined, there might be a risk that such a board could end up blurring the accountability of the Secretary and the CDF.

Defence Planning System

28. While there was a wide level of agreement that two Defence Chief Executives need the support of an effective defence Planning System, there was disagreement on what such a system should look like. One submission argued that the defence planning system should have simple, easy to understand processes and be capable of being written down in one diagram on a single piece of paper. Others noted that as Defence was an intrinsically complicated business it was natural to expect that any planning system that accurately mirrored it would also be complex.

Summary of Submissions

32. The conclusions, which emerge from my overall analysis of the submissions, are as follows:
    • important aspects of the separation of the defence agencies into defence policy (civilian) and operations (military) on which the 1990 Act is based, have not worked; key functions that require both civilian and military inputs were artificially separated;
    • strategic level change is needed in accountability and structural arrangements between the MoD and the NZDF, and within the NZDF;
    • overhaul of the 1990 Defence Act is not essential to make substantive progress but would be desirable, both as a means of clarifying the Government's intentions and to confirm the overall direction of reform;
    • pending either amendment to or revision of the Act, structural reforms could proceed on the basis of Ministerial direction (the strongly held consensus is that action is required urgently);
    • governance arrangements and structures need to be comprehensively overhauled;
    • there is a need for a Cabinet-level National Security Committee to be established to provide national security policy guidance and direction - this Cabinet Committee should be serviced by a broadly based Committee of Senior Officials;
    • there is a need to create within Defence a fully integrated, civilian and military staff agency to take responsibility for strategic-level policy" strategy, commitments, capability and resource issues;
    • clearer distinctions are needed between what makes up defence policy, on the one hand, and defence management and operational policy; at the same time, unhelpful and artificial distinctions between "civilian" and "military" policy advice should be dropped;
    • a change in culture and attitudes within the defence organizations is required: civilian and military staffs are not interchangeable; each bring distinctive skills and experiences to the Defence function, which need to be respected and recognized; at the same time structures and incentives must be designed to ensure both professional streams work closely and harmoniously together;
    • transparency of information is a key attribute of all high performing organisations: in order to facilitate good working relationships between the MoD and the NZDF, and between the NZDF and the single Services, Defence needs to address urgently the requirement to build a fully integrated, seamless, management information system throughout the entire Defence Organisation;
    • senior level committee structures within the defence organisation need to be overhauled: there is a need for a new senior level committee or management board to bring together and act on advice from an integrated, joint, staff agency;
    • current moves towards increasing jointness need to be encouraged: issues identified as needing attention include the development of joint doctrine; the integration of force development, war gaming and operational research staffs to encourage a joint approach to capability development; and, the integration of existing single Service military educational training institutions into a Joint Defence College;
    • incentive structures need to be reworked to reflect the move towards a joint and integrated approach; senior level appointments in the MoD, the NZDF and the single Services need to be made in consultation between the Secretary, the Chief of Defence Force and the Service Chiefs;
    • CDF's command authority over the Service Chiefs needs to be strengthened; and,
    • disagreements between the MoD and the NZDF over architecture and design issues in respect of the defence planning system need to be resolved and action taken to implement fully an upgraded system.

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1. It is noteworthy that in a 1997 Canadian study of authority and accountability arrangements in the defence establishments of Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the then Federal Republic of Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, the authors concluded that in all cases studied (except New Zealand) the benefits of close interaction, and even organizational integration, between military and civilian staffs were seen to have 'outweighed any potential difficulties with who is accountable for what.'
2. See Annex F. Professor Matthew Palmer, Director, New Zealand Centre for Public Law, observes that it is particularly noticeable that in the current Act, the Ministry exercising policy and purchase responsibilities has 'few powers to extract information from the operational military organisation of the New Zealand Defence Force'.

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