Reports and Publications

• Hunn Review
  • Contents
  • Executive Summary
  • Chapter 1
  • Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3
  • Chapter 4
  • Chapter 5
  • Chapter 6
  • Chapter 7
  • Chapter 8

Within this section

• Requirement for Change
• Management of Change
• Initial Practical Steps

Hunn Review: 30 September 2002

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Chapter 8

Change management

Requirement for Change

1. As I have noted in the preceding chapters, in order to achieve the objectives of this review, current defence structures and arrangements require major transformation. Such organisational transformation is neither simple, nor resource-neutral. It is inevitable that significant changes of this kind will encounter institutional resistance. This may seem at odds with my finding that across the Defence Organisations, and in a number of submissions, there is general recognition that such change is required.
2. It may also seem at odds with the new senior appointments made earlier this year, which were intended to herald a fresh start. However, as I have observed elsewhere in this review, it would be unwise to rely on individual appointees to overcome ineffective and costly structures, processes and governance systems. Leaders on their own can only be one part of an effective solution. Inevitably, new leaders will replace those currently in the Defence Organisation. A new combination of personalities may not be as congenial as the present one appears to be, and systems whose fundamental flaws have not been remedied, could again become the means for dysfunctionality and ineffectiveness.
3. It remains the case also that there is reluctance in some quarters to contemplate the scale of change needed to achieve the improvements in performance that will meet Government's expectations. I recognise the Defence Organisation has been working to improve its practices, processes and working arrangements and that a number of practical measures have been initiated. From my perspective, however, these are limited in both scope and effect, and do not address in a comprehensive and interconnected manner the four change areas - processes, responsibilities, governance systems, and organisational structures. In terms of meaningful progress, they are only signs of good intentions, not the real thing.
4. I suspect also there are those who would like to "pick and choose" from among the reforms proposed in the previous chapter. Only those parts of proposals that do not fundamentally affect the status quo, or the "status quo plus" that exists in the Defence Organisations today, are likely to be supported. Those that are uncomfortable, require critical changes of authority and responsibility, and commitment of resources to achieve, will encounter the usual bevy of reasons why they cannot be actioned. Proposals will be challenged because they will require the allocation of staff resources that might have been committed to other important work. They could be rejected as likely to generate a high level of staff turbulence. While to be expected, such reasons for avoiding change are not sound. Short term considerations should not be permitted to stand in the way of actions - whether they be those I have suggested or others equally fundamental - which will cut to the heart of the current problems within our defence system.
5. The experience of similar change processes in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States has shown that initiatives to create integrated joint defence organisations are routinely resisted by powerful actors - be they civilian or military - within those organisations. For example, in dealing with joint reforms, General David C. Jones, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1978-82 tellingly commented: "When my first term as Chairman began, I had great hopes that internally we chiefs could reform the system...At the end of my first two years as Chairman, I became convinced that Admiral Mahan, the guru of naval strategy at the turn of the century was right when he said that no military service could reorganize itself The pressure had to come from the outside. These words pertain even more to a joint organization. I hasten to add that I did not consider my colleagues to be negative or parochial. A chief is first the chief of his service. History has shown that a chief who does not fight tooth and nail for his own service may soon lose his effectiveness."¹ Given the entrenched nature of this opposition, it was accepted in the United States that the inability of the defence organisation to transform itself required legislative change - the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
6. For my part, I do not suggest that new defence legislation is the only way forward. The change process can commence within the framework of the present Act. At a certain point, let us say 12 months after the reforms have been launched, Ministers could reassess the situation and decide whether amended legislation is needed either to reinforce the higher levels of jointness and co-operation achieved at that stage or to put in place new statutory frameworks should satisfactory progress not have been made. As I have noted at a number of points in this review, my own assessment is that new legislation will be required, whether now or at a later date, if the stated objective is to be attained.

Management of Change

7. Once this report, and its accompanying material has been referred to the Government's advisers for comment, I would see the development of a Cabinet paper or series of papers, to provide the basis for substantial change to the current system and structure. I suggest that a proactive management approach to make these changes should include the following elements:
   • a Ministerial Oversight Committee chaired by the Minister of Defence;
   • a high-level steering group of senior officials chaired by the Head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and including the CEs for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Treasury, and the Chief of the Defence Force;
   • a dedicated task force headed by two senior defence executives - one from the Ministry of Defence and one from the NZDF - who should report to the high-level steering group; the task force should also include representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Treasury;
   • a fixed time period for completion of the initial components of reform of no less than six months and no longer than a year (assuming that at that point a further Cabinet decision would be made on the question of legislative revision);
   • a review mechanism whereby the State Services Commission evaluated progress at six monthly intervals.²

Initial Practical Steps

8. I am aware that some time could elapse between now and when a task force could start work on implementing major change. This time should not be wasted. Following the lead of the current Defence CEs who have already initiated some enhancements, the submissions made to this review identified a number of practical and comparatively straight forward actions that are consistent with the overall transformation concept outlined in the preceding chapter. Such measures do not represent the substantive body of reform that is required of New Zealand's defence system, but they could lead into and support the change process. It is suggested therefore that the current defence organisations could take early action on the following:
   • formalise consultative relationships between all agencies involved in defence and national security matters;
   • set up regular meetings between the Minister, the Secretary of Defence, the CDF, the Joint Forces Commander and the three Service Chiefs;
   • introduce an annual Ministerial Directive to both the Secretary and the CDF setting out the Government's objectives for, and expectations of, defence strategic management;
   • eliminate distinctions between civilian and military advice so that both CDF and the Secretary may offer any advice to the Minister they consider professionally necessary;
   • co-locate the current five senior military and civilian officials of the HQ NZDF and Ministry in adjoining offices;
   • establish procedures for the Secretary to participate in senior military appointments and for the CDF in senior civilian appointments;
   • assess the potential for allocating organisation-wide responsibilities to the Chiefs of Staff in addition to their redefined responsibilities as professional leaders of their Services;
   • define the circumstances in which individual Chiefs of Staff might seek to consult with the Minister, and the procedures to be followed in requesting consultation;
   • establish the committees and workgroups suggested in this review, to cover the main responsibilities of both the NZDF and MOD, on which there should be full military and civilian representation;
   • develop, adopt and disseminate widely a shared organisation vision statement and strategy for the Defence Organisation that incorporates the responsibilities and goals of both the NZDF and the MoD;
   • develop similarly a long-term joint vision of the future capabilities of the NZDF in a form that is readily understandable by military personnel and civilian staffs of the Defence Organisation;
   • develop a top-level joint doctrine for the NZDF that defines a joint philosophy of how the NZDF's components will work together or with strategic partners on future operations, and a set of values, behaviours and working practices at a11levels of the NZDF;
   • complete the defence planning system project - with new terms of reference to co-ordinate system design, development and support with any implementation of the major organisational changes recommended in Chapter 7 of this review - within three months of the Government's decisions on this report;
   • expand current moves to ensure greater harmonisation between defence policy and capability development decisions on the one hand and acquisition processes on the other, and closer customer/client involvement in those processes, in line with the over-arching concepts of a new Defence Planning System;
   • implement immediately measures to improve communications and information flows between MoD and NZDF, including introducing or expanding exchanges of staff between the two agencies, and between the two organisations and other agencies;
   • review the entry-level skill requirements of civilian staff and their subsequent personal development programmes to ensure improved knowledge and understanding of the defence function and its policy framework, the conduct of military operations, and the systems and management processes of the NZDF;
   • re-designate the RNZAF Command and Staff College as the Defence Command and Staff College, further develop a joint curriculum, and an increased and more balanced participation of potential senior military officers and senior civilian officials in the College;
   • examine the potential for integrating existing single Service military educational institutions and schemes into a Joint Defence College;
   • recognise service in Wellington-based and joint strategic staff-level appointments as career-enhancing and valued by all parts of the NZDF by introducing into military and civilian career management policies, a requirement for successful completion of such an appointment for promotion above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (and equivalents);
   • develop a funded strategy for assuring Ministers of contestable advice from sources other than the NZDF and MoD on defence policy, value for money in defence expenditure and performance evaluation.

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1. David C. Jones, "Reform: The Beginnings" in Dennis J. Quinn, (Ed.), The Goldwater- Nichols DOD Reorganisation Act - A Ten-Year Retrospective (Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1999), pp. 4-5.
2. I would note here that I do not think these evaluation arrangements should be as complex or time consuming as they were in the early 1990s. A simple process of establishing progress against the Government's prime objectives would be all that was necessary.

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