Reports and Publications

Within this section

Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP)
(June 2003 Update)

Contents | Previous | Next

Projects Necessary to Provide a Well-Equipped Land Force

Land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)

Description

  1. This project proposes to equip the Army with an improved land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capability.

Policy Value

  1. An improved land ISR capability provides land forces with the ability to detect threats at greater distances and with greater certainty. An improved land ISR capability is an important element in operations where land forces face a demanding threat environment and need to know what is happening around them.

Capability Gap

  1. Land forces require integral capabilities to identify personnel and vehicles, both static and moving. Current ISR capabilities are limited to foot, vehicle and motorcycle patrols and include night vision and some ground sensors. A significantly larger area, up to 100 by 60 square kilometres, will need to be observed when the LAV is introduced into service.

Links to other Capabilities

  1. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Special Operations Capability
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • P-3 Mission Systems Upgrade
    • NZDF Helicopter Capability

Timing

  1. A land ISR capability has linkages to a number of projects including the introduction of the LAV into service, which will start in 2004. Timing of the introduction of land ISR into service will be calibrated with these projects.

Current Status

  1. Further studies are required to assess joint contributions to land ISR needs, assess the best mix and numbers of sensors and review personnel issues.

Costs

  1. This project is expected to cost $25 million - $52 million.

Army Tactical Trunk Communications

Description

  1. This project proposes to replace and/or upgrade existing Army short-range communications systems to provide a high bandwidth (high capacity) digital theatre communication system to support command and control requirements of the NZDF Battalion Group operations.

Policy Value

  1. The Army Tactical Trunk Communications system will provide an enhanced capability to exercise command and control over an NZDF battalion group, as well as communicate with allied forces. It forms an important component of any battalion group deployment, particularly in peace enforcement operations where good command, control and communications enhance the safety and effectiveness of land forces.

Capability Gap

  1. Current Army tactical trunk communications systems are voice oriented, technologically old, and are comprised of ad hoc and short-term systems. This limits the Army’s ability to exchange information between deployed Army sub-units. An upgraded system would provide short-range communications that interface between medium/long range communications and the tactical units. This system needs to be military specification equipment.

Links to other Capabilities

  1. The Army tactical trunk communications system will need to be interoperable with other NZDF communications systems, particularly the JCCS and the Joint Modernisation Communications.

Timing and Current Status

  1. This capability needs to be implemented following the outcome of the JCCS project definition study and on completion of a separate study to determine the work required to achieve an integrated communications infrastructure.

Costs

  1. This project is expected to cost up to $10 million.

Combat Service Support Vehicles

Description

  1. This project has two parts:
    • Additional combat service support trucks, to provide support to the LAV. LAV support vehicles include fuel, water and bulk-handling equipment (moving containers/pallets over rough terrain).
    • Later in the decade, a replacement for the Unimog general service trucks that provide service, maintenance and sustainability to the motorised battalions, specifically LAV and LOV logistic support.

Policy Value

  1. Combat service support vehicles are a critical enabler for LAV motorised operations. They sustain and resupply the LAVs with fuel, personnel and spares and provide maintenance support. Their utility in meeting policy objectives is in peace support operations in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.

Capability Gap

  1. The introduction of the LAV will create an additional requirement for combat service support trucks beyond the Army’s current capabilities.
  2. In addition, the current fleet of Unimog general service trucks (2.5 and 4 tonne) will be 25 years old in 2008. At this age they will be approaching the end of their economic life and will require replacement.

Links to Other Capabilities

  1. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Multi-Role Vessel

Timing

  1. The optimum start time for the introduction into service of the additional combat service support capabilities would be during 2004 to coincide with introduction of the LAV into service.
  2. The Unimogs will need to be replaced from around 2008/9. Timing will depend on the levels of serviceability of the Unimogs.

Current Status

  1. Defence officials are preparing options for the Government to consider towards the end of 2003.

Costs

  1. This project is expected to cost $10 million for immediate needs and $20 million from 2008/09 to replace the Unimogs.

Army Engineering Equipment

Description

  1. This project proposes to enhance Army engineering equipment to support mobility of the motorised land force. Equipment includes:
    • Combat engineering tractors
    • 20 metre light bridging equipment
    • Lane way track laying equipment (metal carpet rolled in front of a truck)
    • Water purification/storage

Policy Value

  1. Additional engineering equipment will enable LAVs and LOVs to cross obstacles that may be encountered. Some engineering equipment may also be necessary to enable landing operations from the MRV.
  2. The policy utility of this equipment will be in supporting the LAVs when deployed on peace support operations in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.

Capability Gap

  1. Current engineering capabilities are very limited and not oriented towards motorisation. Additional capabilities are necessary to provide for the increase in the scale of mobility requirements associated with the increased number of vehicles in the motorised battalion. This also includes providing for the crossing of gaps and broken or soft ground, potentially including beach crossing from the MRV.
  2. The Army lacks water purification and storage capacity.

Links to Other Capabilities

  1. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Multi-Role Vessel

Timing

  1. The engineering equipment is required to coincide with introduction of the LAV into service, starting in 2004.

Current Status

  1. Defence officials are preparing options for the Government to consider towards the end of 2003.

Costs

  1. This project is expected to cost around $15 million.

Army In-Service Weapon Replacement

Description

  1. This project proposes to replace the following in-service weapons when they become due for replacement around 2007-2009:
    • 1000 C9 light machine guns
    • Special Forces miscellaneous weapons
    • Carl Gustav light anti-armour weapons

Policy Value

  1. The above small arms are integral to the full range of land force operations and have applications in a host of policy roles.

Capability Gap

  1. Current weapons are serviceable but will require replacement around 2007–2009.

Timing

  1. The weapons do not require replacement until 2007-2009.

Current Status

  1. No action required at this stage.

Costs

  1. This project is expected to cost around $8 million.

Very Low Level Air Defence

Description

  1. This project proposes to purchase additional equipment to bring the Mistral Air Defence System up to operational standard.

Policy Value

  1. An air defence capability is necessary to protect critical land force elements from air threats such as low flying aircraft and armed helicopters.

Capability Gap

  1. The current system is not fully operational. Target detection, identification and tracking rely on visual observation. To be fully effective and minimise risk to friendly aircraft, the system requires an auto cueing and identification friend or foe (IFF) capability.

Timing

  1. This project should proceed as soon as possible.

Current Status

  1. Work is underway to identify the best option to bring the system up to a fully operational standard. Once updated cost information is received, a submission will be brought forward to Cabinet seeking approval to proceed with acquisition of the required components.

Costs

  1. This project is estimated to cost $12 million.

Top | Previous | Next

Page contents Accessibility (list of Access Keys) Sitemap Homepage About us Defence Policy Acquisition Activities Reports & Publications Links Contact Us Search box New Zealand Government websites homepage