Reports and Publications

• Marine Forces Review
  • Contents
  • Summary
  • Policy Requirements
  • Shaping Factors
  • Requirements of the Navy
  • Gap Analysis
  • Capability Requirements to Meet Policy Gaps
  • Fleet Composition Option for the Royal New Zealand Navy
  • Implications
  • The Way Ahead
  • Glossary
  • Annex A - Terms of Reference

Within this section

• Introduction
• The requirement for maritime forces
• Meeting the requirement
• Other issues
• Gap analysis
• Costs
• Timing issues and priorities
• Next steps

Maritime Forces Review

Summary

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Introduction

1. On the 8th May 2001 the Government announced a series of decisions that built on the Defence Policy Framework (DPF) with the aim of developing a modern, sustainable Defence Force that will concentrate defence resources in a range of affordable and sustainable military capabilities to meet our requirements, our strategic interests and our obligations.
2. The announcements signalled the need for increased coastal and mid-range offshore surface surveillance, as concluded in the Maritime Patrol Review chaired by the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet and released in February 2001. This conclusion, coupled with the impending withdrawal from service of the last of the Leander-class frigates, Canterbury, in 2005, provided an opportunity to review the composition of the Navy’s surface fleet. The Government also requested that the two roles performed by the Royal New Zealand Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNZNVR), Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Naval Control of Shipping (NCS), be examined.
3. In addition to the military and foreign policy related uses of naval vessels, the Review was to take into account the recommendations of the Maritime Patrol Review, in particular:
   • The civilian requirement for coastal and mid-range offshore capabilities;
   • The roles to be performed in conjunction with New Zealand’s responsibilities and obligations in respect to the Southern Ocean and Ross Dependency;
   • The need for an appropriate sealift capability, including the use of such a capability for disaster relief and other tasks in the South Pacific; and
   • The need for, and priority to be accorded to, the roles performed by the RNZNVR.
4. To be fiscally sustainable, capital acquisition costs to meet this requirement must not exceed NZ$500 million and operating costs must be accommodated within the NZDF baselines that were set as part of the 2001 Budget. Initial Rough Order of Magnitude costings suggest that within this ceiling it is possible to acquire a Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) to replace Canterbury at a maximum cost of $US100 million, at least two offshore patrol vessels and to upgrade the Navy’s existing fleet of five Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) so that they are able to provide some capability to meet the inshore patrol requirements of civilian agencies. This is considered a minimum option that would provide an affordable and acceptable solution although it would leave some gaps. Replacing the existing IPCs with fast inshore patrol boats would be a longer term objective.

The requirement for maritime forces

5. The Government’s objective is to equip the Navy with a practical fleet that is modern, sustainable and matched to New Zealand’s needs. To meet this objective the Navy requires the capability to undertake an extensive array of military and non-military tasks in widely varied environmental conditions. This requires a Naval Combat Force, Naval Support Force, Naval Patrol Force, Mine Countermeasures and Diving Support Force, and a Hydrographic service.
   • A Naval Combat Force is required to undertake the most demanding military tasks. These include providing for the defence of New Zealand and its territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), meeting our alliance commitments to Australia including responding to South Pacific and Southern Ocean contingencies across a broad front, meeting our Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) obligations and contributing to UN and other multilateral peace support operations. The ships of the Naval Combat Force also demonstrate New Zealand’s commitment to regional and global security through ship visits, and training and exercises with other countries. With the disbandment of the Air Combat Force the ability of the Naval Combat Force to participate in FPDA activities will take on added importance.
   • A Naval Support Force. There are two elements to the Naval Support Force. The first is the provision of underway replenishment of deployed forces, currently provided by the fleet tanker, Endeavour. The second is the provision of a sealift capability for the transport and deployment of equipment, vehicles and personnel without access to a port. No Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) capacity currently exists. A MRV that is able to meet a range of roles in our region would also have a tactical sealift capacity. The MRV’s roles would also include: responding to natural disasters in the South Pacific; undertaking humanitarian relief operations; participating in peace support operations; military support activities; and contributing to development assistance in the South Pacific.
   • A Naval Patrol Force is required to conduct maritime surveillance, in conjunction with maritime air patrol assets, in the New Zealand EEZ, to assist South Pacific Island states to patrol their EEZs, and in the Southern Ocean. The surveillance tasks are primarily non-military in support of civilian agencies. These tasks can be grouped as inshore tasks that cover the area from the shoreline to about 24 nautical miles; offshore tasks that extend to the limit of New Zealand’s EEZ; tasks in the South Pacific; and Southern Ocean tasks.
   • A Mine Countermeasures and Diving Support Force is required to provide mine countermeasures and clearance diving support capabilities. The requirement is to protect New Zealand’s seven major ports through: the development of safe routes into them; the maintenance of a route survey database; the development of a capacity to dispose of mines and other explosives underwater; and by practicing the skills necessary to lead merchant ships through cleared access routes into the ports.
   • A Hydrographic Service refers to the provision of hydrographic survey and associated services to the NZDF, Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) and other civilian agencies (this is the subject of a separate review and is not addressed further in this report).

Meeting the requirement

Naval combat force

6. The Navy currently has a naval combat force of three frigates with embarked Seasprite maritime helicopters supported by the fleet tanker, Endeavour. The force will be reduced to two frigates when Canterbury is taken out of service in 2005.
7. Because the ANZAC frigates have few training bunks, they need to spend considerable time on combat training tasks in order to maintain sufficient crew to provide an appropriate level of capability to meet operational requirements. This high training requirement, in addition to operational commitments and maintenance requirements, means that in a 12-month period, the Navy would be able to guarantee one frigate for operational tasking for no more than six months. The Review concluded that the naval combat force, supported by Endeavour, should be devoted to primarily military tasks in the achievement of the Government’s global and regional security objectives. There would be some capacity to respond to patrol tasks that may arise during training.

Naval support force

8. The naval support force provides two capabilities: underway replenishment of deployed forces and sealift. Underway replenishment is currently provided by the fleet tanker Endeavour. There is no capacity for sealift at present. Based on the findings of the 2000 Sealift Review the Government determined that, given the infrequent need for sealift, the ability to charter commercial ships when required, and the lack of versatility for other tasks, the acquisition of a dedicated sealift ship would not be a wise investment. A better investment would be a MRV that can undertake a number of roles in our region, including a limited tactical sealift capacity for such operations as disaster relief in the South Pacific. It could also be used for humanitarian relief operations, peace support operations, military support operations and contribute to development assistance in the South Pacific. It must also take over the training role currently performed by Canterbury. The MRV will be available to supplement the naval patrol force when not engaged on these roles.
9. The military and civilian sealift requirement is for the transport of people and equipment into a theatre of operations so that they will be able to operate effectively once ashore. Given the limitations in port facilities in the South Pacific and parts of Southeast Asia, there is a requirement to be able to off-load people and equipment without access to a port facility. The civilian requirement could include the delivery of heavy equipment such as bulldozers for disaster relief. The military requirement for sealift includes the transport of the Army’s light armoured vehicles. The requirement to deliver onshore heavy equipment will influence the design of the MRV.
10. In the past, New Zealand has relied on coalition partners to provide this capability, in particular France and Australia. The increasingly fragile security situation in the South Pacific will likely drive an increase in concurrent operations such as peace support, humanitarian assistance and evacuations. New Zealand will need an independent capability to conduct these types of operations. Growing demands on the naval assets of other countries make it increasingly likely that they would be unable to meet our needs. Reliance on other countries could also significantly slow down response times for military and civilian emergencies.

Naval patrol force

11. The Maritime Patrol Review identified that there was very little routine surveillance undertaken around New Zealand and that RNZN vessels were not appropriately configured for this work. The Maritime Forces Review has confirmed that patrol capabilities are required to conduct maritime surveillance, in conjunction with maritime air patrol assets, in the New Zealand EEZ, to assist South Pacific Island states patrol their EEZs, and in the Southern Ocean.
12. Surface surveillance provided by the naval patrol force would complement aerial surveillance and other sources of information. Although aircraft are the most cost-effective method of providing surveillance over a large area, surface vessels are required to maintain a physical presence and provide enforcement. They provide the capability to board, inspect, and arrest or conduct hot pursuit of offending vessels that may be engaged in illegal or unregulated activities and would be interoperable with maritime patrol aircraft. Their presence also serves to deter would-be offenders and demonstrate New Zealand’s will to protect its territorial sovereignty and natural resources.
13. There are several agencies with surface patrol requirements. They are the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish), the New Zealand Customs Service, the Maritime Safety Authority (MSA), the New Zealand Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Conservation (DoC) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). The tasks required of the Navy by civilian agencies include: surveillance; monitoring; boarding and inspection of vessels; arrest; hot pursuit of vessels beyond the EEZ; finding and retrieving items from the sea floor; detecting and responding to marine oil spill incidents; conducting search and rescue operations; providing limited towage facilities; and observing and recording marine species. There is also a sealift requirement for transport of personnel and supplies to remote DoC bases such as Raoul Island.
14. Patrol tasks are grouped as inshore tasks that cover the area from the shoreline to 24 nautical miles; offshore tasks that extend to the limit of New Zealand’s EEZ; and tasks in the South Pacific and Southern Ocean. Analysis of the civilian requirements highlighted a number of tasking patterns:
    • About two-thirds of the total civilian agency requirement is in the inshore zone;
    • Over half of the total requirements were considered to be high priority by the responsible agency;
    • Tasks in the northern half of the EEZ (north of and including the Marlborough Sounds and Tasman Bay) are almost all inshore and tasks in the southern half of the EEZ are mostly offshore. The southern half of the EEZ experiences the most extreme sea states (See Table 1, Page 10, for description of sea states);
    • The level of activity in the north remains relatively constant during the year. Activity almost doubles in the south during winter, coinciding with the worst sea states.
15. The requirement is for about 950 sea days annually performing inshore patrol tasks and about 420 days annually performing offshore patrol tasks. This Review, and consultation with civilian agencies, suggests that a mix of five small inshore patrol vessels for most of the inshore tasks and at least three capable offshore patrol vessels (OPV), plus the MRV, for the offshore tasks would meet this requirement.
16. Financial constraints may limit the ability to acquire immediately both a MRV and all of the patrol force capabilities needed. Innovative and bridging solutions need to be investigated. Upgrading the Navy’s existing fleet of five IPCs would provide a low cost solution for meeting the inshore requirement, although it would not satisfy the total requirement. The Navy’s IPCs as presently configured are not ideally suited for the inshore patrol task, due largely to a significant speed limitation that cannot be improved (a maximum speed of 12.5 knots). Civilian agencies agree, however, that upgraded IPCs could provide a workable solution should financial constraints prevent the immediate acquisition of a more suitable capability. Upgrades would include improving seakeeping, enhancing communications and fitting a faster, more capable Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB). The IPCs, in conjunction with the diving support vessel, Manawanui, would still be required to provide training and a mine countermeasures and clearance diving support capability. As further funds become available, the IPCs would progressively be replaced by specialist fast inshore patrol vessels.
17. Discussions with industry and other countries have indicated that there may be other, less traditional, ways of meeting the requirement. It is therefore proposed that the shipbuilding industry be approached to proffer solutions based on commercial design standards to meet output-based specifications. The specifications will indicate how many sea days are required, the tasks that have to be performed, the operating conditions in which the tasks will have to be performed, and the financial constraints that will govern affordability.
18. This is the approach used by Australia and the United Kingdom in addressing their surface patrol requirements. Contact with the shipbuilding industry indicates they will be receptive to this approach. Some companies have indicated they will be prepared to respond with a package approach to meet our requirement for both a MRV and a patrol force. The shipbuilding industry has also indicated that there will be considerable scope for New Zealand industry involvement in the acquisition projects to meet this requirement.
19. The minimum patrol option is for the MRV, at least two OPVs, and upgrading the five IPCs. This would provide a minimum level of coverage but would not satisfy the total requirement.

Mine countermeasures and diving support force

20. The requirement is to protect New Zealand’s seven major ports through: the development of safe routes into them; the maintenance of a route survey database; by developing a capacity to dispose of mines and other explosives underwater; and by practicing the skills necessary to lead merchant ships through cleared access routes into the ports. The Review has concluded that the mine countermeasures role should be retained for three reasons. First, New Zealand is vulnerable to mining of its harbours and shipping lanes (laying mines is a cheap and relatively unsophisticated capability). Second, the lead time for developing a mine countermeasures capability is longer than the lead time for an aggressor to develop a mine-laying capability. Third, it would take 2-3 years to redevelop the existing database of mine-like objects along safe routes if the surveys were allowed to lapse. This capability is provided by the diving support unit, the diving tender Manawanui and four of the IPCs. The latter are manned and operated by the RNZNVR and located in the major ports throughout New Zealand. As mentioned above, these vessels would still be required to undertake mine countermeasures tasks if they were modified and utilised to undertake inshore patrol duties.

Other issues

Management of maritime patrol resources

21. All of those agencies involved in the review acknowledge that management and tasking of air and surface assets will be critical to the success of maritime patrol in the EEZ. The Maritime Coordination Centre, currently under consideration by an interdepartmental working group, will meet this need.

Ice-Strengthening

22. The Navy does not currently have the capability to conduct surface patrols in the Southern Ocean below about 65 degrees south. There is a requirement for patrolling in the deep Southern Ocean (below 65 degrees) and in the Ross Sea, both to provide a New Zealand presence and to meet our obligations under the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). An ice-strengthened ship is needed to meet this requirement. It may be possible to ice-strengthen either the MRV or one or more OPVs. Advice will be sought from industry as to which is the most appropriate and cost effective vessel type for ice-strengthening.

Helicopter capability

23. A helicopter, such as the Seasprite with its sensor suite, extends the surveillance range of a surface vessel up to twelve times. Given the vastness of our EEZ, this enables fewer vessels to cover a larger area. Helicopters operating from the MRV and/or OPVs would provide an additional means by which to board vessels of interest and rescue/evacuate people when sea conditions preclude the use of RHIBs, and would meet the DoC requirement for resupply of offshore bases. The long duration of patrols in distant parts of the New Zealand EEZ and the distances involved in some resupply tasks will require a basic hangar to prevent damage to the helicopter caused by sustained exposure to sea spray. Industry will be consulted as to how to best find an affordable and viable solution to this requirement. The need for helicopters will be met by the recently acquired fleet of five Seasprite maritime helicopters.

Naval control of shipping

24. This role was not considered during the review because whether or not this capability is retained will not have an impact on the size and composition of the Navy fleet.

Gap analysis

25. While the addition of a MRV and a patrol force will substantially add to the Navy’s ability to meet maritime patrol requirements, there are some civilian tasks and capabilities that would not be met by this fleet mix. These include towage/salvage of large vessels, close inshore search and rescue (0-3nm), and response activity for Customs and MFish.

Costs

26. An important consideration in terms of the type of MRV and the mix of patrol vessels is the financial costs associated with acquisition. Financial issues include not only the initial purchase, but also the impact of the acquisition on the NZDF’s operating costs, any associated infrastructure costs, and any additional costs of developing new skill groups.
27. The NZDF’s draft Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) has included a provision of NZ$500 million for capital acquisition to meet this requirement. The operating costs must be affordable within the NZDF baseline. The proposal for acquisition will need to be a ‘design to cost’ approach to fit within these parameters.

Timing issues and priorities

28. The two key issues are the urgency of filling the gap in meeting the civilian agency patrol requirements around New Zealand and bringing into service a MRV to replace Canterbury when she is retired in 2005. Given the demand and priority accorded by the civilian agencies to the inshore patrol tasks, meeting these requirements should be pursued ahead of offshore patrol capabilities.
29. Planning the entry into service of a MRV on the retirement of Canterbury is sensible for a number of reasons. First, the MRV is needed to meet the Navy’s training requirement for sustaining sufficient personnel to operate other naval vessels. Second, the tactical sealift requirement of the MRV is part of the Government’s core requirement for a modernized land force that can be deployed to where it is required. Third, a MRV will be the most capable vessel and have utility across the range of military and civilian requirements.

Next steps

30. It is intended that a set of output based statements to meet both the MRV and patrol requirements be prepared by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), in consultation with the Defence Force and civilian agencies, to identify the functions that potential vessels must perform and the standards and conditions to which those functions are required to be performed. It is proposed that these functional statements be provided to industry to allow for a range of alternative vessel options and acquisition strategies to be developed that can be acquired within the set financial limitation. Following the identification of feasible options, the MoD will report back to Government with specific proposals to proceed to acquisition.
31. To ensure that there is no loss in training capability within the Navy, a smooth transition from Canterbury to the MRV will be necessary. The planning process for this replacement will require a realistic timetable for any build or modification programme.

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