New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews
Phase One – Land Forces and
Sealift (November 2000)
Sealift
Deployment of land forces could require both strategic and tactical sealift. Strategic sealift consists of movement of heavy and large equipment and stores from New Zealand to an assembly area, normally a fixed port where the equipment is married up with the personnel who would be deployed by air. In some circumstances delivery may be directly into the operational area, either to an available port facility, or if a docking facility is not available, to a location where unloading can be accomplished “over the beach”.
Tactical sealift requires a capability to deliver both personnel and equipment into the operational area so that the forces are able to undertake operational missions as soon as they are safely ashore. Tactical sealift ships are specially designed to land both personnel and equipment without requiring access to a port facility.
Both requirements were demonstrated in the deployment of the New Zealand contingent to East Timor. Strategic sealift was provided by a chartered commercial Roll On-Roll Off (RO-RO) ship, from New Zealand to the assembly area at Darwin. From Darwin, the equipment was deployed into the Suai operational area by a French military tactical sealift ship which had the ability to off-load the M113 carriers and heavy trucks over the beach.
A limited over the beach capability can be built into a modified RO-RO ship through a combination of cranes on the deck, cargo landing platforms carried on the ship (called Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel or LCVPs) and deck space that permits off-loading using helicopters. This method is suitable for pallets and light vehicles but not for heavy loads such as the LAV's, heavy trucks and engineering equipment.
Given the small number of port facilities in the South Pacific and parts of South-East Asia, an ability to off-load cargo independently over the beach would be a useful military and civilian asset. However, the requirement to off-load heavy military cargos, such as LAVs, in this manner is very infrequent. In most circumstances the limited over the beach capability that can be built into a RO-RO vessel will meet New Zealand's military requirements. On those occasions where heavier loads need to be off-loaded where port facilities are not available, it is likely to be under circumstances where New Zealand would be operating as part of a multinational force when tactical sealift ships of other nations would be available to provide this capability.
In disaster relief operations in the South Pacific, if all of an island's ports and airfields have been rendered unserviceable, there may be a requirement to off-load over the beach. The majority of items that would be required in a disaster relief operation (specialist personnel such as medics and engineers, blankets, tents, building materials, vehicle spare parts, light trucks and so on) could be off-loaded from a modified RO-RO. However, there may be a requirement to deploy items that are too heavy for a modified RO-RO, such as bulldozers, heavy trucks and heavy engineering equipment. Often these items are on the island already and simply need to be repaired. Alternatively, it may be possible to deploy some heavy equipment by air or, if the airport is unserviceable, by airdrop. In some extreme cases neither a modified RO-RO nor airdrop will allow for the delivery of heavy equipment if this is required. This risk however, is assessed as low, as disaster relief operations have not been impeded in the past for this reason.
Box 9 - The Sealift Requirement
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While the concept of sealift is often split into strategic sealift and tactical sealift, the distinction between the two can be blurred. To determine the requirements for a sealift ship it is better to think in terms of capacity (i.e. what can be carried) and load-off-load (i.e. where it can be taken to). CapacityThe requirement is to transport equipment to support a battalion group. Personnel will normally be deployed by air. One sealift ship should have the capacity to move sufficient equipment to deploy and sustain the battalion group until the next load arrives. Equipment is moved in stages to allow more rapid preparation and departure and to simplify the task of setting up in the crisis area by gradually assembling what is needed in a logical order of priority. There may also be a need to pre-position troops off-shore to increase the options open to Government and to allow more rapid deployment. Separately, in a disaster relief operation there may be a requirement to provide emergency short-term shelter and a means of emergency evacuation for a large number of people. Thus the capacity required is as follows:
Loading/Off-loadingThe capability to load and off-load determines the flexibility of the sealift ship, effectively where it can go. The requirements are increasingly demanding as you move through the different facilities available:
The discussion of the different options will outline the marginal costs involved in increasing the flexibility of the sealift ship. |
The military requirement in the NZDF for sealift is sporadic. Any ship which is owned and operated by the NZDF primarily for strategic and tactical sealift therefore would be available for other tasks, including disaster relief in a civil emergency in the South Pacific, low-level surveillance and presence, and logistic support to deployed forces. In general, the speed, manoeuvrability and lack of combat systems limit the utility of a sealift ship for most maritime patrol tasks. The hull design can make these ships unsuitable for safe employment in the Southern Ocean or Ross Sea. A sealift ship can be a valuable contribution to a multinational effort in its own right. A sealift ship could have been gainfully employed for the operations in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands.
A dedicated sealift ship would be available for immediate tasking for 90% of the year. For the remaining time, the ship would be available within 28 days. Analysis of the expected usage dedicated to sealift showed that minimum employment for exercises and other tasks would amount to about 80-105 sea days. In addition, about five weeks would be required for maintenance and a further five weeks for leave. During the remaining 11 weeks, the ship could be assigned other tasks in support of other defence outputs.
The key considerations in determining how to meet New Zealand's sealift requirement are:
- availability to meet the requirement for a timely deployment;
- sufficient capacity for strategic sealift of a battalion group size land force, with supporting helicopters and national support elements 30;
- the degree to which an over the beach capability and tactical sealift is required and its affordability 31; and
- the utility for other tasks.
The Options
Four options were considered for providing sealift:
- reliance on commercial chartering arrangements;
- acquisition of a used military sealift ship;
- purchase of a new purpose built ship; and
- modification of CHARLES UPHAM.
The purchase and conversion of another used RO-RO vessel and the acquisition of a new modified design RO-RO vessel were also examined. Both of these possibilities were found to have no significant advantage over the modified CHARLES UPHAM and carried significantly higher costs and risks.
If one of the first three options were chosen, the CHARLES UPHAM could be sold.The receipt from this sale would be likely to be between US$6-8M.
Chartering
This was the approach taken for Bosnia and East Timor and it is the cheapest option. It has two drawbacks. One drawback is that there is no guarantee a suitable ship will be available when needed to meet the requirement for a rapid response. Previous studies have shown that ships available for charter are usually operating at long distances from New Zealand. This potentially prolongs the time it would take to deploy a New Zealand contingent.
The other drawback is that commercial ships come as they are. They cannot provide any tactical sealift capability. This can limit government choices in responding to a security event. The limitation could be significant for situations in the South Pacific where there is a high expectation that New Zealand would independently play a major role in a crisis or in response to a natural disaster.
New Zealand has only two experiences on which to make judgements on this: Bosnia and East Timor. In the case of Bosnia the arrangement was unsatisfactory both because of the long time it took to arrange the charter and because the shortcomings of the ship required vehicles to be stowed on open decks. In the case of East Timor the charter arrangement was satisfactory.
There could also be other risks associated with the commercial nature of charter arrangements. There was a recent case in Canada where a ship operator refused to enter port and unload the cargo of Army equipment because of a dispute about payments among the commercial firms involved. As a result the equipment was at risk of being lost in the open waters of the North Atlantic. The situation was only resolved when the Canadian Navy undertook a risky operation and seized the ship and forced the master to take the ship into port where the military cargo could be discharged safely. As a result of this experience the Canadians have put renewed effort into their plans to acquire military sealift ships.
Acquisition of a Used Military Sealift Ship
Military sealift ships being offered for sale are usually meeting the end of their useful life. The initial capital cost of these second hand ships can be low but the work necessary to modify and maintain military specification ships is usually significant and costly. This is greater than for commercial specification ships because of greater complexity and the heavier build standard of military ships. Many older military sealift ships also require a large crew (200 for the Newport class acquired by Australia versus 50 for CHARLES UPHAM). Through life cost penalties can completely offset the advantage of the low initial purchase price.
Recent conversions of ex-USN Newport class amphibious ships by Australia required a considerable amount of restorative maintenance and significant modernisation to tailor them for the Australian requirement. The cost was extremely high with the final conversion cost price in the region of A$200M per ship.
Only in circumstances where heavy vehicles and plant must be unloaded across the shore would the additional capability of a specialist amphibious landing ship be required. In circumstances where the LAVs or other large vehicles are critical, no ports are available, and no tactical sealift support is available from other nations, New Zealand would require a full tactical capability of its own. This requirement is assessed as infrequent.
In specialist ships, load capacity is traded off for the unique construction and configuration requirements for direct unloading of heavy equipment. Reduction can be quite marked in strategic lift capacity. The core requirement to transport New Zealand forces is the strategic move. Compromising this for the limited need for tactical offload of large vehicles, when this is likely to be achievable by other means, is not desirable. It is difficult to assess how frequently the need to tactically offload heavy vehicles will arise. The additional investment to achieve that margin above the capability of a modified CHARLES UPHAM is in the order of $200m. A ship could not be acquired before 2005.
Purchase of a Purpose-Built Ship
The concept of using a multi-role ship to perform sealift tasks and also a range of tasks such as resource protection to reduce loading on the frigate fleet requires a wider study than could be completed within the time constraint for the completion of the Phase One review. Issues such as trade-offs in frigate availability, crew combat training, sustainability, and logistics support are complex. In catering for the differing roles in multi-role design, each role will invariably be compromised to some extent. This is a possible option, however. A ship purpose built for sealift could also be designed to carry out tasks such as disaster relief, EEZ surveillance and patrol, search and rescue, and presence. It could support service assisted evacuations of nationals, provide a command and control facility for land force operations, and provide a host platform for peace talks. When suitably modified, CHARLES UPHAM could do some of these tasks under certain conditions. However, its lack of armament may be a limitation for some surveillance, response and emergency evacuation missions and it could not operate a helicopter while underway.
Both the Royal Navy and Republic of Singapore Navy have tactical sealift ships which have utility in other roles - HMS OCEAN and RSS ENDURANCE. HMS OCEAN's capabilities exceed the NZDF requirement. The RSS ENDURANCE, however, presents a compromise that could meet many of the NZDF's requirements. Its design emphasises the tactical sealift role ahead of strategic utility. The vessel could tactically offload heavy vehicles up to LAV size. It has two on-board helicopter operating positions, and can operate helicopters at sea. The Navy Seasprite could be operated on such a ship and the decks are capable of taking larger helicopters operated by other nations. It has a troop carrying capacity in excess of the tactical requirement.
This class of ship is better suited to patrol and surveillance tasks than the CHARLES UPHAM, in that it can carry its own helicopters and operate them at sea. It also carries a 76mm gun. The tactical unloading facility comes at the expense of lift capacity. RSS ENDURANCE has only half the strategic lift capacity of a modified CHARLES UPHAM. This option therefore only partially meets the strategic lift requirement, while it fully meets the tactical requirement.
No data is available for the cost of a new multi-role capable sealift ship designed specifically for New Zealand. Using RSS ENDURANCE as an example, the marginal cost of a multi-role ship over modifying CHARLES UPHAM is expected to be around $400m. However, if this ship also replaces CANTERBURY, the marginal cost would largely disappear. A more detailed study would be required to assess the economic benefit of a single multi-role ship meeting the sealift requirement and some of tasks currently assigned to the naval combat force, i.e. as a replacement for both CHARLES UPHAM and CANTERBURY. A suitable ship could not be acquired before 2005.
Modification of CHARLES UPHAM
When modified for its role as a sealift ship, CHARLES UPHAM will have the capacity to meet the requirement for strategic sealift and it will have a limited tactical sealift capability with deck cranes, on board LCVPs and, when anchored, the ability to facilitate helicopter sling loading from the deck. It can also be used to carry a company size force of land forces with their equipment, giving the ability to position forces close to a potential trouble spot. The modified CHARLES UPHAM will not have the ability to unload over the beach the LAVs, heavy trucks or heavy engineer plant equipment.
The modifications envisaged will enable the vessel to undertake disaster relief and humanitarian operations. The ship will have the capacity to supply fuel and water supplies over the beach and it could provide emergency, short-term shelter and a means of emergency evacuation for a large number of people (1,000+).
The design for the modification is partially done and can be completed within six months. The modification work can be undertaken following a worldwide competitive tender, or by a shorter directed tender process for New Zealand industry. The earliest the modified ship could enter service is January 2003. The estimated cost of the conversion is $35-40 million. Conversion is technically simple, the basic ship structure can easily accommodate it and the condition of the ship's structure is well known through the extensive assessment conducted within the Lloyds class survey. Based on the design and specification work done to date, it is assessed that conversion of CHARLES UPHAM is a low risk option and the ship would have a 15-year post-conversion life.
Summary - Sealift Options
| Charter | Used Military Sealift Ship | Purpose Built Ship | Charles Upham | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Availability | Uncertain | High | High | High |
| Strategic Sealift Requirement | Uncertain but probable | Partial | Partial | Meets fully |
| Tactical Sealift Requirement | None | Meets fully | Meets fully | Partial |
| Utility for Other Tasks | N/A | Moderate | Better | Moderate |
| Capital Acquisition Cost (Incremental) | Nil | $260 million | $440 million | $35-40 million |
| Annual Operating Costs | Unknown, but low cost | $40 million | $54 million | $13 million |
| Earliest In-Service Date | N/A | 2005 | 2005 | 2003 |
| Life of Type | N/A | 20 years | 30 years | 15 years |
| Overall Risk | ||||
| -Operational | Highest | Moderate | Moderate | Lowest |
| -Financial | Lowest | High | Highest | Low |
Conclusion
For sealift, the modified CHARLES UPHAM, has some shortfalls in off-loading cargo where ports are not available, but this is not assessed as presenting a significant military risk. It also has limitations in its suitability to undertake other tasks when not used for its primary sealift function. A ship like the Singapore ENDURANCE class has a better over the beach capability and is more versatile. It only has half the strategic lift capacity of CHARLES UPHAM, however, and it costs significantly more – in the region of $440 million as opposed to an additional $35-$40 million to modify CHARLES UPHAM. It may, however, be a viable single replacement platform for both CHARLES UPHAM and CANTERBURY. The cheapest option is to sell CHARLES UPHAM and rely on chartering. A modified CHARLES UPHAM is the most cost effective option for meeting the core requirement for assured strategic sealift.
- This requirement is outlined in more detail in Box 9.
- This requirement is outlined in more detail in Box 9.
