The Shape of New Zealand's Defence - A White Paper (November 97)

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Chapter IV (Four) - Military Considerations

Introduction

However good the analysis of New Zealand’s strategic situation and the security requirements which flow from it, as a nation we risk failure if we do not get the balance and shape of our forces right. The dilemma is particularly sharp for small countries like New Zealand which can sustain only a few capabilities and thus face a proportionately bigger penalty if they get it wrong.

This means the Government must consider not only the level of defence preparedness the community is willing to pay for, and the expectations of our friends and allies, but also a wide range of military factors. This chapter looks at key military issues that will determine the shape of New Zealand’s future Defence Force - lessons from the past, trends in peacekeeping, technological change; and issues of time, breadth versus depth, critical mass, interoperability, and sustainability.

Lessons from the Past

Since 1945, there has been no year in which NZDF units or personnel have not been deployed out of New Zealand on operations in support of national policy. Virtually all of these operations have been undertaken with allies and friends. Commitments have varied from small groups of specialists to infantry brigades, combat air squadrons and frigates. Some commitments lasted only days; others for many years. These deployments have taken place alongside a continuous cycle of refits and upgrades; constant training and exercising in New Zealand and offshore; and regular requirements to support the community in search and rescue, disaster relief, surveillance of our EEZ and support for the Antarctic research programme.

These lessons suggest that the future pattern of employment will require the NZDF to perform a wide spectrum of operations other than war, together with periodic combat operations in support of New Zealand’s national security requirements. Some operations may involve commitment of forces for prolonged periods and in diverse locations. In most cases it can be expected that New Zealand units will operate within the framework of a multinational force.

The Changing Face of Peacekeeping

For forty years peacekeeping forces were usually small, lightly armed and created for each specific mission. Such missions became possible when protagonists had exhausted themselves and there was a peace to keep. Since the end of the Cold War, however, peace missions have increasingly been launched during hostilities. The consent of the warring parties has been neither complete nor continuous. These peace enforcement missions are a higher-order task than peacekeeping as they involve conventional high-intensity operations.

Thus, while peace support and combat missions are not the same thing, they are becoming more alike. Units committed to peacekeeping need to be more self-contained, equipped with self-defence and protection capabilities appropriate to their mandate and the degree of risk. They need to be able to transport themselves and their supplies over considerable distances, and if necessary, sustain themselves for lengthy periods. They need an effective national command and communications system, and they must be able to integrate smoothly into multinational joint forces whose capabilities are likely to be shaped by NATO standards. In short, they will be structured like conventional combat forces.

This has two major implications for New Zealand. Firstly, it has been regularly demonstrated in many varied peacekeeping operations that a defence force structured and trained for conventional combat is usually best equipped and disciplined to cope successfully with peace support duties. The reverse is not true. To make effective contributions to peacekeeping, the NZDF requires conventional warfare levels of self-defence, mobility, protection, and training.

The second implication follows from this. For more than twenty years the capabilities of our actual or potential security partners have been growing. Technological change is accelerating this trend. As a result, a significant capability gap is emerging between many of our capabilities and those of our partners. Because others are now better able to perform peacekeeping tasks, New Zealand’s ability to offer operationally useful contributions to peacekeeping is diminishing.

Technological Trends

Perhaps the major trend of the 1990s is the dramatic and accelerating change in conventional warfare. Called the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), it is in fact the military application of the information revolution. It covers three broad areas. The first is surveillance - gathering information by the use of sensors in order to monitor all that is happening on, near and above the battlefield. The second is concerned with command and control systems for processing and evaluating information and assigning weapons to targets. The third area is acting on this information, using precision-guided weapons such as cruise missiles or other "smart" weapons to destroy the chosen targets - if a target can be located, it can be destroyed. More importantly, this can be achieved with less risk of undesirable collateral damage.

As these technologies spread, and as arms proliferation increases the availability of new weapons systems, it is likely that all future battlefields will demonstrate various mixes of "high tech" and "low tech" weapons. The RMA, originally the exclusive province of major powers, is already influencing the doctrine and military purchases of medium and smaller powers. It will thus become increasingly difficult to maintain any meaningful distinction between "high-tech" and "low-tech" combat operations.

Another by-product of the RMA is the further extension in the life of platforms - ships, aircraft and the like - for, as warfare becomes increasingly more technologically complex, the platform has become less important than the quality of the sensors and munitions it carries. This means that spending will be less focused on periodic purchases of large capital items (though these will still be important) than spending on progressive upgrades. As the pace of change quickens, so does the potential to fall behind and risk military irrelevance. The upgrade cycles for computerised systems fitted on platforms (ships, aircraft and vehicles) are now shorter than the traditional planning and acquisition cycles for the platforms themselves.

There is a key message in this for small countries like New Zealand. Technological changes are not merely concerned with remote "Star Wars" concepts. Military forces in the future will be smaller in number but more powerful and able to control a much wider area. This has direct implications for military forces as small as our own. It does not mean that we have to match the technological developments of others, but we must be able to use or exploit the technology. For example, New Zealand does not have to develop battlefield surveillance management systems of its own, but our sensors must be able to contribute to the battlefield picture, and we must be able to exploit the information that is available from such systems.

The Time Element

The cycle for planning, developing, deciding on and acquiring major weapons systems and platforms stretches into years. Many ships, aircraft and vehicles will, with regular refits and upgrades, have a life in excess of twenty years. The rising cost of replacements driven by technological change is likely to stretch this even further - there are many examples of highly effective ships and aircraft that are already over forty years old.

The Government cannot know how the nation’s security interests might be challenged over that period, or how military practice will develop. Yet the systems and platforms we choose now will have to be as useful and as adaptable in twenty or thirty years as they are when acquired. It is a risk that can only be managed, not avoided. To meet the unexpected New Zealand should concentrate on capabilities that are multi-purpose and have high levels of inherent adaptability. New Zealand governments can best cope with technological change by maintaining a sustained and forward-looking investment programme which can provide regular updates to equipments over their lifetime.

Arms proliferation, off-the-shelf purchasing, and relaxation in arms trading policies by manufacturing states have encouraged the illusion that acquiring a capability is easy. But buying the equipment is just the start. Acquiring the skills to make it operational would take years, and in some cases, more than a decade. Building an effective air strike capability would take, it is estimated, between fifteen and twenty years. Loss of anti-submarine warfare skills would take at least twelve years to redevelop. Running down capabilities in times of tranquility is thus risky. If the security situation deteriorates, it may be too late to acquire the capabilities needed to do anything about it.

Given these dynamics, New Zealand’s military capabilities need to be carefully selected, built up well in advance of any need to use them, and maintained at a level from which an effective response can be guaranteed within expected warning times.

Warning time is an estimate of how much notice a government can expect to receive of an emerging threat to New Zealand’s territory or interests. Fundamental changes in the strategic situation would develop over a period of years, and we might hope to have a reasonable period of warning time. But even in current circumstances, significant mid-level or high-level conflicts could break out at short notice in areas where New Zealand’s interests would be affected. In any event, the lead time for acquiring new capabilities might be significantly longer than the warning time.

Readiness is therefore important. International conflicts move through stages, and at each stage particular military capabilities will be especially useful. In the early stages of building a multinational response, the size and combat potential of a nation’s contribution can be less important than a quick arrival. Smaller but timely and professional contributions will be more welcome and perhaps more useful than the promise of larger forces later. But early arrival requires forces that are held complete and at a high state of readiness.

Breath Versus Depth

Very few states have either the need or the resources to maintain every kind of military capability. Most states, including New Zealand, choose a spread of capabilities that reflect national security circumstances, demographic and fiscal resources, and the kinds of operations the state is likely to undertake.

Getting the choice right requires balance - a careful choice of the range of capabilities and the depth to which they are maintained. New Zealand’s security interests are geographically very broad and this dictates the need for a range of capabilities sufficiently wide both to give the Government options from which to choose, and to make it possible for New Zealand to make an effective contribution to any multinational coalition. The NZDF therefore needs a range of capabilities that allow New Zealand to participate in a broad spectrum of military operations including conventional war, peacekeeping operations, the support of friends, and the use of military capabilities for non-military tasks such as disaster relief.

At the same time, the NZDF needs a structure with sufficient depth to sustain a significant international commitment while safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty and providing community services at home. For lengthy deployments, where units will be rotated, the force structure needs to be deep enough to fulfil the commitment and at the same time be able to train replacements.

Critical Mass

Unit sizes cannot be indefinitely reduced. Within any given set of deployment assumptions, there is a basic level which must be retained to be militarily effective. The size must be such that it can operate as a distinct unit in any coalition operation, handle rotation and attrition losses, and train replacement personnel.

On the assumption that New Zealand requires its forces to undertake sustained deployment, the critical mass for the air combat force is a squadron of eighteen aircraft. To produce an effective unit capable of doing the job of a standard squadron size contribution to an operation, at least ten aircraft need to be deployed. Six more aircraft are required for training and a minimum of two for maintenance. An allowance for aircraft loss would require some additional aircraft.

The critical mass for the naval combat force to meet the Government’s current requirements is three surface combatants. New Zealand requires the capacity to deploy a single ship continuously on operations, and this requires a concurrent training effort while a ship is away on operations so that a commitment can be sustained. Three ships provides the capacity to maintain the required continuous training effort. Without this training capacity, the ability to operate effectively would quickly decay.

For the Army, a brigade group size formation (about 3,500-5,000 personnel) is the smallest that is capable of operating independently in conventional operations as a separate and distinct national entity. For lesser operations, such as peace support operations, a battalion group2 is often used as the organisational basis for a force, as well as the basis for a distinct national entity. New Zealand would not need to consider the deployment of a brigade size force unless there was a serious change in the international situation. This would provide considerable time to build up to a deployable brigade capability.

Therefore, the critical mass for the Army is two regular force infantry battalions, the necessary brigade level combat support (artillery, armour, field engineers and communications) and combat service support (logistics) to permit the deployment of up to a battalion group size force. This calls for the Army to have a brigade group structure, both as the framework from which to generate a deployable battalion group, and to provide a base to build up the capability to deploy a brigade size force should a serious threat to our security develop in the future. The brigade structure will be made up of both regular forces and territorial forces, the latter fulfilling the very important role of rounding out the regular force to provide an operationally effective brigade group. This contribution by the Territorial Force preserves a force structure that provides a basis for responding to a serious change in the security situation, and it demonstrates a commitment to national defence.

Interoperability

Apart from tasks in and around New Zealand, all other operations involving our forces will involve working with other forces. The ability to work together is developed in peacetime exchanges and exercises. Agreed operating procedures are worked out and standards of equipment performance are defined in areas where cooperation is essential for safety or effectiveness: communications, logistic support, doctrine and intelligence.

Operating with Other Forces - Levels of Standardisation

• Incompatible - forces cannot work with others without being a liability
• Compatible - forces can operate together without mutual interference
• Interoperable - forces can provide services to, and accept services from, each other
• Interchangeable - forces can fully support one another
• Commonality - means equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures are common among forces.

The minimum level of standardisation required for New Zealand forces in order to work with others as part of a collective endeavour is interoperability.

A battalion has about 700 personnel and consists of rifle companies and some short range support weapons, such as mortars. A battalion group has about 1,200 personnel and it includes attached elements, such as artillery, engineers and logistics that are part of a brigade structure.

The technological changes brought about through the RMA will make it more difficult to maintain interoperability among military forces when operating together. It means that in the future, making a useful contribution to any allied enterprise will require capabilities that are fully interoperable, particularly in intelligence-gathering, communications and command and control.

Interoperability for everyone now means interoperability with the United States. It is the uncontested leader in military doctrine and technology, and its lead is lengthening. The participation of the United States in any major cooperative undertaking is essential, and all countries wishing to play an effective part in those undertakings have to be interoperable with the United States in communications, equipment and other critical aspects, such as operating procedures.

Sustainability

Units with insufficient ammunition, fuel, spares and skilled maintenance are a liability. They have to draw on the stocks of others or be withdrawn. Adequate sustainment capabilities are therefore crucial to any New Zealand force which, even on a deployment to Australia, would have to operate at a considerable distance from home.

Furthermore, modern combat operates at a high tempo and consumes resources in great quantities. New Zealand needs to maintain stocks and logistics arrangements which will sustain these high tempos of combat. In general, the NZDF needs to be shaped to sustain expected rates of effort for what is considered a normal tour of duty for conventional or peace enforcement operations - six months. For lower operating tempos in other kinds of military operations, a 24-month tour would normally be acceptable. As a general rule for defence planning, any operation that is expected to last longer than six months will require a capacity for rotation, that is, personnel should be replaced after a six-month operational tour, and equipment withdrawn for deeper maintenance than is possible in the area of operations.

New Zealand’s geographical remoteness means that our forces must be able to deploy over long distances and large areas of ocean. Troops can be quickly moved by air but the transport of their supplies and heavy equipment can only be by sea. As a result the NZDF needs a cost-effective combination of strategic sea and airlift capabilities if it is to be available for distant operations. Previous reviews of our sealift and airlift requirements have demonstrated that ad hoc or borrowed transport often will not meet the need. For New Zealand’s policy to be credible it requires the airlift and sealift capacity to deploy forces in a timely manner and to sustain them when they are committed. These assets are, of course, valuable non-combat contributions to contingencies in their own right.

Summary

The NZDF needs a range of capabilities suitable for a broad spectrum of military operations including conventional war, peace support operations, the support of friends and peaceful uses of military capabilities. The depth of the force structure must permit commitments to be sustained and at the same time allow for the training of replacements in case a rotation of forces is required. There is also a need for sufficient depth to concurrently sustain a deployed force while safeguarding national sovereignty and providing community services. The force must be interoperable with New Zealand’s allies and friends, and we must be able to deploy and sustain our committed forces over considerable distances. The force elements must be of a size sufficient to sustain operational capability. Forces required for the more likely tasks in the short term must be complete and at a relatively high state of readiness, while providing a base to meet more serious security challenges that could develop over the longer term.

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