Peace Support Operations Review

Portfolios: Defence / Foreign Affairs / Police

On 23 October 2013, the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee:

1. noted that, as at 1 October 2013, there were 77 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel and 29 New Zealand Police deployed on international peace support operations;

2. noted that this number has fallen from 335 NZDF and 30 New Zealand Police personnel deployed in July 2009 and, with New Zealand’s recent drawdowns from Afghanistan, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands, New Zealand now has the smallest number of personnel deployed to international peace support operations in almost 20 years, with renewed capacity to contribute to discretionary international peace support operations;

3. noted that New Zealand has a strong history of providing trusted, capable, and professional force elements to a variety of types of peace support missions, and that New Zealand retains a strong strategic rationale for continued involvement in these operations;

4. agreed that New Zealand’s peace support priorities will continue to be focused on New Zealand’s immediate region, and that discretionary peace support operations further afield should not affect New Zealand’s capacity to respond to an emerging crisis in the South Pacific Australia;

5. noted that the mandates and conditions in peace support operations continue to grow more complex, highlighting the need to continue to place high importance on managing risk to New Zealand personnel;

6. agreed to the refreshed guidelines set out in Annex 1 to the paper under ERD (13) 34, against which officials would frame advice to Ministers on potential New Zealand contributions to particular peace support operations;

7. agreed that New Zealand adopt an active approach to considering contributions to international peace support operations, with officials seeking potential opportunities that best fit New Zealand’s national interest and strategic considerations for further consideration by Cabinet;
8 noted that the decision in paragraph 7 above does not commit the government to any peace support operations, and that new peace support operations would still need to be considered by Cabinet on a case by case basis;

9 noted that any future decision by Cabinet to make significant contributions to peace support operations may require additional funding.
Chair,
External Relations and Defence Committee

Peace Support Operations Review

Proposal

This paper:

a. seeks Cabinet agreement to refreshed guidelines to be used when considering New Zealand contributions to discretionary peace support operations;¹

b. outlines the strategic rationale for New Zealand's continued participation in discretionary peace support operations; and

c. seeks Cabinet agreement to one of three options for the scale of New Zealand's involvement in future discretionary peace support activities.

Executive Summary

Following the drawdown over the last 12 months of New Zealand's three substantive long-term peace support deployments from Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, there is now an opportunity to take stock of New Zealand's commitments to international peace support operations.

2. This paper suggests some refreshed guidelines to assist in determining what peace support operations New Zealand might consider in the future, bearing in mind that separate Cabinet authorisation will be required before any particular commitments are made. These guidelines include a more specific consideration of direct foreign policy benefits, New Zealand's wider international interests and objectives, the mandate and nature of the proposed operation (including whether it is led by the UN or is a 'likeminded coalition'), the operational risks to New Zealand personnel deployed (and strategies to manage those risks), and the implications for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and other contributing agencies.

3. New Zealand's primary peace support responsibilities remain in the South Pacific. There is an expectation that New Zealand would, along with Australia, play a leading role in responding to conflict and crisis in this region. Accordingly, the NZDF and other agencies must retain sufficient capacity for non-discretionary regional engagement in the South Pacific and domestic requirements. This paper therefore focuses on discretionary peace support deployments beyond our immediate region which would not degrade our capacity to deploy within our region.

¹ Peace support operations may include some or all of the following tasks: conflict prevention; peace-making; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace building and humanitarian operations. They are usually in support of UN Security Council-mandated objectives (even if the operation is not a UN-led 'blue helmeted' operation), usually involving both military and civilian (police, diplomatic, development) elements.
4. This paper also identifies options for Cabinet to consider on the overall scale of New Zealand’s involvement in discretionary operations in the immediate future:

   a. **Option 1**: Not to consider any new discretionary peace support deployments at this time, declining all requests for contributions. Officials do not recommend this option due to the negative impact on New Zealand’s foreign policy and other national interests, and the consequences for the NZDF’s readiness and retention;

   b. **Option 2**: Maintaining the status quo ‘wait and respond’ approach, providing flexibility to respond to requests from the UN and other security partners and considering these requests against the proposed refreshed guidelines; or

   c. **Option 3**: A more active approach to seeking opportunities with the UN and others that best fit the proposed refreshed guidelines and New Zealand’s strategic considerations.

5. This paper does not invite Cabinet to agree to any specific peace support deployments. Nor does it intend to limit the options in responding to peace support requests or pursuing other peace support opportunities. Under options 2 and 3 new peace support operations will still need to be considered by Cabinet on a case by case basis with robust analysis and recommendations provided.

**Background**

6. New Zealand has primarily contributed to peace support operations (PSOs) over the last fifty years though the deployment of NZDF and NZ Police personnel. Currently, however, NZDF deployment numbers are at their lowest level since the early 1990s as, since 1994, New Zealand has made continual significant contributions to international peace and security through large-scale operational commitments in Bosnia, Bougainville Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Afghanistan.

7. Following the withdrawal of the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from Barnum in April 2013, there are currently only 77 NZDF personnel and 29 NZ Police deployed abroad to 11 operations. This is compared to more than 300 NZDF and 128 NZ Police in 2009. Of these 106 currently deployed, 15 are part of UN-led peace support missions, ranking New Zealand 92nd out of 116 in terms of UN troop contributing nations.

**Comment**

**Refreshed Guidelines for the Assessment of Proposed New Zealand Contributions to Peace Support Operations**

8. There is now a good opportunity to take stock of New Zealand’s peace support policy settings. This paper outlines the strategic rationale for New Zealand’s continued participation in discretionary PSOs and, in light of this rationale, proposes some refreshed guidelines for officials to consider when providing advice to Ministers on potential contributions to PSOs. The refreshed guidelines are set out in Annex 1, while the existing guidelines, last updated in 2009, are attached as Annex 2. The guidelines do not determine whether a deployment will be approved, or not, by Cabinet. They are simply to

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2 These numbers do not include NZDF personnel deployed aboard RNZN ships.
be used to frame the advice to Cabinet which would make its own decisions on any particular deployment.

9. The proposed refreshed guidelines place a stronger emphasis on foreign policy and national interest considerations. They also reflect that peace support missions are increasingly difficult, complex and costly, usually dealing with prolonged intra-state conflicts involving multiple actors. Accordingly, the refreshed guidelines draw greater attention to the nature (and leadership) of the particular mission and, given the high premium placed on the safety and security of New Zealand personnel deployed on operations, to operational risk and risk management strategies surrounding any proposed deployment.

Foreign policy/national interest considerations

10. The NZDF and other New Zealand agencies stand ready to deploy on substantive operations for a variety of reasons, particularly to respond to: a direct threat to New Zealand or Australia; a crisis in New Zealand’s immediate region; or to benefit New Zealand’s wider national and security interests through discretionary contributions to international PSOs.

11. New Zealand will continue to place priority on contributing to stability, capacity strengthening and economic development of the South Pacific. Peace support responses to crises in our immediate region are considered non-discretionary in nature. New Zealand’s priority will always be to ensure that New Zealand agencies have the necessary capabilities and capacity to respond in a timely manner to developments in our region.

12. Many of New Zealand’s closest neighbours in the South Pacific face chronic social, economic, environmental, and governance stresses meaning that the outlook for the South Pacific over the next 25 years is one of fragility. Three of New Zealand’s largest peace support deployments in the last few decades have occurred in our immediate region in Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville.

13. While New Zealand’s deployments to Timor Leste and Solomon Islands have been substantially wound down over the last twelve months, we retain a residual obligation and interest in potentially providing military and police resources at short notice. There are also other potential challenges to stability in the region which may emerge with relatively little warning in other Pacific jurisdictions, as the riots in Tonga in 2006 demonstrated, and which may require the rapid deployment of New Zealand personnel.

14. Contributing to PSOs around the globe has traditionally been viewed primarily through the lens of ‘being a good international citizen’ or demonstrating ‘solidarity with traditional partners’. These reasons endure today, yet threats to New Zealand’s national interests are now also more overtly global in nature. The increase in globally connected supply chains, the rise of non-state actors, international terrorism, porous national borders, and the diffusion of geo-strategic power all contribute to a complex and challenging security environment that can directly affect New Zealand’s interests from afar. In this environment, conflicts outside our region now have a more direct relevance to our economic, trade and security interests and to the safety of New Zealanders abroad. A commitment to collective security efforts outside our region can, therefore, support New Zealand’s national security interests.
Our recent smaller contributions to South Sudan, Israel/Lebanon/Syria, Egypt, Korea and Iraq, have met a range of interests such as contributing to stability in regions of global strategic relevance and meeting historical commitments.

16. Maintaining New Zealand’s security credentials is also relevant in the context of the campaign for election to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2015/16. This, however, is not a consideration for this paper, as the national security and foreign policy rationales for involvement in PSOs extend well beyond the immediate UNSC campaign.

17. With the above rationale for peace support deployments in mind, it is proposed that officials consider the following questions when formulating advice for Ministers on foreign policy/national interest considerations around potential PSOs:

   a. Would a contribution to the proposed peace support operation:

      i. represent a useful contribution to New Zealand’s foreign policy goals and/or

      ii. contribute to New Zealand’s broader national or international strategic interests and objectives, such as:

         - enhancing security in a region of global strategic importance?
         - enhancing security in a region of strategic or economic interest to New Zealand (especially in the Asia-Pacific)?
         - responding to a significant global or regional security threat?
         - enhancing/maintaining our reputation as a contributor to collective international peace and security? or
         - enhancing/maintaining our multilateral or bilateral relationships particularly with key partners?

   Nature of the mission/mandate and New Zealand’s possible contribution to it

18. New Zealand has historically been involved in a range of PSOs and we could expect future missions to cover the same types of deployments:

   a. Regional missions in response to regional threats (e.g. Timor Leste, RAMSI);

   b. UN-led ‘blue helmeted’ missions further afield (e.g. UN missions in South Sudan (UNMISS), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Israel, Syria and Lebanon (UNTSO)); and

   c. Like-minded coalitions, led by a major regional organisation or state (e.g. the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan;

19. The different types of PSOs each bring their own benefits and risks. Concerns remain over the complex mandates and resourcing of some UN missions, as well as variability in terms of leadership, command and control, and the quality of some contributors. However, the UN remains the principal source of legal legitimacy for the use of force in international affairs and New Zealand has a long history of supporting UN missions. Coalition operations often have the advantage of joining with preferred partners with whom we have much experience in working alongside which, at times, offers more comfort in terms of the safety and security of personnel. For more discussion of involvement in the different types of PSOs see Annex 3.

20. New Zealand will continue to look for opportunities to work with close partners, such as Australia, the US, the UK and Canada in peace support initiatives. Australia, notably, is also drawing down from Afghanistan, Timor Leste and RAMSI. Where such opportunities do not exist, however, New Zealand could look to develop partnerships, where the security environment allows, and capitalise on long-standing defence relationships with regional partners.

21. Contributions from the NZDF will continue to make up a large proportion of New Zealand's overall peace support contributions. However, the complex nature of modern PSOs and our own recent experience suggests that a whole-of-government approach is desirable. Where appropriate, operations involving a combination of military, police, diplomatic, policy and development expertise would provide the most effective outcomes, particularly in the 'post conflict reconstruction' phase of PSOs.

22. It is proposed that officials consider the following questions when formulating advice for Ministers on the nature of potential PSO contributions:

a. Is the proposed mission established in accordance with international law? Is there a clear mission mandate (both for the mission as a whole and for any contributing New Zealand elements)?

b. To what extent is the mandate achievable and is there sufficient flexibility for responding to changing conditions?

c. What would 'success' look like? Are there opportunities to review New Zealand's proposed contribution? What is New Zealand's exit strategy?

d. Are any of New Zealand's traditional security partners contributing to the mission and/or is there an opportunity to build/enhance relationships with other partners?

e. Has a whole of government approach been considered, including the potential contributions that civilian agencies such as Police, Foreign Affairs, Customs, Justice, Treasury, Corrections and others could make to the mission?
Operational Risk and Risk Management Strategies

23. New Zealand lives have been lost in both UN-led and UN-mandated missions. There is inherent risk in any offshore deployment, and these risks continue to form part of the calculation of when and under what circumstances to send New Zealanders into conflict or post-conflict situations.

24. The growing complexity and risk involved in some PSOs was evident in the recent security incidents involving NZDF personnel stationed in the Golan Heights as part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). A high premium is placed on the safety and security of New Zealand personnel deployed on PSOs and officials will continue to take all possible steps to manage the risks. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence have separately been provided with additional information regarding force protection and risk management strategies for current New Zealand PSOs.

25. New Zealand officials in New York have been instructed to pursue proactively arrangements which would improve the safety and security of our personnel. Increased engagement with the UN Secretariat, particularly the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Department of Field Support, who together coordinate UN peacekeeping operations in the field, will ensure New Zealand is better informed of UN activities regarding the safety and security of UN personnel in the field.

26. It is proposed that officials would consider the following questions when formulating advice for Ministers on the operational risk/risk management strategies of potential PSO contributions:
   a. Has a threat assessment been conducted? What are the types of risks that have been identified?
   b. What strategies have been/could be put in place to manage the risks identified? (Risk management strategies will include consideration of factors such as force protection elements, in-extremis support, intelligence support and resourcing).
   c. What is the residual risk level to New Zealand personnel?

Implications for the NZDF and other Contributing Agencies

27. Threats to security and stability in the South Pacific/Australia are nondiscretionary and will require some sort of New Zealand response. Deployments in our immediate region are likely to be undertaken in concert with Australia and other partners with New Zealand playing a leading role. The NZDF will therefore need to continue to retain the capacity to respond to a crisis in our immediate region and to be able to deploy to the region at short notice as set out in the NZDF Output Plan. Accordingly, before recommending any contribution to a discretionary PSO further afield, officials would need to ensure that the NZDF and other agencies can still meet this capacity requirement.

28. Regular deployments to PSOs play an important role in building experience, maintaining capabilities, operational effectiveness and interoperability of the NZDF and other agencies as well as assisting with the recruitment and retention of personnel particularly in the NZDF. These are all vital should the NZDF and other agencies be required to deploy in response to a direct threat to New Zealand or respond to a regional crisis.
29. NZ Police see continuing value in operating in offshore operations and recognise the high regard with which the 'NZ Police brand' is held internationally. However, NZ Police resourcing must be directed in the first instance at domestic responsibilities. The Commissioner of Police must balance domestic requirements with a desire to operationally deploy NZ Police members on peace support activities. The Commissioner is likely to favour deployments in the Asia-Pacific region and will likely only have the capacity to deploy small teams or individual officers. In crisis situations NZ Police would have surge capabilities of up to 20 people for short periods of time.

30. As with any peace support contribution, the financial implications of deployments will need to be considered when officials make recommendations to Ministers, particularly if a proposed deployment extends beyond existing NZDF, or other agency, baselines.

31. Officials will consider the following questions when formulating advice for Ministers on the implications for the NZDF and other contributing agencies to potential PSOs:
   a. What implications would a proposed commitment have on the capacity of NZDF or other contributing agencies to fulfil other objectives and/or respond to threats in New Zealand’s immediate region?
   b. Is there any additional professional, training, or capacity building benefit for contributing agencies?
   c. What are the financial implications of the proposed contribution, where will the funding come from and is it affordable/sustainable?

Current deployments

32. Officials have reviewed existing New Zealand PSO deployments and consider that all fit within the proposed guidelines.1

Alternative Contributions to Peace Support Deployments

33. In addition to providing military/police personnel directly into PSOs, New Zealand has other capabilities/options available to support international peace support at less risk or cost, while still achieving some of New Zealand’s peace support objectives. Policy engagement and capacity building are two good examples.

34. New Zealand contributes to broader peacekeeping objectives through engagement with the UN in the development of peacekeeping policies and practices. New Zealand is placing a higher priority on the issue of the safety and security of UN personnel, in particular, especially against the background of recent events. The UN would also welcome greater New Zealand policy engagement on peacekeeping issues in New York as New Zealand is often seen as having an objective, pragmatic approach to issues. Such policy engagement would provide New Zealand with an opportunity to add some real value to UN peacekeeping discussions and policy formation as well as ensuring that New Zealand keeps closely abreast of any actions taken by the UN regarding the safety and security of UN personnel in the field. Such engagement would also be valuable should New Zealand’s membership bid for the UN Security Council be successful – much of whose business is focused on the establishment and monitoring of peacekeeping and peace support operations.

1 A brief summary of each current PSO is found in Annex 4.
35. Training other peace support contributors is an area where New Zealand expertise can make a particular difference to the professionalism and capabilities of peace support missions. The United States, in particular, has identified peace support capacity building as an area of future bilateral co-operation as an outcome of the 2012 Washington Declaration. Accordingly, officials intend to investigate opportunities to deliver training jointly to those regional partners looking to increase their capacity to contribute to PSOs.

Options for New Zealand’s future engagement in Peace Support Operations

36. With the drawdown from New Zealand’s three decade-long deployments, there is now also an opportunity to take stock of the overall scale of New Zealand’s on-going involvement in discretionary operations.

Option 1: Do not consider any new deployments at this time, a period of hiatus (ultimately reducing New Zealand’s peace support footprint).

37. Not to consider any new international deployments would reduce New Zealand’s residual peace support commitments, putting at risk the foreign policy and national interest gains from contributing to PSOs outlined in paragraphs 10-17. The operational and training benefits derived by the NZDF from engagement in PSOs would also be significantly affected should Ministers choose this option, impacting on NZDF’s readiness to respond to a peace support crisis in our immediate region. A lack of deployments may also negatively affect NZDF retention. Officials do not recommend this option.

Option 2: Refreshed criteria with a status quo, wait and respond approach, alongside an additional policy/capacity building focus

38. Should Cabinet agree, officials would use the refreshed criteria proposed in the paper to advise Ministers in responding to requests for contributions to PSOs from the UN and other security partners. Separately New Zealand officials would continue to undertake the complementary initiatives discussed in paragraphs 33-35.

39. This approach provides the Government with flexibility to respond to requests as they come in and to consider these against the proposed refreshed guidelines. This option would also ensure New Zealand is in a position to retain the benefits of regular deployments and meet some of the foreign policy/national interest objectives identified in this paper.

Option 3: A more active approach to peace support contributions using the refreshed criteria.

40. Rather than waiting for the opportunity to respond to a request for a peace support contribution, New Zealand could take a more active and strategic approach to identifying opportunities.
42. A clear advantage with this option is that it would likely mean that New Zealand could identify, and if Cabinet subsequently agreed, contribute to those PSOs that best fit New Zealand interests, international priorities and available capabilities, rather than being limited to responding to requests for contributions to specific missions.

Consultation

43. This paper was jointly prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Police. Treasury was consulted. It was considered by the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC). The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was informed.

Financial implications

44. There are no financial implications arising from the recommendations in this paper. Ministers should note, however, that in adopting either option 2 or 3 as a framework for New Zealand's future engagement in PSOs any future decision by Cabinet to make any significant contributions to PSOs may require additional funding.

Human rights and Legislative Implications

45. This paper has no inconsistencies with the Human Rights Act 1993. There are no legislative implications or regulatory impacts arising from the recommendations in this paper.

Regulatory impact analysis

46. A regulatory impact analysis is not required.

Publicity

47. No publicity is planned, although media and close security partners have already expressed an interest in the outcomes of this review.

Recommendations

48. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and Minister of Police recommend that the Committee:

1. note that, as at 1 October 2013, there were 77 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel and 29 New Zealand Police deployed on international peace support operations;

2. note that this number has fallen from 335 NZDF and 30 NZ Police personnel deployed in July 2009 and, with New Zealand's recent drawdowns from Afghanistan, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands, New Zealand now has the smallest number of personnel deployed to international peace support operations in almost 20 years, with renewed capacity to contribute to discretionary international peace support operations;

3. note that New Zealand has a strong history of providing trusted, capable, and professional force elements to a variety of types of peace support missions, and
that New Zealand retains a strong strategic rationale for continued involvement in these operations;

4. **agree** that New Zealand's peace support priorities will continue to be focused on New Zealand's immediate region and that discretionary peace support operations further afield should not affect New Zealand's capacity to respond to an emerging crisis in the South Pacific/Australia;

5. **note** that the mandates and conditions in peace support operations continue to grow more complex, highlighting the need to continue to place high importance on managing risk to New Zealand personnel;

6. **agree** to the refreshed guidelines set out in Annex 1, against which officials would frame advice to Ministers on potential New Zealand contributions to particular peace support operations;

7. **agree** to one of the following options for New Zealand's global peace support posture:
   
a. **Option 1**: Not to consider any new discretionary international deployments, reducing New Zealand's residual peace support commitments (this option is not recommended by officials due to the negative impact it would have on New Zealand's foreign policy and other national interests);

b. **Option 2**: A status quo, "wait and respond" approach providing flexibility to respond to requests, while maintaining complementary contributions to wider peace support activities, such as policy engagement and capacity building; or

c. **Option 3**: An active approach to considering contributions to international peace support operations, with officials seeking potential opportunities that best fit New Zealand's national interest and strategic considerations for further consideration by Cabinet;

8. **note** that, by agreeing to the recommendations in this paper, Cabinet is not committing to any peace support operations. New peace support operations would still need to be considered by Cabinet on a case by case basis; and

9. **note** that any future decision by Cabinet to make significant contributions to peace support operations may require additional funding.
Hon Murray McCully
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Dr Jonathan Coleman
Minister of Defence

Hon Anne Tolley
Minister of Police
Annex 1

Refreshed Guidelines for the Assessment of Proposed New Zealand Contributions to Peace Support Operations

The following provides proposed guidelines for officials to use when formulating advice to Ministers about possible New Zealand contributions to discretionary peace support operations.

It is recognised that Ministers will continue to assess potential New Zealand contributions to peace support operations on merit, recognising the need to manage strategic considerations, the nature of the mission, and the implications for government agencies.

Foreign policy/national interest considerations
1. Would a contribution to the proposed peace support operation:
   i. represent a useful contribution to New Zealand’s foreign policy goals? and/or
   ii. contribute to New Zealand’s broader national or international strategic interests and objectives, such as:
      • enhancing security in a region of global strategic importance?
      • enhancing security in a region of strategic or economic interest to New Zealand (especially in the Asia-Pacific)?
      • responding to a significant global or regional security threat?
      • enhancing/maintaining our reputation as a contributor to collective international peace and security? or
      • enhancing/maintaining our multilateral or bilateral relationships, particularly with key partners?

Nature of the mission/mandate and New Zealand’s possible contribution to it
2. Is the proposed mission established in accordance with International law? Is there a clear mission mandate (both for the mission as a whole and for any contributing New Zealand elements)?
3. To what extent is the mandate achievable and is there sufficient flexibility for responding to changing conditions?
4. What would ‘success’ look like? Are there opportunities to review New Zealand’s proposed contribution? What is New Zealand’s exit strategy?
5. Are any of New Zealand’s traditional security partners contributing to the mission and/or is there an opportunity to build/ enhance relationships with other key regional partners?
6. Has a whole of government approach been considered, including the potential contributions that civilian agencies such as Police, Foreign Affairs, Customs, Justice,
Operational Risk and Risk Management Strategies

7. Has a threat assessment been conducted? What are the types of risks that have been identified?

8. What strategies have been/could be put in place to manage the risks identified? (Risk management strategies will include consideration of factors such as force protection elements, in-extremis support and resourcing)?

9. What is the residual risk level to New Zealand personnel?

Implications for the NZDF and other Contributing Agencies

10. What implications would a proposed commitment have on the capacity of NZDF or other contributing agencies to fulfil other objectives and/or respond to threats in New Zealand's more immediate region?

11. Is there any additional professional, training or capacity building benefit for contributing agencies?

12. What are the financial implications of the proposed contribution, where will the funding come from and is it affordable/sustainable?
Annex 2

Current Guidelines for the Assessment of Proposed New Zealand Contributions to Peace Support Operations: Last updated 2009 [CAB (09) 9/9 refers]

The following provides guidelines to help ensure fully considered and consistent decisions are made regarding New Zealand’s contributions to peace support operations. Each request for a contribution should be considered on its own merit, recognising that there are difficult balances to be achieved between the strategic considerations, the nature of the mission, and the implications for the New Zealand Defence Force or other agencies.

Strategic Considerations:

Would a contribution to the peace support operation:

(a) represent a desirable contribution to collective security including, as appropriate, support for UN-led and/or UN-endorsed peace support operations?

(b) support humanitarian objectives, including the need for humanitarian intervention? Are there cost effective options (other than a military contribution) by which New Zealand could provide assistance?

(c) enhance security in a region of strategic or economic interest to New Zealand?

(d) enhance our multilateral or bilateral relationships?

(e) offer a distinctive role?

(f) be acceptable to the New Zealand public?

Nature of the Mission:

(a) Is the mission established in accordance with International law? Is it supported by the region concerned as well as the broader International community? Do the main parties in the country/countries concerned support the mission? Are key New Zealand bilateral partners contributing to the mission?

(b) Is the mandate for the mission clear and achievable, with options for responding to changing conditions, and an exit strategy? Is the mission adequately resourced, particularly in relation to force protection and in extremis support, as well as providing for civilian components as appropriate?

(c) Is there a sound operational plan, including effective direction and control of military operations, force protection and in extremis support?
Implications for NZDF and other contributing agencies:

(a) What implications would a commitment have on the capacity of NZDF or other contributing agencies to fulfil other policy objectives and respond to other situations?

(b) What is the estimated duration and cost of the commitment? Are there options to review the New Zealand commitment? Is there an optimal timeframe for the contribution (e.g. early in; early out)?

(c) What other countries are contributing to the mission? Would the New Zealand contribution be able to operate effectively with other contributors to the mission?

(d) What is the risk assessment for the mission?

(e) What role would New Zealand personnel have within the mission? Is there a professional or training benefit?

(f) What opportunities are there to provide other forms of New Zealand assistance?
Annex 3

Types of Peace Support Operations

Regional missions in response to regional threats

PSOs in response to threats to security and stability in the South Pacific are considered non-discretionary PSOs for New Zealand. Such deployments are likely to be undertaken in concert with Australia and other regional partners with New Zealand playing a leading role.

United Nations-led 'blue-helmeted' missions

2. New Zealand is currently involved in these types of missions through the United Nations missions in South Sudan (UNMISS), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Israel, Syria and Lebanon (UNTSO), and Korea (UNCMAC).

3. There has been some significant growth in UN-led missions over the past 15 years, particularly in Africa. Africa is – and will continue to be – a region of instability and conflict. Half of all current UN missions and 90% of all currently deployed UN peacekeeping personnel are in Africa.

4. The mandates of UN missions are increasingly challenging and complex, often dealing with a range of armed actors with the mandates including elements of 'peace-making' and protection of civilians. In short, future UN missions are likely to be more like we found in Bosnia in 1995 than the traditional 'observe and report' missions such as UNTSO in the Golan Heights.

5. UN personnel are no longer necessarily afforded non-combatant status by combatants. In fact on occasion the UN has become a specific target (e.g. in Iraq, Somalia). Accordingly, the UN has stressed that even traditional UN-led, 'blue-helmet' missions are likely to require additional elements of force protection, including armoured vehicles, enhanced firepower and robust Rules of Engagement that allow offensive action against infringements, i.e. a 'war-fighting capability'. Military observers will require a commensurate level of protection. Reflecting the increasing complexity and risk, several UN missions have also included a 'fighting' component deployed alongside UN forces. A specialised UN Intervention Brigade' has, for example, deployed to the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo to subdue armed groups in the east of the country and French troops remain deployed in Mali to support the UN peace support mission in that country.

6. At the same time, there remain concerns over resourcing of UN missions, as well as variability in terms of leadership, command and control, the quality of fellow contributors to UN-led missions and force protection measures put in place to date by the UN DPKO.

7. Despite the many challenges that UN operations often have, there are instances of the UN working effectively in PSOs.

The large number of UN operations across the globe means that not all UN operations, or indeed other non-UN PSOs are managed equally. Officials would examine each potential PSO on its own merits before making recommendations to Ministers.
Like-minded coalition missions, led by a major regional organisation or state

8. The command and control and force protection issues that can arise in UN-led missions are more manageable when partnering with traditional partners in 'like-minded' coalitions where resourcing and mandate constraints are less prominent and interoperability is more practiced. Some current examples are New Zealand's contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan (led by NATO) and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean (led by the US).

New Partners

9. There is a real potential for New Zealand to capitalise on the long-standing defence relationships with regional partners.
Annex 4

Current New Zealand Peace Support Operations

SCI BRANCH OPERATIONS BRIEF
NZDF Deployed Missions – OE 16
4 October 2013

ISAF (Afghanistan)

The closure of the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamiyan province in Afghanistan marked the end of New Zealand’s primary military contribution to Afghanistan. However, New Zealand has continued to support a number of development projects in Bamiyan since the withdrawal of the PRT. Continued military contributions from New Zealand include a small number of training officers to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy from 2013 and personnel to the ISAF special operations forces headquarters in intelligence and planning roles. In addition New Zealand will contribute US$2 million per annum in funding to Afghanistan’s National Security Forces from 2015.

Timor Leste

2. At the end of 2012, at the request of the Government of Timor-Leste, both the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), of which New Zealand was a large contributor, ended their involvement in Timor-Leste. There are now no NZDF personnel in Timor-Leste. Two full time and 10 short term
Police personnel are deployed to Timor Leste in mentoring and advisory roles. The NZ Police mission in Timor-Leste is popular with the Timorese government and contributes to the increased capacity of the Timorese Police to maintain stability in a country which has needed the help of international peacekeepers (led by Australia and New Zealand) twice in the past 15 years.

**RAMSI (Solomon Islands)**

3. There are currently 17 NZ Police personnel deployed to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Cabinet agreed in March 2011 to extend the mandate for New Zealand’s support to RAMSI to 30 September 2014.

4. RAMSI is now concentrating on building the capacity of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. That capacity and the Force’s confidence is increasing. New Zealand development programmes currently located within RAMSI have almost all been completed, localised or moved to bilateral or other donor programmes. The RAMSI mission is expected to continue in a reduced form until at least 2017.

**MFO (Sina)**

5. New Zealand has 28 NZDF personnel deployed with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sina. The MFO was established in 1982 to supervise the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace. New Zealand provides the current Force Commander, Major General Warren Whiting, whose appointment has been extended until 1 March 2014. The current Cabinet mandate for this deployment extends until 28 February 2014.

6. The MFO exemplifies New Zealand’s long-standing commitment to peace in the Middle East.

**UNMISS (South Sudan)**

7. New Zealand contributes three military observers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The Cabinet mandate for these observers is set to expire on 31 August 2014.

8. The UN remains committed to the mission in South Sudan, which continues to make gradual progress to improve the prospects of the country. UNMISS is New Zealand’s only sub-Saharan African deployment and as such is an important indicator of New Zealand’s interest and concern in peace and security on the African Continent.

9. Around 90% of all currently deployed UN personnel operate in Africa and 50% of all current UN missions are in Africa.

**UNTSO (Israel, Lebanon, Syria)**

10. New Zealand’s present mandate of up to eight NZDF personnel to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) expires on 30 September 2014. Three personnel are located in Israel, with three in Lebanon, and the remaining two in the Israeli-controlled territory of the Golan Heights. UNTSO military observers are unarmed.
11. UNTSO was established in 1947 to ensure that peace agreements and ceasefires between Israel, Lebanon and Syria are observed. New Zealand has contributed to UNTSO since 1954, our longest standing peacekeeping mission. The mission reduces day-to-day tensions along the border areas between Israel, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and promotes dialogue to support the Middle East Peace Process amongst the international community. New Zealand's contribution to UNTSO reinforces a number of high level statements of support for the Middle East Peace Process and is a practical demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to the peace and security of the region.

UNCMAC (Korea)

12. New Zealand has three military observers in the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in Korea. The Cabinet mandate for the deployment expires on 31 August 2015. UNCMAC plays an important confidence building role on the Korean Peninsula and supports inter-Korean reconciliation measures.

13. Our role in UNCMAC builds on New Zealand's participation during the Korean War and is a highly valued aspect of our bilateral relationship with South Korea. Further it demonstrates our on-going commitment to international efforts to bring about stability and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula.

CMF (Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden)

14. Cabinet has agreed to deploy NZDF personnel and assets to the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean as part of the Combined Maritime Taskforce (CMF) to combat piracy in the region. The main force element, a RNZN frigate will be deployed into the taskforce from November 2013 for three months.

15. New Zealand has a strategic interest in supporting the maritime security taskforces that are contributing to the downward trend of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean region. The CMF deployment package allows New Zealand to make a contribution to the protection of a vital route for global commerce, thereby protecting our trade and economic interests; demonstrating New Zealand's commitment to a major global security challenge; and enhancing our bilateral and multilateral defence relationships with traditional partners such as the US and Australia.

UNAMA (Afghanistan)


Bougainville

17. There are seven NZ Police personnel deployed to Bougainville in advisory roles. A continued NZ Police presence in Bougainville is desirable as capacity building of local police forces in the Pacific is necessary to decrease incidences of instability in our near abroad which may require costly peace support interventions by New Zealand personnel.