

## **HON ANDREW LITTLE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE**

### **New Zealand Defence Force Support to Ukraine – August 2022**

May 2023

This publication provides documents on Cabinet's August 2022 decision to deploy two New Zealand Defence Force training teams of up to 120 personnel, to the United Kingdom, until 30 November 2022.

The pack comprises the following documents:

- The Cabinet minute of decision: *New Zealand Defence Force Support to Ukraine*. [CAB-22-MIN-0317]
- The Cabinet paper: *New Zealand Defence force Support to Ukraine*. [CAB-22-SUB-0317]

This pack has been released on the Ministry of Defence website, available at: [www.defence.govt.nz/publications](http://www.defence.govt.nz/publications).

It has been necessary to withhold certain information in accordance with the following provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Where information is withheld, the relevant sections of the Act are indicated in the body of the document. Where information has been withheld in accordance with section 9(2) of the Act, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Information is withheld where making it available would be likely to prejudice:

- the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand [section 6(a)]
- the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on the basis of confidence by the Government of any other country [section 6(b)(i)].

Information is also withheld in order to:

- maintain the constitutional conventions for the timing being which protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and officials [section 9(2)(f)(iv)]
- maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty [section 9(2)(g)(i)]



# Cabinet

## Minute of Decision

*This document contains information for the New Zealand Cabinet. It must be treated in confidence and handled in accordance with any security classification, or other endorsement. The information can only be released, including under the Official Information Act 1982, by persons with the appropriate authority.*

### New Zealand Defence Force Support to Ukraine

**Portfolios** Foreign Affairs / Defence

On 15 August 2022, following reference from the Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, Cabinet:

1 **noted** that:

1.1 in April and May 2022, Cabinet agreed to various support options for New Zealand's involvement in the conflict following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine [CAB-22-MIN-0131, CAB-22-MIN-0191];

s6(a)

2 **noted** that high numbers of Ukrainian forces are being killed and wounded while Russia also continues to attack civilian populations and infrastructure;

3 s6(a)

4 **noted** that further New Zealand contributions to Ukraine now will have a direct and positive impact on the broad range of New Zealand interests that are engaged through this conflict;

5 **noted** that the options outlined in the paper under CAB-22-SUB-0317 have been assessed against the Strategic Framework previously agreed by Cabinet [CBC-22-MIN-0034];

6 **noted** that the proposed New Zealand Defence Force commitments can be funded within existing Vote Defence Force baseline funding;

7 **noted** that the proposed options would not negatively impact the ability of the New Zealand Defence Force to respond to regional or domestic contingencies, current engagement in the Pacific, or the regeneration of New Zealand Army capabilities;

8 **noted** that deploying qualified New Zealand Army infantry personnel would provide a significant retention mechanism;

9 **agreed** to deploy two New Zealand Defence Force training teams of up to 120 personnel, to the United Kingdom, as soon as practicable until 30 November 2022, at an estimated cost of \$4.366 million in FY 2022/23;

10 [REDACTED] s6(a)

11 **noted** that the threat to New Zealand Defence Force personnel operating in the United Kingdom is considered to be [REDACTED] s6(a)

Rachel Hayward  
Acting Secretary of the Cabinet

Released by the Minister of Defence

## NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE SUPPORT TO UKRAINE

### Proposal

- 1 This paper responds to an invitation from the United Kingdom Armed Forces for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to contribute to an infantry training programme for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This paper seeks a mandate to deploy up to 120 NZDF personnel to the United Kingdom (UK) until 30 November 2022, to conduct infantry training.

2  s6(a)

### Relation to Government priorities

- 3 Providing additional support to Ukraine as the conflict continues to unfold enables Aotearoa New Zealand to support our strategic interests in the defence of the international rules-based system, and is a demonstration of our values and independent foreign policy. Our ongoing role assisting and adding value to an international response supports Ukraine in protecting its territorial integrity and sovereignty as it continues to defend its interests.
- 4 This proposed deployment also supports the Minister of Defence's 'People' priority. A deployment of this nature involving junior members of the New Zealand Army conducting core soldier skills in a foreign environment alongside key partners is likely to enhance morale and improve retention.

### Executive Summary

5  s6(a)

The British Army has commenced the training of 10,000 Ukrainian battle casualty replacements, with approximately 2500 personnel expected to be trained per month, across four training locations in the UK. New Zealand has been invited to support the UK with this training.

- 6 Assisting with this training would be a substantive, practical and proportionate contribution in support of Ukraine's self-defence. It would complement and build on the military support already provided, and New Zealand's broader diplomatic and economic assistance. Providing one or two infantry training teams (up to 120 NZDF personnel to the UK to 30 November) would make a valuable

contribution to the international effort in support of Ukraine and reinforce New Zealand's position as a responsive partner. This proposal also provides a significant retention opportunity for the New Zealand Army at a time when attrition is high, partly as a result of the low tempo of military activity in the wake of the NZDF's support to New Zealand's COVID-19 response. The proposed options meet the criteria in the Strategic Framework as agreed by Cabinet.

- 7 While infantry training would encompass different technical skills and an increased number of deployed NZDF personnel, it is substantively similar in nature to the recent artillery training, and does not represent an escalation in the nature of New Zealand's support. Both forms of training involve instructing frontline AFU personnel who will utilise the skills and capabilities provided in direct combat with Russian forces.
- 8 An NZDF contingent would need to depart New Zealand no later than 17 August 2022 to be able to maximise the cost-benefit ratio of the proposed deployment. If a Cabinet decision was delayed beyond 15 August 2022, the projected NZDF training output would be reduced by approximately 50 percent (see para 40 for more detail). Officials would return to Cabinet should an extension beyond 30 November or changes to the deployment be proposed.
- 9 The proposal would not affect the NZDF's ability to operate in the Pacific, or respond to, domestic or regional contingencies. The NZDF would be able to maintain current levels of engagement within the Pacific s6(a)

## Background

### *Current state of conflict and Ukraine's requests for support*

10

s6(a)

11

s6(a)

### **Previous New Zealand support**

- 12 Since February this year, New Zealand has taken significant and unprecedented decisions to provide diplomatic, economic and military support to Ukraine. Our contributions continue to be strongly welcomed and acknowledged by Ukraine and key partners. New Zealand has contributed more than \$41.3 million of financial and in-kind assistance in addition to sanctions

targeting over 840 Russian and Belorussian individuals and entities. New Zealand's full response to-date is in Annex A. A summary of the NZDF's recently concluded deployments are in Annex B.

- 13 Cabinet has previously noted New Zealand's national interests in continuing to support Ukraine—these interests remain unchanged.<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED] s6(a)

### United Kingdom Armed Forces training programme

- 14 On 27 June 2022, the UK Armed Forces commenced training AFU infantry personnel, known as [REDACTED] s6(b)(i).<sup>3</sup> Over the next four months the UK intends to train 10,000 AFU personnel. Partner nations, including New Zealand, have been invited to support the UK with this programme.<sup>4</sup> The training is being delivered [REDACTED] s9(2) British Army training teams, dispersed across four locations in the UK. Each team is able to train approximately 200 AFU personnel per month.

- 15 This activity will train enlisted AFU personnel and equip them with the core skills to be effective in frontline combat. The training is based on the UK's basic soldier training course which includes weapons handling, combat first aid, operational law and soldier skills. The training syllabus has been assured by UK legal advisors and is delivered with full interpreter support. [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)

- 16 [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i) The personnel are full members of the AFU and are commanded by an AFU support team located in the UK. [REDACTED] s6(b)(i)

- 17 [REDACTED] s6(a)

<sup>1</sup> CAB-22-MIN-0131, CAB-22-MIN-0191 and CBC-22-MIN-0034 refer.

<sup>2</sup> CAB-22-MIN-0232 refers.

<sup>3</sup> [REDACTED] s6(b)(i) is an extension of previous UK commitments to train AFU soldiers following Russia's annexation of Crimea.

<sup>4</sup> Other countries invited include Five-Eye and NATO members.

<sup>5</sup> [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)

## New Zealand's potential contribution

- 18 Cabinet is asked to consider the deployment of NZDF infantry instructors to the UK to support [REDACTED] s6(b)(i).
- **Option One** Deploying two NZDF training teams of up to 120 personnel, to the UK until 30 November 2022 to train approximately 800 AFU personnel.
  - **Option Two:** Deploying one NZDF training team of up to 60 personnel, to the UK until 30 November 2022 to train approximately 400 AFU personnel.
- 19 Both Option One and Option Two align with the criteria of the framework, the main difference being the scale of training that would be delivered and difference in cost. Option One would provide the greater benefit to Ukraine by training 800 AFU personnel. It is also likely to have a greater immediate benefit to NZDF personnel retention. Option Two would provide training to half the number of AFU personnel [REDACTED] s6(a).
- 20 The retention of NZDF Pacific response options remains a high priority for the NZDF. Neither option proposed would affect the NZDF's ability to operate in, or respond to, domestic or regional contingencies in the Pacific. Humanitarian assistance missions, such as in the wake of severe weather events, typically require support trades such as logistics, medical and engineering, as opposed to infantry personnel. [REDACTED] s6(a).
- 21 Both of the proposed options can be funded from within existing Vote Defence Force baselines. There is currently [REDACTED] s9(2)(f)(iv) of unallocated appropriation in the Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA. All extant NZDF operational commitments have been accounted for already in FY 2022/23. As such, the remaining allocation is for contingent operations and activities which cannot be readily forecasted.
- 22 Officials considered alternative options, including embedding smaller units within existing UK training teams. However, as a result of close co-ordination with the UK, it was determined to be more effective for NZDF to provide complete training teams that would be able to seamlessly integrate into the wider UK programme and operate on a more self-sufficient basis. Deploying more than two training teams is not recommended.
- 23 The training would be conducted exclusively at one of four locations in the UK— at no time would NZDF personnel enter Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.
- 24 [REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a), s6(b)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)

- 25 The NZDF contingent would consist of a command element and instructional staff. The training teams would be primarily comprised of non-commissioned and junior infantry-qualified soldiers and would be commanded by a New Zealand Army Officer. 60 personnel has been identified as the optimum training team size that will guarantee and deliver the required output, with the necessary resilience needed for COVID-related impacts.

### Assessment against the Strategic Framework

- 26 The proposed options meet the criteria in the Strategic Framework as agreed by Cabinet. Detailed analysis of these options against the Framework criteria is in Annex C, and summarised below.
- The proposals align with and reinforce New Zealand's independent foreign policy. They support our national interests, including: ensuring the defence of the international rules-based system; upholding international law in the face of violations; and contributing to ongoing collective security interests.

s6(a)

### Why should New Zealand support this training programme?

27

s6(a)

28

s6(a)

s9(2)(g)(i)

Due to differences in equipment types, the NZDF is unable



to provide maintenance support. However, New Zealand is able to provide professional, respected, and capable personnel to make a meaningful contribution to train AFU members and support our key partners in their own efforts. The NZDF maintains a well respected people capability that could be utilised to assist Ukraine, [REDACTED] s6(a) and reinforce New Zealand's interests (in addition to New Zealand's broader diplomatic and economic support for Ukraine).

29 The infantry training support that would be provided aligns well with the skills and capabilities of NZDF personnel. This training would be a substantive, practical and proportionate contribution in support of Ukraine's self-defence, and aligned with Ukraine's needs at this phase of the conflict. NZDF is well-positioned to provide support, and make a further tangible contribution to the international effort in support of Ukraine.

30 This proposal provides a significant retention opportunity for the New Zealand Army—the ability to engage junior infantry personnel in overseas activities following a long period of support to New Zealand's COVID-19 response will improve morale and job satisfaction. Furthermore, the nature of the activities conducted on the deployment would complement activities programmed as part of the New Zealand Army capability regeneration plans.

31 The Army regeneration programme is to restore a range skills and capabilities that have lapsed during the delivery the NZDF's support to New Zealand's COVID-19 response (Operation Protect). These skills and capabilities generally relate to either [REDACTED] s6(a). This programme of regeneration will continue during the deployment of the training team; with activities rescheduled if required.

32 The Army remains able to respond to likely security or disaster responses domestically or regionally with elements that were maintained throughout the delivery of Operation Protect.

*New Zealand's value add*

33 As was seen with the recent deployment to train AFU personnel in the use of the L119 light field gun, the NZDF is able to integrate seamlessly into the UK training system and deliver valuable training outcomes for the AFU. The systems and procedures to provide training for the AFU alongside the UK would again be utilised to deliver infantry training.

34 This training programme will continue regardless of New Zealand's involvement. [REDACTED] s6(b)(i)

*Is this an escalation of the support being provided?*

- 35 While infantry training would encompass different technical skills and Option One would see an increased number of deployed NZDF personnel, it is substantively similar in nature to the recent artillery training support, as defined in the Strategic Framework. Both forms of training involve instructing frontline AFU personnel who will utilise the skills and capabilities provided in direct combat with Russian forces. Infantry training would represent a broadening of the range of New Zealand military support, but would remain proportionate to and aligned with New Zealand's interests, Ukraine's needs, and the relative contributions of other key partners.
- 36 Officials consider that there is a good case for an increased NZDF footprint. This is based on: the overall alignment with the Strategic Framework; the opportunity to make a substantive and practical contribution in support of Ukraine's self-defence; how the proposal complements the military support already provided and New Zealand's broader diplomatic and economic assistance; and the broader organisational benefits for the NZDF in supporting the New Zealand Army's retention and regeneration objectives.

*Partner contributions to the training programme*

- 37 The Netherlands has announced that they will support [redacted] s6(b)(i) from the end of August with a [redacted] s6(b)(i) team. The Canadian Government is considering a proposal to contribute a training contingent. [redacted] s6(b)(i) [redacted] s6(b)(i), [redacted] s9(2)(g)(i) and Sweden are also considering contributions at this time and officials will remain engaged to understand these as they are confirmed.

**Why now?**

- 38 [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)
- 39 [redacted] s6(b)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)
- 40 [redacted] s9(2)(g)(i)
- [redacted] herefore, the NZDF contingent would need to depart New Zealand no later than 17 August 2022 in order to be ready to instruct [redacted] s9(2)(g)(i) If a Cabinet decision was delayed beyond 15 August 2022, the projected NZDF training output would be reduced by approximately 50 percent. This would mean only 200 AFU personnel trained with one team and 400 with two teams, as opposed to 400 and 800 respectively.

41

s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted]

s9(2)(f)(iv)

42

s6(b)(i)

[Redacted]

43

s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted]

s9(2)(g)(i)

44

s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted]

45

s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted]

46

s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted]

s6(a)

[Redacted]

<sup>6</sup> CAB-22-MIN-0313 refers.

<sup>7</sup> CAB-22-MIN-0243 refers.

s6(a)

s6(a)

### Legal Considerations

51 The option discussed in this paper is consistent with international law. Under the UN Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression. This proposal does not present a significant risk of being a party to a conflict.<sup>8</sup> Operational parameters for any support will be tailored to ensure compliance with New Zealand's legal obligations. The NZDF will ensure that any assistance provided will be consistently monitored to ensure compliance.

---


<sup>8</sup> A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question.

52 **Legal basis for presence in host nation.** The legal basis for all of the NZDF deployments is with the permission of the host Government.

53 **Status of forces and application of host nation law.** New Zealand maintains an Exchange of Personnel Memorandum of Arrangement with the UK. Exchange personnel in the UK are subject to the provisions of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland Visiting Forces Act 1952.

54 **Health and Safety at Work Act 2015.** This activity is an operational activity as defined by section 7(4) (a) (ii) of the act. The activity is to be carried out by the Armed Forces overseas, and should it be approved, will constitute an activity in respect to which the Government of New Zealand wishes to provide assistance. Therefore, the Health and Safety at Work Act does not apply.

55 **Human rights risk assessment.** New Zealand is obligated under international law to not aid or assist (or be complicit in) an internationally wrongful act by another State, such as acts of torture. The legal standard for complicity is high and officials assess it unlikely New Zealand's actions would meet it.


56 s9(2)(g)(i)  
  
There is no evidence to-date that the AFU are conducting themselves unlawfully in the conflict. There is nothing specific or substantial to indicate a human rights breach may occur.

57 Should officials be made aware of specific or substantial information which indicate a human rights breach may occur, the training would be suspended while a revised risk assessment was carried out. If the resulting risk was substantiated, officials would revert to Cabinet for consideration before training resumed.

**Impact Analysis**

58 The NZDF has considered the likelihood of civilian casualties resulting from this activity; due to the training nature of the activity it is not considered a risk.

**Threat Assessment**

59 New Zealand Defence Intelligence assess that the threat to NZDF personnel operating in the UK would likely be equivalent to the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment of s6(a)  


## Financial Implications

- 60 The proposed contributions can be funded from within existing Vote Defence Force baselines. These deployments are not declared to be qualifying operational service under the Veterans' Support Act; therefore, there is no impact on the veterans' support entitlement obligation.

Estimated Direct Cost	(NZ \$million)
	FY 2022/23
• Option One – two training teams	4.366
• Option Two – one training team	2.206
s6(a)	
<i>Unallocated NZDF appropriation</i>	s9(2)(f)(iv)

## Consultation


- 61 This Cabinet paper has been jointly prepared by the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Treasury, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Government Communications Security Bureau were consulted.

## Communications and Proactive Release

- 62 If Cabinet agrees the deployment of additional personnel will be publicly announced with an appropriate level of detail regarding the nature of the training support. The paper will be proactively released in due course.

## Recommendations

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence recommend that Cabinet:

- 1 **Note** that high numbers of Ukrainian forces are being killed and wounded while Russia also continues to attack civilian populations and infrastructure.
- 2  s6(a)
- 3 **Note** that further New Zealand contributions to Ukraine now, will have a direct and positive impact on the broad range of New Zealand interests that are engaged through this conflict.
- 4 **Note** that the proposed options outlined in this paper have been assessed against the Strategic Framework previously agreed by Cabinet.
- 5 **Note** the proposed New Zealand Defence Force commitments can be funded within existing Vote Defence Force baseline funding.
- 6 **Note** the proposed options would not negatively impact the ability of the NZDF to respond to regional or domestic contingencies, current engagement in the Pacific, or the regeneration of New Zealand Army capabilities.

7 **Note** deploying qualified New Zealand Army infantry personnel as proposed would provide a significant retention mechanism.

**Either**

8 Option One

**Agree** to deploy two New Zealand Defence Force training teams, of up to 120 personnel, to the United Kingdom, as soon as practicable until 30 November 2022.

**Note** that the estimated cost of this option is \$4.366 million in FY 2022/23.

**Or**

9 Option Two:

**Agree** to deploy one New Zealand Defence Force training team, of up to 60 personnel, to the United Kingdom, as soon as practicable until 30 November 2022.

**Note** that the estimated cost of this option is \$2.206 million in FY 2022/23.

**And**

10

s6(a)

11

**Note** the threat to New Zealand Defence Force personnel operating in the United Kingdom is considered to be s6(a)

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Nanaia Mahuta  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Peeni Henare  
Minister of Defence

## Annex A: New Zealand assistance to Ukraine (as at 24 July)

Date	Topic	Announcement	Value of assistance NZ\$ million			Status
			Military	Economic	Diplomatic	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>41.376</b>	<b>29.411</b>	<b>8.750</b>	<b>3.215</b>	
27 June	Diplomatic	Contribution of \$600,000 to the International Criminal Court and announce New Zealand's intention to intervene in the ICJ case against Russia			0.600	Paid.
27 June	Diplomatic	Secondment of a senior NZ military officer to support the International Criminal Court investigations			0.800	Scoping activity is underway.
27 June	Military	s6(a) upgrade for 400 TAIT radios previously supplied to Ukraine	0.100			Upgrade provided to Ukraine Armed Forces.
27 June	Military	Deploying an additional liaison officer to s6(a) for two months	0.045			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	Extending the deployment of two NZDF liaison officers to Belgium and the UK to 30 November	0.209			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	Extending the deployment of four NZDF logistics specialists in Germany to 31 August	0.376			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	A further six NZDF s6(a) intelligence analysts deployed to the UK to 30 November	0.568			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	Extending the deployment of six NZDF intelligence analysts to the UK and the use of NZ based open-source intelligence capability to 30 November	0.571			Deployment is under way.



Date	Topic	Announcement	Value of assistance NZ\$ million			Status
			Military	Economic	Diplomatic	
27 June	Military	<b>\$4.5 million to the NATO Trust Fund for non-lethal military assistance</b>	4.500			Paid.
9 June	Economic	<b>\$750,000 contribution to USAID project supporting Ukraine's cyber resilience</b>		0.750		Delegated cooperation agreement has been finalised with USAID and funding paid. New Zealand contribution announced on 26 July.
23 May	Military	<b>Artillery Training team, surplus equipment and training ammunition.</b>	1.205			Training has been completed and all personnel have returned to New Zealand. 288 Ukrainian soldiers were trained over the course of this deployment.
3 May	Economic	<b>\$2 million to New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership NGOs.</b>		2.000		Paid. Approved activities cover a range of interventions including cash based assistance, education, psychosocial support and food security. Activities are with partners operating in Moldova, Poland or Romania. With the scaled up activities the total round to be approved is NZ\$1,934,857.
11 Apr	Military	<b>C-130H Hercules and 50-strong NZDF team to Europe to carry equipment and supplies.</b>	3.977			The NZDF C-130H has completed over 50 operational flights from 11 countries to logistics nodes in s6(a) The aircraft has flown 132 flying hours and transported 255,372kg of stores and 98 passengers. The aircraft and supporting crew have now returned to New Zealand.
11 Apr	Military	<b>Eight NZDF logistics specialists based in Germany.</b>	0.575			The NZDF logistics specialists have embedded in the International Donor Coordination Centre in Germany and are working alongside senior AFU officials and partner nation representatives. Their main task is to prioritise aid deliveries and schedule them for transportation with the nations who are providing airlift capabilities. The mobile logistics team have supported each mission conducted by the NZDF C-130H in order to certify the load and ensure all cargo requirements have been met, particularly in respect to the carriage of munitions.
11 Apr	Military	<b>\$7.5 million to contribute to weapons and ammunition procurement via the United Kingdom.</b>	7.500			Paid to UK MoD, and purchase of materiel ( s6(a) ) confirmed with the UK.
11 Apr	Military	<b>\$4.1 million to support commercial satellite access for the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence.</b>	4.129			Paid.

Date	Topic	Announcement	Value of assistance NZ\$ million			Status
			Military	Economic	Diplomatic	
11 Apr	Diplomatic	<b>\$1 million to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.</b>			1.000	Paid.
11 Apr	Diplomatic	<b>\$500,000 for the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court.</b>			0.500	Paid (\$400,000 to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor; \$100,000 towards the costs of external legal counsel for New Zealand's intervention in Ukraine's ICJ case).
28 Mar	Military	<b>Nine New Zealand Defence Force personnel to the United Kingdom and Belgium,</b> to support intelligence and engagement work.	0.656			<b>Intelligence</b> —The NZDF analysts have integrated seamlessly with s6(a) and provided a meaningful contribution to the analytical output and resilience of s6(a) <b>Liaison</b> —NATO and the UK are critical players in supporting Ukraine's self-defence. The NZDF liaison officers have enhanced the flow of information, ensuring New Zealand's contributions were clearly understood by partners. They have also informed New Zealand-based officials on what Ukraine's ongoing needs are and the niche areas where we may add value.
26 Mar	Diplomatic	<b>\$315,000 to help the International Criminal Court's</b> urgent resource needs.			0.315	Paid.
21 Mar	Military	<b>\$5 million for non-lethal military assistance,</b> of which \$4.24 million to NATO Trust Fund and \$0.76 million purchase of Tait communications equipment.	5.000			NATO Trust Fund contribution paid. TAIT radios have been delivered.
15 Mar	Economic	<b>\$2 million to the UN Ukraine Humanitarian Fund.</b>		2.000		Paid.
15 Mar	Economic	<b>\$2 million to UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).</b>		2.000		Paid.
28 Feb	Economic	<b>\$2 million to International Committee of the Red Cross.</b>		2.000		Paid.

## Summary of New Zealand's Sanctions actions (as at 2 August 2022)

Date announced	Topic	Focus	Notable targets	Details
1 August	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 9: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and military-industrial entities</b>	Russian Armed Forces; Gas Industry Insurance Company; Russian Railways; other defence entities	The branches and independent arms of service of the Russian Armed Forces; 61 other entities  (840 plus total entities and individuals now subject to sanctions)
4 July	Sanctions (trade-related)	<b>Tranche 8: Banning the import of Russian gold</b>	Gold of Russian origin	
8 June	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 7: State-owned enterprises and other companies of strategic importance to Russia</b>	Gazprom, Russia's largest company; defence entities, weapons manufacturers, who form part of Russia's vast military-industrial complex	44 entities: (38 Russian, 6 Belarusian)
16 May	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 6: Belarusian leaders and defence entities</b>	President Lukashenko, military leaders	27 sanctioned 12 previously travel banned now have full suite of prohibitions applied
10 May	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 5: Russian disinformation and malicious cyber actors, automatic extension of some sanctions measures to 'immediate family members' and associates of those sanctioned</b>	Troll farm, Ministry of Defence spokesperson, military intelligence head and units	8 sanctioned (5 individuals and 3 entities)
2 May	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 4: Additional Russian political elites and defence entities, extension of sanctions prohibitions on those travel banned</b>	Members of Upper House	170 Upper House members, 6 defence companies and organisations sanctioned 400+ individuals previously travel banned now have full suite of prohibitions applied
19 April	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 3: Russian financial institutions</b>	Central Bank, sovereign wealth fund, biggest banks	18 entities sanctioned
6 April	Sanctions (trade-related)	<b>Application of 35% tariff on imports of Russian origin</b>		

Date announced	Topic	Focus	Notable targets	Details
		<b>Extension of export prohibitions of certain strategic industrial products to Russia and Belarus</b>		
4 April	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 2: Russian oligarchs</b>	Chief Executives, founders, owners of major companies and financial entities, family members	36 individuals sanctioned
18 March	Sanctions	<b>Tranche 1: Political, military and economic elites and entities, additional travel ban targets, ban on entry into New Zealand of Russian government aircraft and vessels</b>	Putin, Prime Minister, Ministers, Security Council, State Duma	13 individuals and 19 entities sanctioned 364 other individuals sanctioned (travel ban only) Prohibition on all Russian military and government ships and aircraft entering New Zealand
15 March	Export prohibition	<b>Export prohibition of 25 February 2022 on controlled strategic goods to Russian military and security forces expanded to cover Belarus</b>	Russian and Belarusian military, paramilitary, militia and police forces	Any goods (no exclusions) to the entities listed in the Gazette Notice that are listed in the NZ Strategic Goods List or which materially enable or support operations and activities of a military or internal security nature
9 March	<b><i>Passing of Russia Sanctions Act</i></b>			
25 February	Export prohibition	<b>Export prohibition on controlled strategic goods and any other goods to Russian military and security forces</b>	Russian military, paramilitary, militia and police forces	Any goods (no exclusions) to the 4 entities listed in the Gazette Notice that are listed in the NZ Strategic Goods List or which materially enable or support operations and activities of a military or internal security nature
24 February	Travel ban	<b>Travel ban against Russian Government officials and other individuals associated with Russia's invasion</b>	Putin, Foreign Minister	100+ individuals travel banned

## Annex B: NZDF Deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence

### Operation Tīeke: Artillery Training Team and supporting equipment



TE OPE KĀTUA O AOTEAROA  
**DEFENCE FORCE**



MANATŪ KAUPAPA  
WAONGA  
NEW ZEALAND  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



**New Zealand's value add:** *This deployment was a practical, niche opportunity for New Zealand to provide a valued, meaningful and immediate additional contribution to the defence of Ukraine. The NZDF were uniquely placed to respond to this request from the UK as a known and trusted partner, as well as having the requisite skills and knowledge to support this training programme.*

#### Artillery Training Team support

In June, 27 NZDF personnel arrived in the UK to commence training members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the use of the L119 Light Field Gun and supporting equipment at Rollestone Camp, Salisbury Plain Training Area. The NZDF soldiers from 16<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment had a range of experience, from the lowest rank of private up to Major (one of the battery commanders).

The New Zealand team led the development and delivery of the training, supported by the UK Royal School of Artillery. The team transferred 36 UK L119 guns out of long term storage and prepared them for firing, and supervised the Ukrainian personnel's live-fire confirmation exercises. The team integrated into the UK system seamlessly, receiving support from UK armourers and other artillery units to support training delivery and the maintenance of equipment. The team also coordinated and conducted the inspection and first line repair of the New Zealand supplied weapon aiming systems (sights).

The last member of the team returned on 10 July, completing New Zealand's artillery training deployment to the UK in support of Ukraine.



#### Key statistics

- 288 Ukrainian soldiers trained including:  
s6(a)
- There were a variety of Ukrainian personnel deployed to train on the L119 Light Field Gun, with the youngest being 18 years old.
- The NZDF team assisted three observer trainers with lessons and technical information to prepare them to train Ukrainians into the future.
- Training consisted of six day courses for anywhere from 80 to 125 soldiers, and involved a live-firing confirmation exercise.
- The team also coordinated the delivery of the overall L119 equipment donation programme.
- New Zealand contributed 500 rounds of ammunition to support the training.

#### Professional NZDF soldiers made a meaningful contribution

NZDF Artillery team commander Major Jonathan Dick: *"We're pretty proud to be here and help out and defend Ukraine against Russia... it's been an interesting job so far looking after these guys. They're pretty motivated, dedicated and it's been a real privilege."*

NZDF personnel noted that the Ukrainians have experience in artillery systems, and have shown a lot of commitment, which was something the NZDF can take away from the experience and share back home in New Zealand.

#### New Zealand's value add

Major Rebecca Bullock (British Armed Forces) *"... the knowledge of these gunners has absolutely been pivotal in the delivery [of this capability]. [Their] professionalism has been superb."*

The Ukrainian soldiers said the NZDF instructors were professional, provided a lot of information and were dedicated to the training programme. *"We're learning things here, the new drills, new weaponry and really hope this will help with the fight against Russia."*



#### Media

The UK Ministry of Defence invited a small number of media based in Europe, including TVNZ, to watch an artillery exercise at the Rollestone Military Camp in Salisbury, England.

TVNZ also did a news story with the artillery team prior to their deployment.

# Operation Tīeke: C-130 Hercules aircraft deployment and logistics support to the International Donor Co-ordination Centre



TE OPE KĀTUA O AOTEAROA  
**DEFENCE FORCE**



MANATŪ KAUPAPA  
**WAONGA**  
NEW ZEALAND  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

**New Zealand's value add:** *This Defence deployment demonstrated New Zealand is willing and able to strengthen the international response in support Ukraine's self-defence efforts. This was a tangible and visible example of our willingness to contribute to the response, was well-received by partners and strengthened our relationships with donor states.*

## Air Transport support

- One C-130 Hercules
- 50 personnel deployed in support
- Six trade groups
- 10 week deployment from 13 April to 26 June
- C-130 Hercules Based at Royal Air Force Base Brize Norton in the UK

## Logistics support

- Eight personnel
- Based in Stuttgart, Germany
- Majority deployed from April to June
- Four personnel [REDACTED] s6(a)
- Based in Stuttgart, Germany

## Key statistics

- Hours flown: 165.3
- Total hours flown: 239.1
- European countries supported: 11
- Flights into aid distribution centres: 25
- Military aid carried: 255,372 kg
- Pallets carried: 98
- Passengers carried: 92



## Case study: Malta

In May, almost 2000kg of medical supplies destined for Ukraine were transported by the RNZAF C-130 Hercules from Malta to a distribution centre in Eastern Europe before being delivered into Ukraine to support those in need. This was an example of how the logistics team and C-130 Hercules detachment worked together help Ukrainians by supporting non-traditional partners and meet the urgent needs of the Ukrainian people. Army Lieutenant Colonel Vanessa Ropitini, commander of the logistics detachment, said the team had enjoyed coming together and working with others in the multinational effort to support Ukraine. The work of the logistics and air transport teams meant that Ukraine had access to urgently needed medical equipment to provide to those in need.

## Purpose:

- The IDCC is a multinational headquarters based in Stuttgart, Germany and assists with the control and flow of military aid to Ukraine.
- The UK stood up the IDCC in March in order to co-ordinate and control the flow of assistance to Ukraine in response to the unprecedented levels of aid donated by partners.
- By late-March, the UK was requesting partner support to relieve the strain on established logistics networks, in order to support Ukraine's self-defence efforts against Russia

## New Zealand contribution:

- In April, a RNZAF C-130 Hercules, 50 accompanying personnel and eight NZDF personnel from Army, Air Force and Navy deployed to Europe to assist to the IDCC.
- The C-130 Hercules, 50 personnel detachment and four logistics personnel returned to New Zealand at the end of June.
- The remaining four logistics personnel will return to New Zealand by 31 August. [REDACTED] s6(a)

## Effect:

- NZDF personnel immediately began assisting multinational efforts to coordinate the movement of donated military to Ukraine.
- The personnel ensured that equipment donations were in accordance with Ukraine's operational priorities, coordinated the logistics for donations and matched transport opportunities to donated aid.
- The work of the teams supported the transportation of aid for multiple other nations as part of the co-ordinated global response efforts. Their contribution has been effective and meaningful, and has helped the international community ensure that Ukraine **gets the right equipment at the right time** to assist their self-defence efforts.
- The logistics team was essential to ensure the most appropriate tasks for the New Zealand Hercules were identified and transported to Ukraine.
- Partners regularly acknowledged New Zealand's support in this area during engagements, particularly during the monthly Ministerial-led Ukraine Contact Group.




**Annex C: NZDF Training Team: assessment against Strategic Framework criteria**

s9(2)(g)(i)



Released by the Minister of Defence



Released by the Minister of Defence



**Annex D: Schedule of training**

s9(2)(g)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence