## HON RON MARK, MINISTER OF DEFENCE

New Zealand Defence Force: Iraq Deployment Review – Release of Cabinet Documents

July 2019

This publication provides papers associated with Cabinet's June 2019 decision to extend the mandate for the NZDF Building Partner Capacity Development to Tai and related support positions in Iraq, with withdrawal from Taji to take place by 30 June 2020.

The pack comprises the following documents:

- June 2019 Cabinet minute of decision New Zealand Defence Force: Iraq Deployment Review [CAB-19-MIN-0265]
- May 2019 consideration by the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee New Zealand Defence Force: Iraq Deployment Review [ERD-19-MIN-0009]
- The associated Cabinet paper New Zealand Defence Force Iraq Deployment Review [CAB-19-SUB-0265 and ERD-19-SUB-0009]

This pack has been released on the Ministry of Defence website, available at: www.defence.govt.nz/publications.

It has been necessary to withhold certain information in accordance with the following provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Where information is withheld, the relevant sections of the Act are indicated in the body of the document.

Information is withheld where making it available would be likely to prejudice:

- the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand [section 6(a)]
- the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on the basis of confidence by the Government of any other country [section 6(b)(i)] or any international organisation [section 6(b)(ii)].

Information is also withheld in order to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty [section 9(2)(g)(i)]. No public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding this information.



## **Cabinet**

## Minute of Decision

This document contains information for the New Zealand Cabinet. It must be treated in confidence and handled in accordance with any security classification, or other endorsement. The information can only be released, including under the Official Information Act 1982, by persons with the appropriate authority.

## New Zealand Defence Force: Iraq Deployment Review

#### Portfolios Foreign Affairs / Defence

On 4 June 2019, following reference from the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee, Cabinet:

## **Background**

- noted that New Zealand's current mandate in Iraq expires on 30 June 2019 [CAB-18-MIN-0455];
- noted that on 17 September 2018, Cabinet invited the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to report back to Cabinet on possible options for New Zealand contributions to Iraq, from July 2019 [CAB-18-MIN-0455];
- **noted** the ongoing threat posed by ISIS to Iraq, globally and to New Zealand security, as outlined in the paper under ERS-19-SUB-0009;
- 4 **noted** that:
  - 4.1 the legal basis for New Zealand's military presence in Iraq rests on the invitation and consent of the Government of Iraq, s6(a), s6(b)(i)
  - 4.2 all New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) operations in Iraq are carried out in accordance with domestic and international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict.
- 5 **noted** that the unmitigated threat level for NZDF personnel in Iraq s6(a)
- noted that the New Zealand Embassy in Baghdad was opened in 2015 to provide the diplomatic interface between the NZDF deployment at Taji and the Government of Iraq, s6(a)

## New Zealand's future contribution to Iraq

#### Taji roles

- agreed to extend the mandate for the NZDF Building Partner Capacity Deployment to Taji and related support positions in Iraq s6(a), with withdrawal from Taji to take place by 30 June 2020;
- **agreed** that the maximum personnel deployed to Taji will not exceed 75 until December 2019, and then will reduce to a maximum of 45 until June 2020;

#### Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles

- 9 agreed to extend the NZDF deployment of the Deputy Director Training, Training Warrant Officer, Operational Law Attorney and ISF Sustainment Development Team Coordination Officer to Coalition Headquarters in Iraq until 30 June 2020;
- agreed to extend the NZDF deployment of the three intelligence roles s6(a) in Qatar until 30 June 2020;
- authorised the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence to determine the timing of the withdrawal of the Deputy Chief of Operations, Future Information Operations Planner, Future Operations Planner and Operations Planner to Coalition Headquarters in Iraq, but no later than 30 November 2019;

## Stabilisation funding

agreed to increase New Zealand's stabilisation funding to Iraq to approximately NZ\$3 million per annum for the next three years, concluding by June 2022;

#### **Rotations**

- agreed that the NZDF may temporarily exceed the Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers for this deployment for the purposes of command reconnaissance, rotation, and extraction of forces from theatre [CAB-18-MIN-0346];
- 14 **noted** that the Chief of Defence Force will inform the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in advance whenever Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers are exceeded for the reasons set out in paragraph 13 above;

## **Financial implications**

- noted that the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue of the extension of Taji roles to 30 June 2020 is assessed as \$21.613 million;
- **noted** that the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue of the extension of the Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles to 30 June 2020 is assessed as \$2.562 million;
- 17 **noted** that there is a shortfall in appropriation funding in 2019/20 that is not able to be met within existing baselines;
- approved the following changes to appropriations to give effect to the above policy decisions in paragraphs 7-11 above, with a corresponding impact on the operating balance.

|  | NZ \$m – increase / (decrease) |         |         |         |           |
|--|--------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Vote Defence Force   | 2019/20                        | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | 2023/24 & |
| Minister of Defence  |                                |         |         |         | out-years |
| Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA | 17.282                         | -       | -       | -       | -         |
| Departmental Output Expense: Military Operations in Support of a Rules-Based International Order (funded by revenue Crown)     |                                |         |         |         |           |

- agreed that the additional expenses required in 2019/20 under paragraphs 7-11 above be 19 first charged against the tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 2017 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order;
- 20 agreed that the change to appropriations for 2019/20 above be included in the 2019/20 Supplementary Estimates and that, in the interim, the increase be met from Imprest Supply;
- 21 **noted** that the remaining funding for the above decisions will be met from existing baselines:
- 22 noted that the tagged operating contingency established as part of Budget 2017 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order will be fully allocated as a consequence of the above decisions, meaning there will be no funding remaining in 2019/20 for any new deployments following this decision.

Michael Webster Secretary of the Cabinet

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# **Cabinet External Relations** and Security Committee

## Minute of Decision

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## New Zealand Defence Force: Iraq Deployment Review

Portfolios Foreign Affairs / Defence

On 28 May 2019, the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee **agreed to recommend** that Cabinet:

## **Background**

- note that New Zealand's current mandate in Iraq expires on 30 June 2019 [CAB-18-MIN-0455];
- 2 note that on 17 September 2018, Cabinet invited the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to report back to Cabinet on possible options for New Zealand contributions to Iraq, from July 2019 [CAB-18-MIN-0455].
- note the ongoing threat posed by ISIS to Iraq, globally and to New Zealand security, as outlined in the paper under ERS-19-SUB-0009;
- 4 note that:
  - 4.1 the legal basis for New Zealand's military presence in Iraq rests on the invitation and consent of the Government of Iraq. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
  - 4.2 all New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) operations in Iraq are carried out in accordance with domestic and international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict;
- 5 note that the unmitigated threat level for NZDF personnel in Iraq s6(a)
- note that the New Zealand Embassy in Baghdad was opened in 2015 to provide the diplomatic interface between the NZDF deployment at Taji and the Government of Iraq, s6(a)

## New Zealand's future contribution to Iraq

#### Taji roles

agree to extend the mandate for the NZDF Building Partner Capacity Deployment to Taji and related support positions in Iraq s6(a), with withdrawal from Taji to take place by 30 June 2020;

agree that the maximum personnel deployed to Taji will not exceed 75 until December 2019, and then will reduce to a maximum of 45 until June 2020;

## Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles

- agree to extend the NZDF deployment of the Deputy Director Training, Training Warrant Officer, Operational Law Attorney and ISF Sustainment Development Team Coordination Officer to Coalition Headquarters in Iraq until 30 June 2020;
- agree to extend the NZDF deployment of the three intelligence roles s6(a) in Qatar until 30 June 2020;

## Stabilisation funding

agree to increase New Zealand's stabilisation funding to Iraq to approximately NZ\$3 million per annum for the next three years, concluding by June 2022;

#### **Rotations**

- agree that the NZDF may temporarily exceed the Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers for this deployment for the purposes of command reconnaissance, rotation, and extraction of forces from theatre [CAB-18-MIN-0346];
- note that the Chief of Defence Force will inform the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in advance whenever Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers are exceed for the reasons set out in paragraph 12 above;

## **Financial implications**

- note that the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue of the extension of Taji roles to 30 June 2020 is assessed as \$21.613 million;
- note that the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue of the extension of the Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles to 30 June 2020 is assessed as \$2.562 million;
- note that there is a shortfall in appropriation funding in 2019/20 that is not able to be met within existing baselines;
- approve the following changes to appropriations to give effect to the above policy decisions in paragraphs 7-10 above, with a corresponding impact on the operating balance.

| <u> </u>   | NZ \$m – increase / (decrease) |         |         |         |                     |
|--|--------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------------------|
| Vote Defence Force<br>Minister of Defence  | 2019/20                        | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | 2023/24 & out-years |
| Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA  Departmental Output Expense: Military Operations in Support of a Rules-Based International Order (funded by revenue Crown) | 17.282                         | -       | -       | -       | -                   |

- agree that the additional expenses required in 2019/20 under paragraphs 7-10 above be first charged against the tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 2017 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order;
- agree that the change to appropriations for 2019/20 above be included in the 2019/20 Supplementary Estimates and that, in the interim, the increase be met from Imprest Supply;
- 20 note that the remaining funding for the above decisions will be met from existing baselines;
- 21 note that the tagged operating contingency established as part of Budget 2017 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order will be fully allocated as a consequence of the above decisions, meaning there will be no funding remaining in 2019/20 for any new deployments following this decision.

Janine Harvey Committee Secretary

#### Present:

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern Rt Hon Winston Peters (Chair) Hon Kelvin Davis Hon Grant Robertson Hon Andrew Little Hon David Parker Hon Stuart Nash Hon Ron Mark

#### Hard-copy distribution:

Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Defence

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## Officials present from:

Office of the Prime Minister
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Ministry of Defence

Chair, External Relations and Security Committee

## NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REVIEW PROPOSAL

1. This paper seeks Cabinet agreement on the future shape of New Zealand's contribution to Iraq from July 2019 ahead of the mandate expiry on 30 June 2019.

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- 2. Since 2015, New Zealand has made a substantial contribution to international efforts to counter the security threat posed by ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) to Iraq and globally, s6(a)
- 3. When New Zealand first deployed as part of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition (Coalition), ISIS occupied large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria and oppressed the populations under its control. Four years later, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with Coalition support have liberated Iraq from ISIS control.
- 4. Since the defeat of its physical, self-declared "caliphate", ISIS has transitioned into an insurgency group that still presents a real and current danger to Iraq and globally. s6(a)
- 5. The work done by the non-combat Building Partner Capacity (BPC) mission at Taji is coming to a close as the ISF have nearly reached a stage where they can fully take control of their own basic training. Iraq now requires support to turn their BPC-trained forces into a modern and professional military capability, as well as ongoing support for stabilisation, reconstruction, and the rehabilitation of thousands of internally displaced people.
- 6. The Coalition is shifting its efforts towards the stabilisation of Iraq, with NATO and the European Union (EU) also having commenced advisory, training and support missions in Iraq. s6(b)(i)
- 7. This situation allows for a draw-down and possible reorientation of our footprint in support of international efforts to defeat ISIS and to prevent its resurgence in Iraq. Possible new areas of engagement include support for the NATO and EU missions in Iraq, alongside an increase in stabilisation funding.

#### **BACKGROUND**

- 8. In September 2018 [CAB-18-MIN-0455 refers] Cabinet extended the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployment to Iraq and the region to 30 June 2019 and asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence to report back on possible options for New Zealand contributions to Iraq from July 2019.
- 9. The September 2018 Cabinet paper discussed the rationale for New Zealand's involvement in Iraq, including: advancing and protecting New Zealand's national security interests to counter the threat posed by ISIS; supporting international efforts to combat global terrorism; and supporting the institutions and arrangements that reinforce global security and maintenance of the international (and regional) rules-based order. The paper also covered the legal basis for New Zealand's military presence in Iraq, which rests on the invitation of the Iraqi Government.
- 10. These rationales are still valid, even as the situation in Iraq evolves. ISIS remains the predominant global terrorist actor and a threat to New Zealand's national security interests and to the international rules-based order. The changing situation does, however, require an evolved New Zealand footprint a shift away from the BPC mission at Taji, and a possible new contribution to NATO and EU efforts. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

## Military commitments to date

- 11. Under the current Cabinet mandate, New Zealand has up to 121 personnel deployed to Iraq and support locations in Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait s6(a)

  1 This figure reflects a reduction from the last mandate figure of 143 personnel due to both the changing training needs of the ISF as they gradually assume responsibility for their own training, and the ongoing shift in ISF focus towards counter-insurgency operations against ISIS.
- 12. New Zealand has up to 95 personnel in Taji Military Complex, near Baghdad, where they, alongside the Australian Defence Force (ADF), have provided BPC training to the ISF at the Baghdad Fighting School (BFS)<sup>2</sup> since 2015. The BPC mission's primary objective has been to train Iraqi infantry brigades in conventional war-fighting skills to combat ISIS on the battlefield. By the end of the current deployment rotation, the BPC will have trained approximately 44,000 members of the ISF, including a number of Federal Police. This training contributed to the ISF's ability to liberate Iraqi territory from ISIS control in December 2017.
- 3.In addition to the personnel deployed to Taji, New Zealand also has up to 17 personnel deployed to Coalition Headquarters and support locations in Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait s6(a). The eight personnel based at Coalition headquarters in Baghdad are in roles that include: training planning; support to ongoing planning and

<sup>1</sup> New Zealand currently has around 95 personnel deployed to Taji, and 17 personnel embedded in Coalition Headquarters, s6(a). The remaining 9 personnel are not deployed as they are an operational contingency. The Global Coalition Against Daesh (also called the Defeat-ISIS Coalition) is made up of 79 partner countries and international organisations.

<sup>2</sup> The Baghdad Fighting School was recently renamed the s6(a)

For consistency with previous advice, it will be referred to as the Baghdad Fighting School (BFS) for the purposes of this paper.

logistics; information operations planning; operational coordination and prioritisation; and the provision of legal advice (see Annex A for a list of these positions). s6(a)

## **Current non-military commitments**

- 14. New Zealand has provided development assistance to the Government and people of Iraq to support humanitarian efforts, stabilisation and the safe and dignified return of internally displaced people (IDPs) to their homes in the immediate aftermath of the conflict with ISIS.
- 15. Since 2015, New Zealand has provided a total of NZD\$7.75 million in development assistance to Iraq. This comprises NZD\$2.8 million to the UN Development Programme's Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS), which finances fast-track initiatives to help recovery and rebuilding in areas liberated from ISIS, and NZD\$3.5 million in humanitarian support provided during the conflict to support IDPs. It also includes our provision of technical demining support to assist the work of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Iraq and funding to demining specialists Hazardous Area Life-Support Organisation (HALO Trust) (USD\$200,000) and Quality Solutions International (QSI) (NZD\$1.25 million). New Zealand has partnered on the ground with the German development agency (GIZ) to support the coordination and delivery of stabilisation activities.
- 16. The New Zealand Embassy in Baghdad was opened in 2015 to provide diplomatic support to the NZDF deployment and to engage directly with the Iraqi Government, international organisations, and like-minded countries that are supporting Iraq's fight against ISIS.

#### COMMENT

How has the security environment changed in Iraq since September 2018?

| 17. <sup>s6(a)</sup> |   |   |
|----------------------|---|---|
| 18.56(a)             | _ | _ |
|                      |   |   |
|                      |   |   |

19.s6(a)



#### How does ISIS continue to affect New Zealand's interests?

- 20. ISIS remains the predominant global terrorist actor. It represents a threat to New Zealand's national security and that of our closest partners. ISIS now operates as an insurgency with a global network of affiliates and supporters (across Europe, North America, the Middle East, Africa, South and South East Asia) with the intent and capability to project a global terrorist threat against international targets. New Zealanders travelling or living abroad have previously been affected by ISIS-inspired terrorist acts and could also be caught up in future ISIS attacks in overseas locations or at home as ISIS continues its extensive programme of online radicalisation and incitements to violence. The dispersal of FTFs out of Iraq and Syria to our near region (South East Asia) continues to raise security concerns for New Zealand and Australia.
- 21. For New Zealand, the international rules-based order is fundamental to our national security. ISIS undermines this order by fundamentally and brutally disregarding governmental authority, national sovereignty and the rule of law. Providing continued capacity building support to Iraq and global counterterrorism efforts to combat ISIS would signal New Zealand's ongoing willingness to support the international-rules based order and would demonstrate our opposition to violent extremism and terrorism in all forms. s6(a)

## What more does Iraq need?

22. s6(a) 23. s6(a)

Humanitarian, stabilisation and reconstruction support

- 24. Restoring basic conditions to enable civilians to return and rebuild their communities (for example, the removal of explosive hazards, restoration of electricity, water and sewage, reopening of schools) is viewed as a central precondition for establishing peace and security in the medium term. If communities are not able to rebuild their lives, anti-Government grievances can lead to criminality and extremism and leave communities vulnerable to further exploitation and recruitment to terrorism.
- 25. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which leads the stabilisation programme and manages the 'Funding Facility for Stabilisation' (FFS) has indicated that it requires US\$335 million for stabilisation funding in priority areas.<sup>3</sup> The US has requested that Coalition partners contribute towards the US\$735 million needed to cover the FFS gap, support the removal of explosive hazards, IDP reintegration, reconciliation, social cohesion and accountability for crimes committed by ISIS.

  s6(a)
- 26. Longer term, reconstruction needs remain significant. In 2018, the World Bank estimated that the recovery cost was approximately U\$\$87 billion. International partners have been clear that Iraq, as a relatively wealthy country, needs to take responsibility for much of this. Longer term reconstruction is being led by the World Bank in partnership with the UN and the Iraqi Government.

Military and security sector support

- 27. The Coalition is still the primary mission in Iraq and is now in its stabilisation planning phase. The Coalition previously has focused its efforts on supporting and building the capability of the ISF (including both military and law enforcement) to take the immediate fight to ISIS.

  56(a)

  it is now shifting its focus towards enhancing the ISF's own training capability through train-the-trainer and mentoring programmes. Over recent months the ISF has taken on a greater role in the delivery of training at Taji, allowing New Zealand and Australian personnel to increase their focus on training Iraqi trainers.
- 28. The Coalition's direct training and capacity-building support will have long-term benefits for Iraq. s6(a)

<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 'Funding Facility for Stabilisation' (FFS) is the largest stabilisation programme and has had impressive results. Under the FFS to date, 1.3 million Iraqis have improved access to drinking water and 1.8 million have better access to reliable electricity. Housing projects and the restoration of education and health care facilities have helped enable a return to normality for a number of conflict-affected regions. New Zealand is a valued contributor to the FFS and is the 19th largest donor.

29. Against this backdrop it is clear that a successful Iraqi-led reform process will require ongoing support from partners), s6(a)

Critical partners in this endeavour are NATO (with a focus on military support and reform) and the EU (for civilian agencies) who are best equipped to deliver for Iraq's future.

## **NATO Training Mission in Iraq**


- 30. NATO's non-combat mission in Iraq (NM-I) was established in October 2018 at the request of the Iraqi Government. The mission comprises military and civilian personnel bringing together expertise and best practice in security and defence sector reform, institution building and training and education. Its goal is to support the development of an effective, sustainable, transparent, and inclusive Iraqi security and defence sector.
- 31. NM-I is working with the Ministry of Defence to rebuild Iraqi military institutions to enable Iraq to "raise, train and sustain" its own forces.
- 32. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)
- 33. Fly-in-fly-out Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) s6(b)(ii) will supplement the personnel permanently based in Iraq and deliver individual training courses in areas such as: Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, and Demining, Soviet-era Armoured Vehicle Maintenance; Civil-Military Cooperation and Engagement; and Military Medicine. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)
- 34. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

## European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM-I)\_

35. The EU has established a civilian-led programme to provide advice and assistance to the Government of Iraq on the implementation of civilian aspects of the National Security Strategy, the Security Sector Reform Strategy, and on the development of National Counter-Terrorism and Organised Crime Strategies. The EUAM-I is intended to support the civilian security agencies transition from "green to blue" i.e.

from their current war-fighting posture to more traditional (civilian) law enforcement activities.

36. The EU Mission provides advice at the strategic level. This means it does not undertake operational roles or provide training directly to Iraqi security personnel. Instead it works with the leadership of the Ministry of Interior and the Office of the National Security Adviser to identify needs and advise the Government on how to address them. It has a one year renewable mandate (currently until April 2020) which ensures that the Mission is able to be adapted based on identified need and mission priorities.



40. s6(b)(i)

41. Canada has recently extended its mandate until March 2022. s6(b)(i)

42. Other BPC countries (including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, and Spain) currently remain in Iraq. s6(b)(i)

## **OPTIONS**

4 s6(b)(i)

- 43. The complex situation on the ground in Iraq and the trajectory of international engagement there allow for a draw-down and possible reorientation of New Zealand's footprint in support of efforts to defeat ISIS and to prevent its resurgence in Iraq. There are a number of options through which this can be achieved. Both of the options relating to our existing contributions would see New Zealand drawing down our military presence at Taji, either by the end of 2019 (Option 1) or in line with the scheduled completion of the BPC mission in June 2020 (Option 2). With respect to our existing Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles, Option 1 provides for their conclusion by the end of 2019, while Option 2 provides for extension of some or all of the roles to June 2020.
- 44. Irrespective of which of these two options is chosen, an additional option on potential new contributions s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

  in the NATO and EU missions in Iraq (options 3(a)-(c)). Finally, an option to provide increased stabilisation funding to Iraq is also presented (option 4). As laid out below, these options vary significantly in scope, cost and risk. Additional options considered and dismissed are detailed at Annex B.
  - Option 1 Full withdrawal before the end of 2019;

#### **OR**

- Option 2 Extend the deployment for 12 months with full withdrawal from Taji by June 2020;
  - Taji and Taji-related roles: Reduce numbers, complete the evolution to "train the trainers" role, and withdraw from Taji following handover to IFS; conclude the six Taji-related regional support roles by June 2020; and
  - Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles: extend some or all of the eight Coalition Headquarters and three intelligence roles for 12 months.

#### **AND**

Option 3 – Make a new contribution through:

3a. NATO 56(a)

3b. a NATO 56(a)

3c. an EU Advisory Mission in Iraq deployment.

#### AND

Option 4 – Increase stabilisation funding.

**Option 1 – Withdraw before the end of 2019:** Full withdrawal as soon as operationally possible

45. The first option for New Zealand would be to fully withdraw from the joint Australia-New Zealand Building Partner Capacity (BPC) mission at Taji and the 17 other positions in Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar s6(a) 5 as soon as operationally possible. The

5The 17 comprise: 8 Staff Officers at the Coalition Headquarters in Baghdad and Kuwait, 1 logistics specialist s6(a), 3 personnel s6(a)

17 staff roles include 8 positions within the Defeat-ISIS Coalition's Headquarters. These roles are outlined at Annex A.

46. Should Cabinet choose this option, then it is recommended that the mandate be extended until no later than 30 November 2019 to enable the complete withdrawal of all NZDF personnel and to hand over responsibilities to Australia and other partners. This would coincide with completion of the current deployment to Taji.

47. s6(a)

48. Option 1 is <u>not recommended</u> by officials.

Option 2 – Extend for 12 months with full withdrawal from Taji by June 2020: –

- Taji: Reduce numbers, complete the evolution to "train the trainers" role, and withdraw following handover to IFS; conclude the six Taji-related logistical support roles by June 2020; and
- Extend some or all of the eight Coalition HQ and three intelligence roles for 12 months to June 2020.
- 49. With regards to the Taji element, this option would extend the deployment to Taji for 12 months until June 2020 to finalise and embed the current process of 'train the trainer' with the ISF. s6(a)
- 50. This option would involve significantly reduced numbers of deployed NZDF personnel at Taji dropping from 95 to approximately 45 personnel from December 2019. s6(a)
- 51. This option would provide a logical conclusion to our original mission s6(a)

his option would see a full withdrawal of our substantive contribution to the Coalition by June 2020.

52. The five logistics specialists provide direct support to the New Zealand deployment at Taji and would be required for the full duration of that deployment (i.e., to June 2020 under this option).

## Coalition HQ and intelligence roles

s6(a) in Qatar, 5 logistics specialists s6(a)

- 53. Should Ministers decide to remain at Taji with reduced numbers until 30 June 2020, there are four options for the future of the eight Coalition HQ and three intelligence positions currently held by New Zealand (see Annex A for more details). These options allow the government to continue or conclude all roles, or to continue only those roles that relate most directly to Coalition training, capacity building and sustainment, and intelligence.
- 54. These options are to:
  - 54.1. Discontinue all 11 positions in Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar by 30 November 2019. Officials do not recommend this option;
  - 54.2. Remain in four of the eight Coalition Headquarters positions, <sup>6</sup> namely those located in Iraq, in alignment with the Coalition's training, capacity building, and sustainment presence until 30 June 2020;
  - 54.3. As per option 2, but also retain the three intelligence personnel in Qatar; or
  - 54.4. Maintain all 11 current positions until 30 June 2020, including the four operational planning and coordination roles in Coalition Headquarters in Baghdad and Kuwait.



56. s6(a)

57. s6(a)

6 These roles would comprise: Deputy Director Training, Training Warrant Officer, Operational Law Attorney, and ISF Sustainment Development Team Coordination Officer.

7 s6(a)

8 From time to time we receive requests from partners to fill additional roles in Coalition Headquarters. s6(a)

58. Should Ministers choose to discontinue some or all of these roles, it is recommended that the mandate for those positions be extended until no later than 30 November 2019 in order for partners to find replacements for the roles and complete any handover.

## Option 3 - Make a new contribution in Iraq

59. The conclusion of the BPC at Taji will not mark the end of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. The Coalition assesses that ISIS remains a threat to Iraq and across the globe, including to New Zealand interests, and that Iraq needs ongoing support and assistance to counter this threat. Should the Government wish to contribute to these efforts, it could consider so(a), so(b)(ii) something different in Iraq (with some options being significantly smaller than Taji and with definitive and limited time periods). If interested, we would need to investigate these options in more detail and signal in-principle commitments to partners. so(a), so(b)(ii)

## 3a. NATO <sup>s6(a)</sup>

60. NATO has asked New Zealand to consider a contribution to the NATO Mission in Iraq (NM-I).9 s6(a)

Sb(D)(II)

61. <sup>s6(a)</sup>


62. s6(a)

63. s6(a)

3b.<sup>s6(a)</sup> NATO

64. s6(a), s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)

9



| s9(2)(g)(i) |  |              |
|-------------|--|--------------|
|             |  | s9(2)(b)(ii) |

#### AND

## 4. Stabilisation funding

- 72. Independently of whether a decision is made to extend a military commitment to Iraq beyond June 2019, we recommend New Zealand significantly increases its contribution of stabilisation funding to approximately NZ\$3m per annum for the next three years (concluding by June 2022). Funding would come from MFAT baselines.
- 73. The primary purpose of our stabilisation assistance is to contribute to the Coalition's efforts to create the conditions for effective governance in areas immediately following their liberation from ISIS, thereby reducing the risk of ISIS regaining influence and reigniting armed conflict. As large numbers of IDPs return home and communities are rebuilt, priorities including public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation, explosive hazard management (demining), livelihoods, capacity support and community reconciliation become more acute; especially in avoiding the perception of a vacuum of effective government, New Zealand's stabilisation support can make a meaningful contribution at the community level. Our stabilisation support would continue to be targeted through UN stabilisation programmes, including the FFS and other trusted partners. This support would be delivered through trusted and effective mechanisms/partners with low overheads.

## Legal basis for the deployment and consistency with international law

| 74. | . The legal basis for New Zealand's military presence in Iraq rests on the invitation and |
|-----|---|
|     | consent of the Government of Iraq. s6(a), s6(b)(i)  |
|     |   |
|     |   |

75. All NZDF operations in Iraq are carried out in accordance with domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict. Rules of Engagement for NZDF operations in Iraq, which comply with all relevant international and domestic legal obligations, have been previously issued by the New Zealand Government. If the mission does not change and NZDF continues its current activities, the Rules of Engagement will remain fit for purpose. s6(a)

## Implications for New Zealand's ability to still deploy to our immediate region

76. None of the options articulated above would prevent New Zealand from independently deploying to the Pacific should an emergency arise, s6(a), s9(2) (g)(i)

All deployment numbers identified are sustainable and would also not

impact negatively on our increasing training support to the Pacific. A map showing global NZDF deployment numbers is at Annex C.

#### **Rotations**

77. In 2012, Cabinet agreed to the inclusion in all NZDF deployment papers of a provision that allows NZDF to temporarily exceed Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers for the purposes of command reconnaissance, rotation, and extraction of forces in and out of theatre [CAB Min (12) 10/2 refers]. In July 2018 Cabinet noted the 2012 decision and agreed that this convention should continue [CAB 18-MIN-0346 refers]. The Chief of Defence Force would inform the Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister in advance whenever a rotation, extraction or command reconnaissance is planned above the mandated numbers for specific contributions.

Risks to the safety and security of New Zealand personnel / Threat assessment

- 78. The current deployment involves having NZDF personnel located in Taji, Baghdad and regional headquarters and support locations. Some locations have a different threat profile. The unmitigated operational threat to NZDF personnel deployed to Iraq is \$6(a)
- 79. Potential threats to New Zealand and other international personnel in Iraq include indirect fire, direct attacks on coalition bases, and possible insider attacks. s6(a)

As a result of the mitigations put in place, the risk is assessed as acceptable. This is constantly monitored to ensure this remains the case.

#### **CONSULTATION**

80. This paper has been prepared jointly by the Ministry of Defence, the NZDF, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (NAB, NSG and PAG), the New Zealand Police, s6(a)

Treasury were consulted.

and the

## FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

#### Option 1

- 81. The estimated cost of Option 1 Full withdrawal before the end of 2019 is \$8.946M.
- 82. There is a shortfall in funding available from current appropriations in 2019/20 because funding for Vote Defence: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA is committed or reserved as a result of existing or proposed mandated missions.
- 83. If Option 1 is selected then the estimated costs in 2019/20 are proposed to be charged against the tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order.

84. The following table sets out the expenditure and funding arrangements for Option 1:

|   | NZ \$million |         |          |         |         |
|---|--------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|
| Vote Defence Force  | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22  | 2022/23 | Total   |
| Estimated cost of proposed deployment   | 8.946        | -       | -        | -       | 8.946   |
| Total funded from tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17: Military Operations in Support of a Rules- Based International Order | (8.946)      | -       | -        |         | (8,946) |
| Total funded from existing appropriation:<br>Operations Contributing to New Zealand's<br>Security, Stability and Interests                            | -            | -       | <b>~</b> | 2       | -       |

85. The following table sets out the impact on the tagged operating contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order if Option 1 is agreed:

|   | NZ \$million |         |         |         |         |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Vote Defence Force                      | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | Total   |
| Balance of tagged Operating contingency | 17.282       | -       | -       | -       | 17.282  |
| Funding for Option 1                    | (8.946)      | -       | -       | ı       | (8.946) |
| Remaining tagged operating contingency  | 8.336        | -       | -       | -       | 8.336   |

#### Option 2

- 86. The estimated cost for the extension of Taji based roles to 30 June 2020 is \$21.613M
- 87. The estimated cost of the Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles is dependent on the selected mandate length and ranges from \$1.075M to \$2.562M as follows:
  - The estimated cost to maintain all 11 current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles until 30 November 2019 is \$1.075M
  - 87.2. The estimated cost to maintain all 11 of the current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles until 30 November 2019 with four of the current eight Coalition Headquarters positions until 30 June 2020 is \$1.730M;
  - 87.3. The estimated cost to maintain all 11 of the current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles until 30 November 2019 with four of the eight Coalition Headquarters positions and three intelligence personnel solution to 30 June 2020 is \$1.907M

- 87.4. The estimated cost to maintain all 11 current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles until 30 June 2020, including the four operational planning and coordination roles in Coalition Headquarters in Baghdad and Kuwait is \$2.562M
- 88. There is a shortfall in funding available from current appropriations in 2019/20 because funding for Vote Defence: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA is committed or reserved as a result of existing or proposed mandated missions.
- 89. If Option 2 is selected then the estimated costs in 2019/20 are proposed to be charged against the tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order, with the remainder funded within existing baselines.
- 90. The following table sets out the expenditure and funding arrangements for Option 2 if Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles are agreed to 30 November 2019;

|   | NZ \$million |         |         |         |          |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Vote Defence Force  | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | Total    |
| Estimated cost of Taji roles to 30 June 2020  | 20.727       | 0.886   | -       | -       | 21.613   |
| Estimated cost of Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles to 30 November 2019   | 1.075        | 5       | -       | -       | 1.075    |
| Total funded from tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17: Military Operations in Support of a Rules- Based International Order | (17.282)     | -       | -       | -       | (17.282) |
| Total funded from existing appropriation:<br>Operations Contributing to New Zealand's<br>Security, Stability and Interests                            | (4.520)      | (0.886) | -       | -       | (5.406)  |

91. The following table shows the expenditure and funding arrangements for Option 2 if all 11 current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles positions are agreed until 30 November 2019 with four of the eight Coalition Headquarters positions maintained until 30 June 2020

|   | NZ \$million |         |         |         |          |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Vote Defence Force  | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | Total    |
| Estimated cost of Taji roles to 30 June 2020                                    | 20.727       | 0.886   | -       | -       | 21.613   |
| Estimated cost of Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles to 30 June 2020 | 1.730        | -       | -       | -       | 1.730    |
| Total funded from tagged Operating  | (17.282)     | -       | -       | -       | (17.282) |

| Contingency established as part of Budget<br>17:<br>Military Operations in Support of a Rules-<br>Based International Order |         |         |   |   |         |
|---|---------|---------|---|---|---------|
| Total funded from existing appropriation:<br>Operations Contributing to New Zealand's<br>Security, Stability and Interests  | (5.175) | (0.886) | - | - | (6.061) |

92. The following table shows the additional arrangements for Option 2 if all 11 current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles positions are agreed until 30 November 2019 with four of the eight Coalition Headquarters positions and three intelligence personnel s6(a) maintained until 30 June 2020:

|   | NZ \$million |         |         |         |          |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Vote Defence Force  | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | Total    |
| Estimated cost of Taji roles to 30 June 2020  | 20.727       | 0.886   | -       | -       | 21.613   |
| Estimated cost of Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles to 30 June 2020   | 1.907        | (5)     | -       | -       | 1.907    |
| Total funded from tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17: Military Operations in Support of a Rules- Based International Order | (17.282)     | -       | -       | -       | (17.282) |
| Total funded from existing appropriation:<br>Operations Contributing to New Zealand's<br>Security, Stability and Interests                            | (5.352)      | (0.886) | -       | -       | (6.238)  |

93. The following table sets out the expenditure and funding arrangements for Option 2 if all 11 current Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles are agreed to 30 June 2020

| .00   |              |         |         |         |          |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
|   | NZ \$million |         |         |         |          |
| Vote Defence Force  | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | Total    |
| Estimated cost of Taji roles to 30 June 2020                                    | 20.727       | 0.886   | -       | -       | 21.613   |
| Estimated cost of Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles to 30 June 2020 | 2.562        | -       | -       | -       | 2.562    |
| Total funded from tagged Operating  | (17.282)     | -       | -       | -       | (17.282) |


| Contingency established as part of Budget<br>17:<br>Military Operations in Support of a Rules-<br>Based International Order |         |         |   |   |         |
|---|---------|---------|---|---|---------|
| Total funded from existing appropriation:<br>Operations Contributing to New Zealand's<br>Security, Stability and Interests  | (6.007) | (0.886) | - | - | (6.893) |

94. The tagged operating contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order will be fully allocated if Option 2 is agreed meaning there would be no funding remaining in 2019/20 for any new deployments following this decision

|   | NZ \$million |         |         |         |          |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Vote Defence Force                      | 2019/20      | 2020/21 | 2021/22 | 2022/23 | Total    |
| Balance of tagged Operating contingency | 17.282       | XO      | -       | -       | 17.282   |
| Funding for Option 2                    | (17.282)     | 13      | -       | -       | (17.282) |
| Remaining tagged operating contingency  | All          | -       | -       | -       | -        |

#### **PUBLICITY**

95. s6(a)



97 We recommend the outcome of this paper be announced alongside the concurrent decision on Afghanistan and potentially Operation Gallant Phoenix (OGP).

## PROACTIVE RELEASE

98. A redacted version of this Cabinet paper will be proactively released following the public announcement.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

99. The Ministers Foreign Affairs and Defence recommend that the Committee:

## Background

- 1. **Note** that New Zealand's current mandate in Iraq expires on 30 June 2019.
- 2. **Note** that in September 2018 Cabinet invited the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to report back to Cabinet on possible options for New Zealand contributions to Iraq, from July 2019, before the end of April 2019 [CAB-18-MIN-0455 refers].
- 3. **Note** the ongoing threat posed by ISIS to Iraq, globally and to New Zealand security.
- 4. **Note** the legal basis for New Zealand's military presence in Iraq rests on the invitation and consent of the Government of Iraq s6(a), s6(b)(i)

  . All New Zealand Defence Force operations in Iraq are carried out in accordance with domestic and international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict.
- 5. **Note** that the unmitigated threat level for New Zealand Defence Force personnel in Iraq is \$6(a)
- 6. **Note** that the New Zealand Embassy in Baghdad was opened in 2015 to provide the diplomatic interface between the New Zealand Defence Force deployment at Taji and the Government of Iraq. s6(a)
- 7. Option 1: Withdrawal in 2019:
- 7.1. **Agree** that New Zealand fully withdraw from the deployment to Iraq and associated Coalition Headquarters and support positions in Kuwait, Qatar by 30 November 2019.
- 7.2. **Agree** that the mandate for New Zealand's Defeat-ISIS deployment to Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar 6(a) be extended to 30 November 2019 in order to enable the complete withdrawal of all NZDF personnel and handover responsibilities to partners.
- 8. Option 2: Withdrawal from Iraq in June 2020:

#### Taji roles

- Agree to extend the mandate for the New Zealand Defence Force Building Partner Capacity Deployment to Taji and related support positions in Iraq s6(a), with withdrawal from Taji to take place by 30 June 2020.
- 8.2. **Agree** that the maximum personnel deployed to Taji will not exceed 75 until December 2019 then will reduce to a maximum of 45 until June 2020.

#### Coalition Headquarters and intelligence roles

#### **Withdrawal**

- 8.3. **Agree** that New Zealand fully withdraw from the deployment of all 11 positions in Coalition Headquarters in Iraq and Kuwait and s6(a) in Qatar by 30 November 2019.
- 8.4. **Agree** that the mandate for New Zealand's deployment of all 11 positions in Coalition Headquarters in Iraq and Kuwait and in Qatar be extended to 30 November 2019 in order to enable the complete withdrawal of all NZDF personnel and handover responsibilities to partners.

OR

#### **Extension**

8.5. **Agree** to extend the New Zealand Defence Force deployment of the Deputy Director Training, Training Warrant Officer, Operational Law Attorney and ISF Sustainment Development Team Coordination Officer to Coalition Headquarters in Iraq until 30 June 2020.

AND

8.6. **Agree** to extend the New Zealand Defence Force deployment of the three intelligence roles s6(a) in Qatar until 30 June 2020.

AND

8.7. **Agree** to extend the New Zealand Defence Force deployment of the Deputy Chief of Operations, Future Information Operations Planner, Future Operations Planner, and Operations Planner to Coalition Headquarters in Iraq until 30 June 2020.

#### Additional or Alternative Contributions

- 9. **Note** that, should the Government wish to explore new ways of supporting partner efforts to defeat ISIS and prevent its resurgence in Iraq, there are options <sup>s6(a)</sup> to do something new in Iraq.
- 10. **Agree** to give further consideration to alternative options for contributions to Iraq.
- Note that officials would present further papers to Ministers with Powers to Act (the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Defence) once more concrete operational details are available on selected options.

## NATO Mission in Iraq

12. **Note** that NATO has asked New Zealand to consider a contribution to the NATO Mission in Iraq.

13. s<sup>6(a)</sup>

#### AND/OR

- 14. s6(a), s6(b)(i), s6(b)(ii)
- 15. s6(a)

## European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq

- 16. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)
- 17. s6(a)
- 18. **Agree** to authorise officials to investigate a new contribution in Iraq through the European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq.

## Stabilisation Funding

19. **Agree** to increase New Zealand's stabilisation funding to Iraq to approximately NZ\$3 million per annum for the next three years, concluding by June 2022, to be funded from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade baselines.

#### **Rotations**

- 20. **Agree** that the New Zealand Defence Force may temporarily exceed the Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers for this deployment for the purposes of command reconnaissance, rotation, and extraction of forces from theatre.
- 21. **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force will inform the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in advance whenever Cabinet-mandated personnel numbers are exceed for the reasons set out in paragraph 74 of the paper.

## Funding Recommendations

## If Option 1 – Withdrawal in 2019 is chosen:

- 22. **Note** that the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue is assessed as \$8.946M.
- 23. **Note** that there is a shortfall in appropriation funding in 2019/20 that is not able to be met within existing baselines.

24. **Approve** the following changes to appropriations to give effect to the policy decision in recommendations 7.1 and 7.2 above with a corresponding impact on the operating balance.

|  |             | NZ \$m – i | ncrease / ( | decrease) |                            |
|--|-------------|------------|-------------|-----------|----------------------------|
| Vote Defence Force Minister of Defence   | 2019/2<br>0 | 2020/21    | 2021/22     | 2022/23   | 2023/24<br>& out-<br>years |
| Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure                                      |             |            |             |           | 20                         |
| Operations Contributing to<br>New Zealand's Security,<br>Stability and Interests MCA |             | -          | -           | <u> </u>  |                            |
| Departmental Output<br>Expense:  |             |            | ~(          | ),        |                            |
| Military Operations in Support of a Rules-Based International Order                  | 8.946       | · 6        | (O.         |           |                            |
| (funded by revenue Crown)  |             |            |             |           |                            |

- 25. **Agree** that the additional expenses required in 2019/20 under recommendation 7.2 above be a charge against the tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order.
- 26. **Agree** that the proposed change to appropriations for 2019/20 above be included in the 2019/20 Supplementary Estimates and that, in the interim, the increase be met from Imprest Supply.

## OR, If Option 2 – Withdrawal from Iraq in June 2020 is chosen:

- 27. **Note** that the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue of the extension of Taji roles to 30 June 2020 is assessed as \$21.613M.
- 28. **Note** that depending on the mandate length for Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue is between \$1.075M and \$2.562M.
- Note that depending on the mandate length for Coalition Headquarters and Intelligence roles the total estimated cost to be funded from Crown Revenue is \$1.075M to 30 November 2019 and \$2.562M to 30 June 2020.
- 30. **Note** that there is a shortfall in appropriation funding in 2019/20 that is not able to be met within existing baselines.
- 31. **Approve** the following changes to appropriations to give effect to the policy decision in recommendations 8.1 to 8.7 above with a corresponding impact on the operating balance.

|  |        | NZ \$m – i | ncrease / ( | decrease)  |                 |
|--|--------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|
| Vote Defence Force   | 2019/2 | 2020/21    | 2021/22     | 2022/23    | 2023/24         |
| Minister of Defence  | U      |            |             |            | & out-<br>years |
|  |        |            |             |            |                 |
| Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure                                      |        |            |             |            |                 |
| Operations Contributing to<br>New Zealand's Security,<br>Stability and Interests MCA |        | -          | -           | -          | 40              |
| Departmental Output<br>Expense:  |        |            |             | $\bigcirc$ |                 |
| Military Operations in Support of a Rules-Based International Order                  | 17.282 |            | . (         | 2          |                 |
| (funded by revenue Crown)  |        |            |             |            |                 |

- 32. **Agree** that the additional expenses required in 2019/20 under recommendation 8.1 to 8.7 above be first charged against the tagged Operating Contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order.
- 33. **Agree** that the proposed change to appropriations for 2019/20 above be included in the 2019/20 Supplementary Estimates and that, in the interim, the increase be met from Imprest Supply.
- 34. **Note** that the remaining funding for Option 2 will be met from existing baselines.
- 35. **Note** that the tagged operating contingency established as part of Budget 17 for Military Operations in Support of a Rules-based International Order will be fully allocated if Option 2 is agreed meaning there would be no funding remaining in 2019/20 for any new deployments following this decision.

Authorised for lodgement

Rt Hon Winston Peters

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Hon Ron Mark
MINISTER OF DEFENCE

#### ANNEX A: ADDITIONAL ROLE INFORMATION

The mandated roles New Zealand currently fills in Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar are:

Training, capacity building and sustainment roles at Coalition HQ in Iraq:

- Deputy Director Training (Baghdad). This role is responsible for all collective and individual training involving BPC and Enhanced Partner Capacity.
- Training Warrant Officer (Baghdad). This role monitors and provides situational awareness of day to day training operations in support of all training teams.
- Operational Law Attorney (Baghdad). This role provides advice on operational law, with focus on investigations into civilian casualties and violations of the Law of Armed Conflict and human rights.
- ISF Sustainment Development Team Coordination Officer (Taji). This role maintains situational awareness of Enhancing Partner Capacity activity for the Coalition mission, for coordination and integration across defence and law enforcement agencies.

Operational planning, coordination, and information operations roles at Coalition HQ in Baghdad and Kuwait:<sup>1</sup>

- Deputy Chief of Operations (Baghdad). This role coordinates and prioritises key Coalition assets to support Coalition and Iraqi operations and training. Assets may include medical evacuation, logistics support, and force protection.
- Future Information Operations Planner (Baghdad). This role is responsible for the planning of information operations and activities in support of Coalition objectives.
- Future Operations Planner (Baghdad). This role is part of the team that leads planning teams for operations. Operations may be planned pre-emptively or responsively.
- Operations Planner (Kuwait). This role provides high-level, longer term planning for the Coalition operation as a whole.

| Intelligence roles | s6(a) | in Qatar: |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|
|                    |       |           |
| <b>s</b> 6(a)      |       |           |
|                    |       |           |
|                    |       |           |
|                    |       |           |
| • s6(a)            |       |           |
|                    |       |           |
|                    |       |           |
|                    |       |           |

in accordance

with our mandate. New Zealand is not embedded in this Command.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Note: Offensive operations in Iraq are carried out by and through the ISF. s6(a)

## Annex B – Options considered and dismissed

| Development personnel in         |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| country                          | s6(a)  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  | New Zealand did have one person seconded to the German Development Agency in Iraq in 2017/18 at a cost of NZ\$1m for 12 months, s9(2)(g)(f)                                      |
|                                  | COSt OF NZ \$ 1111 OF 12 111 OF 1111 S, \$9(2)(8)(1)   |
|                                  |  |
| New Zealand Police<br>Deployment | Iraqi Federal and Local Police are a part of the ISF and receive training through the Coalition. This training is in the process of transitioning from a war fighting capability |
|                                  | based primarily on a paramilitary model (provided by Italy's Carabinieri) to traditional law enforcement and   |
|                                  | community policing elements. This new mixed model is being pursued by the Coalition through a multinational  |
|                                  | training force led by Italy and with a significant Canadian component focused on community policing. This is   |
| ļ.                               | further complemented by UNDP's community policing programme at the local level. s9(2)(g)(i)  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |
| 70,                              | Depending on priorities, New Zealand could consider a police or civilian law enforcement role in the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM-I) at a later date. New Zealand could             |
| 600                              | also consider supporting the community policing programme through a targeted funding contribution as part of our stabilisation efforts.  |
| 200                              | part of our stabilisation enorts.  |
| Military Options                 |  |
| 9(2)(g)(i)                       |  |
|                                  |  |
|                                  |  |



Annex C: NZDF GLOBAL MANDATED DEPLOYMENT NUMBERS AS AT 8 MAY

