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MANATŪ KAUPAPA WAONGA
NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

16 March 2026

RESPONSE TO YOUR OFFICIAL INFORMATION REQUEST

Thank you for your email of 11 February 2026, in which you requested, pursuant to the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act), a number of questions relating to the Persistent Surveillance (Air) Project Opportunities Workshops.

The responses to your questions are addressed below for each element of your request.

> *This request is made under the Official Information Act, 1982.*
>
> *It is in regard to the NOI- Persistent Surveillance (Air) Project Opportunities Workshop.*
>
> *For your reference, a link to it is below:*
> *https://www.gets.govt.nz/MD/ExternalTenderDetails.htm?id=33203317*
>
> *Under the "Overview" heading, this is stated: "Please see attached documents for details".*
>
> *Please provide these documents.*

The requested documents are enclosed:

- *2601 PS(A) Industry Workshops – Notice of Information*
- *PS(A) Industry Workshops – Registration (Jan 2026).*

> *Under the "RFx Outcome" heading, this is stated: "This tender has been completed".*
>
> *Please state the recipient(s) of the tender.*
>
> *Please also state the organisation and/or company each of the recipient(s) belongs to.*

No tender processes have taken place in relation to this workshop and the associated project. The listing you refer to on the Government Electronic Tender Service (GETS) is a Notice of Information (NOI) that was published to alert GETS users to the opportunity to register for the workshops that took place in January 2026.

The GETS website appears to have added a notice to the listing, noting it as "Tender Closed". This is a default text that is not correct, and the Ministry has contacted GETS to explore options to remedy this.

You have asked for the recipient(s) of the tender, and the organisation and/or company each of the recipient(s) belongs to. As noted above, no tender process has been initiated and no tender documentation has been published or provided to external parties. The NOI was a general invitation to attend an information workshop.

The Ministry does not hold information about who downloads or views notices or documents loaded onto GETS.

As a result, this element of your request is declined, in accordance with section 18(g)(i) of the Act, as this information is not held.

Please state when the in-person workshop occurred.

A hybrid in-person and virtual workshop for New Zealand-based providers took place on 23 January 2026.

Please provide the agenda for the workshop.

The agenda is included in the enclosed *Notice of Information*.

Please provide any documents supplied to participants of the workshop.

Alongside the documents included in the GETS notice, defence industry participants were provided with several vignettes that described plausible future security events, and asked to provide information about the capabilities they could potentially supply to support New Zealand Defence responses. These vignettes are designed to explore potential future defence capabilities, and do not necessarily represent either Defence's current policy settings or operational plans.

Following the workshops, attendees were provided with a contact list of other workshop attendees, and a feedback form.

#	Title	Enclosed/Withheld
1	*PS(A) Vignettes for Industry Engagement*	Enclosed
2	*PS(A) Industry Workshop 23 Jan 2026 PowerPoint*	Enclosed
3	*NZ Persistent Surveillance Air Contact List*	Withheld s9(2)(a) and s9(2)(b)(ii)
4	*PS(A) Industry Engagement Feedback*	Enclosed

Please provide any reports and/or documentation generated from the workshop.

No reporting has been generated from the three workshops.

Microsoft CoPilot was used to generate transcripts from the workshops. The commentary captured in the transcripts was provided with an expectation of confidence, and are therefore withheld in accordance with the following grounds of the Act:

- section 9(2)(b(ii), where the making available of the information would be likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial position of the person who supplied or who is the subject of the information; and
- section 9(2)(g)(i), to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty.

Please show which participants attended this workshop and which organisation and/or company they belong to.

Please show which participants attended this workshop.

The names of the individuals and companies who attended the workshops are withheld, pursuant to the following grounds of the Act:

- section 9(2)(a), in order to protect the privacy of natural persons; and
- section 9(2)(b)(ii), to protect information that would be likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial position of the person who supplied or who is the subject of the information.

In considering the public interest in this information, I recognise no decisions were made at these workshops, and a small amount of public money was spent to facilitate the workshops.

The workshops represent the very early, information gathering and industry engagement stage of the Persistent Surveillance (Air) project. The workshops will inform thinking on the range of options available to increase the New Zealand Defence Force's capability to provide long duration intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance across the South-West Pacific and Southern Ocean.

The workshops were designed to be brainstorming sessions to help identify innovative and viable opportunities to address the above objective. Defence anticipates that there may be a range of different technologies available that can deliver the required solution.

Following this, please state if, and when, a virtual workshop occurred.

Two virtual workshops took place, on 20 and 21 January to facilitate providers in the United States of America and Europe.

Please provide the agenda for the workshop.

Please provide any documents supplied to participants of the workshop.

Please provide any reports and/or documentation generated from the workshop.

Please show which participants attended this workshop and which organisation and/or company they belong to.

I refer you to our response above regarding the need to protect the details of participants.

Where information is withheld in accordance with section 9(2) of the Act, the public interest is not considered to outweigh the need to withhold that information at this time.

Under section 28(3) of the Act you have the right to request the Ombudsman to investigate and review this response.

Yours sincerely

Sarah Minson
Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery

Enclosed:

- *2601 PS(A) Industry Workshops – Notice of Information*
- *PS(A) Industry Workshops – Registration (Jan 2026)*
- *PS(A) Vignettes for Industry Engagement*
- *PS(A) Industry Workshop 23 Jan 2026 PowerPoint*
- *PS(A) Industry Engagement Feedback*

Persistent Surveillance (Air) Project Opportunities Workshop

20, 21 or 23 January 2026

New Zealand Defence is inviting industry and academia to contribute to a series of workshops in late January 2026. The workshops will inform early thinking on the range of options available to increase the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) capability to provide long duration intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) across the South-West Pacific and Southern Ocean.

What is the project aiming to achieve?

The Persistent Surveillance (Air) (PS(A)) project aims to improve the NZDF's ability to collect high fidelity ISR data, for longer durations, against a range of targets across the South West Pacific and Southern Ocean.

This project is listed in the 2025 Defence Capability Plan as a long-range remotely piloted aircraft. This was an example only, and Defence wants to explore any solution that provides the outcomes sought.

Background on the project

Currently, the PS(A) project is working towards a multi-phased approach to the project.

Phase 1 will be looking for a solution that can be delivered in the next few years. Depending on the solution, this may require a Commercially Owned, Commercially Operated (COCO) approach. It may also require the provision of training services in order to provide experience and qualifications to NZDF personnel in advance of subsequent phases.

Future Phases. It is envisaged that follow-on phases might involve NZDF ownership and/or operation of any capability.

The project team is currently undertaking an 'Opportunities Assessment' which is an environmental scan to provide a better understanding of the market both now and in the near future. This is a critical step in providing government an initial understanding of the viability of investing to address this problem, the breadth of options available, the ability of industry to provide analytical services, and the implications for the NZDF.

The Opportunities Assessment will feed into the Indicative Business Case which will outline the benefits, opportunities, risks and provide advice to Government about the recommended way forward.

About the workshops

The workshops are designed to be brainstorming sessions that will identify innovative and viable opportunities to address the above objective. Defence anticipates that there may be a range of different technologies available that can deliver the required solution.

The workshops will consider all aspects of the solution, from commercial arrangements to in-service support.

Additional information will be provided in a briefing document which will be issued in early January 2026 to participants who register.

Who should attend the workshop?

As this is a brainstorming session, we would encourage attendance from all parties who can contribute to our wider understanding.

We would like to explore not only platforms but technology applications, data analytics, training, through life support, etc.

Therefore, we encourage manufacturers and suppliers, as well as specialists in asset management and training to attend this workshop to support our understanding in this discovery and early engagement phase. We would also encourage the science, technology and research sectors to attend to inform and support the sessions from a forward-looking perspective.

How you can prepare?

These are the questions you'll be asked to discuss in the workshop. You may wish to think about them beforehand.

1. Sensors and Delivery – how does your proposed capability deliver against the problem statement? Are there other effects that the capability could deliver?
2. Technology – how could the desired effects be delivered? How will the proposed solution keep pace with technology advancements throughout its life?
3. Delivery – what arrangements could be used to deliver the solution (including both the initial delivery of the solution and its ongoing operation)?
4. In-Service Support – how will the solution be supported once in-service (e.g. operation, maintenance (if required) and training)? What type of facilities (if any) are required to support the proposed capability?
5. Security classification – what security classification level does the capability normally operate at, what security level is it capable of operating at?
6. Timing – how soon could the capability be delivered?
7. Financial – what financial and purchasing arrangements could be used to deliver the solution?

When will the workshops be?

When:

- Tuesday 20th January (Virtually only. Early morning NZL time to facilitate US involvement.)
- Wednesday 21st January (Virtually only. Late afternoon/evening NZL time to facilitate European involvement.)
- Friday 23rd January (In Person/Virtually. During NZL day to facilitate NZL and Australian involvement.)

The format and agenda for all three days is the same, therefore organisations should only attend one workshop. Please indicate your preference on the registration form.

Where:

Virtually: MS Teams (link to be provided)
In Person: Wellington CBD location Jan 23rd only (location to be advised)

An acceptable form of photo ID will be required to register in person – e.g. driver's licence or passport.

Workshop Agenda

Meeting #1 20 January 2026 0500 – 0800 NZDT (1100-1400 EST)

Virtual on MS teams (primarily for US Industry)
The workshop will be held at:

- MS Teams: TBA

Time (NZDT)	Item
0450	Log-on and confirmation of attendees
0500	Introductions, scene setting, and briefing by PS(A) project team
0520	Session 1: Platforms, Sensors and Technology
0620	Short break
0630	Session 2: Delivery and In-Service Support
0720	Short break
0730	Session 3: Security, Timing, and Funding
0800	Wrap Up and End
	Note that timings of the agenda remain subject to change

Meeting #2 21 January 2026 1900 – 2200 NZDT (0700-1000 CET, 0600-0900 GMT)

Virtual on MS teams (primarily for European, UK and Asian Industry)
The workshop will be held at:

- MS Teams: TBA

Time (NZDT)	Item
1850	Log-on and confirmation of attendees
1900	Introductions, scene setting, and briefing by PS(A) project team
1920	Session 1: Platforms, Sensors and Technology
2020	Short break
2030	Session 2: Delivery and In-Service Support
2120	Short break
2130	Session 3: Security, Timing, and Funding
2200	Wrap Up and End
	Note that timings of the agenda remain subject to change

Meeting #3 23 January 2026 0900 – 1345 NZDT

In person and virtual on MS teams (primarily for NZ and Australian Industry)

The workshop will be held at:

- Location: Wellington CBD.
- MS Teams: TBA

Time (NZDT)	Item
0830	Registration and coffee
0900	Introductions, scene setting, and briefing by PS(A) project team
0920	Session 1: Platforms, Sensors and Technology
1045	Short break
1100	Session 2: Delivery and In-Service Support
1200	Lunch
1245	Session 3: Security, Timing, and Funding
1345	Wrap Up and End
	Note that timings of the agenda remain subject to change

How the workshop will be run?

The workshop will be run either via MS Teams or in-person in Wellington. A link will be sent to those who register to participate via MS Teams.

Miro is a virtual mind map which will be used to record your ideas. You can view the map live during the workshop. A link to the Miro whiteboard will be sent to those who register.

RSVP and Registration Requirements for the Opportunities Workshop

The Opportunities Workshop will be hosted by the PS(A) project team.

Parties who wish to participate (either in-person or virtually) are required to submit the attached registration form, to Andy Evans, the PS(A) Commercial Lead (email andy.evans@defence.govt.nz) as soon as possible, but no later than 5 pm on Wednesday 14th January 2026.

The Registration form also provides an opportunity to arrange 1-1 meetings with the PS(A) project team.

The PS(A) project team will respond confirming your attendance. For virtual attendees a MS Teams invite will be provided and for in person attendees, details of the workshop location will be advised.

If you have any questions or queries in regard to this event please contact andy.evans@defence.govt.nz.

Persistent Surveillance (Air) Project Opportunities Workshop

20, 21 and 23 January 2026

Feedback

1. How useful was the engagement to your organisation (in terms of understanding the project, and participating in the discussion)?

Not at all useful

Very useful

2. What was the most useful part of the workshop for you and your organisation?

3. Any suggestions for how we can improve the workshops for next time we engage?

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Persistent Surveillance (Air) Phase 1 Industry Workshop

23 January 2026

Persistent Surveillance (Air) – Timeline Overview Indicative Only



Indicative Only

PS (A) Key Vignette Capability Points

Vignette 1 – Foreign Military Surface Action Group

- Search, ID, track several military vessels
- Operations at long range from NZ
- Multi-sensor detection and collection
- Consistent monitoring of activity
- Provide credible military presence
- Day/night operations
- Possible coordination with friendly naval vessel
- Near real-time data back to NZDF

Vignette 2 – Foreign Multi-purpose Research Vessel

- Search, ID, track/shadow medium-large multi-purpose vessel
- Multi-sensor collection
- All weather operations (thick cloud, heavy rain)
- Responsive to (relatively) urgent tasking
- Minimise counter-detection from the target vessel
- Provide credible military presence
- Near real-time data back to NZDF

Vignette 3 – Southern Ocean Conservation

- Search, ID, observe, and collect evidence against commercial fishing vessels
- Operations at long range from NZ and at southerly latitudes
- Evidentiary requirements to support legal proceedings
- Low contact density but very high surface clutter (sea ice)
- Maximum monitoring of a target over an extended time period
- Near real-time data back to NZDF

Vignette 4 – Seaborne Drug Smuggling

- Search, ID, track, monitor small vessel
- Low radar and optical detection opportunity against the target
- Time-late last known position
- Minimise counter-detection from the target vessel
- Shadow/monitor a rendezvous
- Simultaneous tracking of multiple targets
- Possible coordination with friendly naval vessel
- Near real-time data back to NZDF

SESSION 1 – PROMPT QUESTIONS

- What **platforms** might address vignettes?
  - Advantages, trade-offs (weather, speed, range, endurance, response times, in-use or experimental, payload capacity)
- What **sensors** might address vignettes?
  - What are the strengths and limitations of sensors in each vignette?
  - How does weather, time of day, range-to-target, and target characteristics affect?
  - How does solution's sensors contribute to search, location, identification, and intelligence collection?
- **Communication and Data** Integration
  - How does data fusion feature?
  - What near real-time communication options are available?
  - Formatting/encrypting constraints?
  - Evidence collection, including assurance of the chain of evidence?
- How might **technology changes** impact above over next 5-15 years?

SESSION 2 – PROMPT QUESTIONS

- Delivery
  - What commercial arrangements might be possible? Military Owned/Operated (NZDF traditional) -> commercially owned/operated
  - Specific considerations for each?
  - What financial arrangements might this include?
  - Benefits? Risks?
  - Management of classified data
  - How might each arrangement transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2?
- Through Life Support
  - What does Defence need to consider?
    - Examples only – Infrastructure, Certification / Airways approvals, PED, specialist personnel

SESSION 3 – PROMPT QUESTIONS

- Thinking about solution delivery
  - How long after a contract signature (notionally Q3 28) can the solutions be delivered? What influences this?
  - When could the solution start conducting tasked ISR operations (if different to the delivery date above)?
  - Prime Contracting / Integration risk?

- What security classifications can these capabilities operate/communicate at?
  - Defence Industry Security Programme
  - Encryption/decryption capability
  - Do the solutions' various data transmission and storage elements have security assurance?

Persistent Surveillance Project Opportunities Workshop Registration.

20, 21 or 23 January 2026

Note:

- 20 Jan will be early morning NZL time on MS Teams to facilitate US involvement
- 21 Jan will be evening NZL time on MS Teams to facilitate European involvement
- 23 Jan will be during NZL day (in person or on MS Teams) and is focussed on NZL / Australian involvement.

Organisations should attend ONE Workshop only – there will be future opportunities for engagement during 2026

Company/Institution name.			
Full Name(s) of Attendees.			
Nominated point of contact (with contact details).			
State date of attendance (please circle or strike through unwanted dates)	20 Jan NZDT (0500 – approx. 0800)	21 Jan NZDT (1900 – approx. 2200)	23 Jan NZDT (0900 – approx. 1400)
For 23 Jan meeting only – state whether intention is to attend in-person* or virtually (please circle).	In-person	Virtually	
For 23 Jan meeting only – Any dietary requirements.			
Continues on following page			

A short company/academic profile that can be reviewed prior to being sent an information pack. A link to your website (if applicable) would be appreciated.		
Are you agreeable to your contact details and profile being shared with other attendees?	Yes	No
Would you like a 20 minute one-on-one meeting (virtually or in person) with the PS(A) project team? Please provide names of those attending, a brief description of what you would like to discuss and (for the Jan 23rd meeting) whether you would like to meet virtually or in person. Note: These one-on-ones will be scheduled after the workshop		

* Note: Physical attendance on January 23rd will be limited to **two members per organisation**, other members of course can join virtually.

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NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

TE OPE KĀTUA O AOTEAROA
DEFENCE FORCE

Persistent Surveillance (Air) Project Opportunities Workshop

20, 21 or 23 January 2026

What is the project aiming to achieve?

1. The Persistent Surveillance (Air) (PS(A)) project is a New Zealand Ministry of Defence led project which aims to improve the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) ability to collect high fidelity Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data, for extended duration, against a range of targets across the South West Pacific and Southern Ocean.

2. This project is listed in the 2025 Defence Capability Plan as a long-range remotely piloted aircraft. This was an example only, and Defence wants to explore any solution that can provide the outcomes sought.

Background on the project

3. For the purpose of this document "Defence" refers to both the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). The MoD is the civilian public service agency that provides Defence policy advice to Government and carries out major procurement activity, the NZDF consists of the Armed Forces of New Zealand: the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), the New Zealand Army and the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF).

4. Currently, the PS(A) project is working towards a multi-phased approach to the project:

   a. **Phase 1** will be looking for a solution that can be delivered in the next few years. Depending on the solution, this may require a Commercially Owned, Commercially Operated (COCO) approach. It may also require the provision of training services in order to provide experience and qualifications to NZDF personnel in advance of subsequent phases.

   b. **Future Phases.** It is envisaged that follow-on phases might involve NZDF ownership and/or operation of any capability.

5. The project team is currently undertaking an 'Opportunities Assessment' which is an environmental scan to provide a better understanding of the market both now and in the near future. This is a critical step in providing government an initial understanding of the viability of investing to address this problem, the breadth of options available, the ability of industry to provide analytical services, and the implications for the NZDF.

c. The Opportunities Assessment will feed into the Indicative Business Case which will outline the benefits, opportunities, risks and provide advice to Government about the recommended way forward.

Context

6. Rising competition and tensions in the wider Indo-Pacific are playing out in New Zealand's immediate region (Antarctica to the South Pacific). While increased international engagement and interest in the Pacific can bring benefits to the region, it also presents challenges for regional security, stability and unity. The NZDF must be able to safeguard New Zealand's sovereignty and territorial integrity and protect the security of our immediate region. This includes delivering on New Zealand's constitutional responsibilities to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.

7. New Zealand's Maritime Area of Interest comprises more than 30 million square kilometres (see map at Annex B), over 8% of the planet, most of which is open ocean. Due to the changing geostrategic environment, activity in our region is increasing. New Zealand therefore has a growing need to enhance its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

8. The NZDF currently has two fixed-wing aircraft types that conduct ISR operations as a core output: two modified King Air aircraft (for short range missions) and the fleet of four P-8A Poseidon aircraft. Five C-130J-30 Hercules aircraft are able to conduct limited ISR operations as an auxiliary capability. The NZDF also has access to both foreign commercial and military satellites but the NZDF lacks both diversity of options and quantity of platforms to conduct regular, extended range or long duration operations within our region because of the limited number of aircraft, and the short on-station endurance for long-range tasks.

What capability is the project looking for?

9. The PS(A) surveillance and response capabilities will ***primarily be utilised by the NZDF*** to provide ISR of both foreign military and paramilitary entities operating on the ocean's surface within our Maritime Area of Responsibility. This information will be used to inform NZDF operations, and to support our partners' and ally's military operations.

10. The final requirements will change a bit over the course of the project definition phase as the project team learns more about what is available in the market (and this workshop is a critical first step in this journey). However, ideally the NZDF is seeking the ability to:

a. conduct ISR across the region in Annex B (approximately 2,500NM from New Zealand), including the Ross Dependency (latitude of 60 south).

b. overtly and covertly gather detailed information of actual or perceived threats across the region at Annex B.

c. provide timely ISR outputs to NZDF tasking.[1]

d. provide multiple, detection, communication and collections payloads.

e. employ high quality, all weather and all day (and night) payloads which can detect, identify, track, and collect data on maritime entities of interest – currently provided by platforms carrying multiple sensors including Electric Optical/Infrared, Radar, Electronic Collection and Automatic Identification Sensor.

f. stream/transmit near real time data to New Zealand.

g. integrate data into existing NZDF systems.

11. Defence is open to a commercially owned and operated model, at least in the first Phase. This will be a near term investment with definition and delivery occurring 2025-2028, entering operational service in 2029.

12. When not conducting operations in support of PS(A)'s primary purpose, the capability may contribute to a variety of security, safety and emergency operations, including:

a. Border protection, detection and deterrence such as:
   i. Fishery activities and compliance;
   ii. Customs compliance and response to smuggling, including transit through New Zealand waters and approaches and the attempted entry of illegal materials; and
   iii. Attempted illegal entry of people and the activities of people smugglers;

b. Offshore and onshore non-military security such as:
   i. Maritime safety;
   ii. Offshore fishery activities and compliance;
   iii. Search and rescue;
   iv. Offshore and near-shore infrastructure, including oil and gas, offshore cables and potentially wave and wind power generation in the future;
   v. Biosecurity incursions including illegal discharges of ballast water and other substances;
   vi. Pollution monitoring;
   vii. Ships in transit;
   viii. Counter-terrorism (CT) and other high impact incidents of interest to Police;
   ix. Anti-piracy;
   x. Disaster response; and
   xi. Criminal activities;

c. All of the civilian tasks above also in support of Pacific Island states; and

d. Maintaining a regular presence in the region in support of national sovereignty and territorial claims, including in Antarctica.

[1] No specific response timelines are currently mandated for this capability.

About the workshops

13. The workshops are designed to be brainstorming sessions that will identify innovative and viable opportunities to address the aims of the project. The project team will use a series of vignettes (scenarios), which are detailed from page 6 of this document, to answer the following questions:

a. What are the potential opportunities to achieve the desired effects/capabilities?

b. What are the currently foreseeable changes to technologies (over the next 5 - 15 years)?

c. Are there any other effects which could be delivered (other than those identified in the below vignettes)?

d. What risks or complications are associated with the identified opportunities?

14. Defence anticipates that there will be a range of different technologies available that can deliver the required solution. The workshops will consider all aspects of the solution, from commercial arrangements to in-service support.

How you can prepare

15. These are the questions we'll discuss in the workshop. You may wish to think about them beforehand in relation to the four vignettes.

a. Sensors and Delivery – how does your proposed capability deliver against the vignettes? Are there other effects that the capability could deliver?

b. Technology – how could the desired effects be delivered? How will the proposed solution keep pace with technology advancements throughout its life? Are there any currently foreseen technology changes that may impact capabilities? What are the risks or complications that will need to be addressed with the proposed capability?

c. Delivery – what commercial arrangements could be used to deliver the proposed capability (including both the initial delivery of the solution and its ongoing operation)?

d. Security – what security classification level does the proposed capability normally operate at, what security level is it currently capable of operating at or planned for? How could Defence's required security level impact the delivery of the capability? Is your organisation aware of and aligned with Defence Security requirements?

e. In-Service Support – how will the solution be supported once in-service (e.g. operation, maintenance (if required) and training)? What type of facilities (if any) are required to support the proposed capability?

f. Timing – how soon could the proposed capability be delivered after contract signature? (days/weeks/months?)

g. Financial – what financial and purchasing arrangements could be used to deliver the proposed capability? Are you offering a product (with or without a support package) or a service? How is it envisaged that payments be spread? What are the high level support elements (GFx) that Defence needs to provide to support the solution?

Persistent Surveillance (Air) Use Vignettes

16. Four high-level vignettes have been developed to help define the PS(A) operational concept.

ID	Vignette	Area of Interest	PS(A) Capabilities[2]
1	Foreign Military Surface Action Group	• Adjacent High Seas • Extended High Seas • SW Pacific EEZ • Southern Ocean	• Wide Area Surveillance • Narrow Area Surveillance • Data collection • Tracking Multiple targets • Presence • Agility • Command, Control and Communication
2	Foreign multi-purpose research vessel	• NZ EEZ • Adjacent High Seas	• Narrow Area Surveillance • Persistent Monitoring • Presence • Agility
3	Southern Ocean Conservation	• Southern Ocean	• Broad Area Surveillance • Wide Area Surveillance • Endurance • Data/Evidence Collection • Presence
4	Seaborne Drug Smuggling	• Adjacent High Seas • Extended High Seas • SW Pacific EEZ	• Wide Area Surveillance • Narrow Area Surveillance • Data/Evidence Collection • Tracking Multiple targets • Endurance • Overwatch • Command, Control and Communication

[2] See Annex A for definitions of Surveillance terms used here

PS(A) VIGNETTE 1: FOREIGN MILITARY SURFACE ACTION GROUP

Overview

17. This vignette describes how the PS(A) would contribute towards locating, identifying, tracking and collecting against a group of foreign military naval vessels. It also describes how the PS(A) would support the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), to interact with the foreign military vessels to provide advance warning and military planning options to Defence and the Government.

Threat or Hazard:

a. Foreign military vessels conducting transit, military drills and other naval activity within the Maritime Area of Interest.

PS(A) Areas of Interest Covered:

a. Adjacent High Seas
b. Extended High Seas
c. South West Pacific EEZ
d. Southern Ocean

PS(A) Capabilities:

a. Wide Area Surveillance
b. Narrow Area Surveillance
c. Data collection
d. Tracking Multiple targets
e. Presence
f. Agility
g. Command, Control and Communication

Vignette 1 Narrative



18. Intelligence from a friendly nation has identified a group of foreign naval vessels tracking south through the Pacific. Indications are that the vessels will conduct live firing drills in the high seas North of The Cook Islands. The PS(A) receives a tasking request for Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) to search for and shadow the vessels in the high-seas during live firing.

19. In order to monitor live-firing activity, overwatch of the vessels is required over an extended time period and multi-sensor ISR collection of the vessels' activities (including during live firing) is required.

20. PS(A) should be prepared to provide the positions of the foreign naval vessels either directly to an RNZN or partner vessel, or via Joint Forces Headquarters.

21. All data collected during the PS(A) operation will be processed by NZDF intelligence personnel and may be shared with partner nations.

PS(A) VIGNETTE 2: FOREIGN MULTI-PURPOSE RESEARCH VESSEL

Overview

22. This vignette describes how the PS(A) would contribute towards locating, identifying, tracking and collecting against a foreign multi-purpose research vessel.

Threat or Hazard:

a. Foreign multi-purpose research vessel potentially conducting undeclared and unknown survey activity within the AOR.

PS(A) Areas of Interest Covered:

a. New Zealand EEZ
b. Adjacent High Seas

PS(A) Capabilities:

a. Narrow Area Surveillance
b. Persistent Monitoring
c. Presence
d. Agility

Vignette 2 Narrative



23. Intelligence has identified a foreign, government-owned (non-military) research vessel approaching, and then loitering in the NZ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Kermadec Islands.

24. The NZDF receives a request to immediately search for, and shadow the vessel in the NZ EEZ in vicinity of the Kermadecs (Narrow Area Surveillance).

25. There is a relatively large tropical storm moving eastward along the southern edge of the Fijian EEZ, with thick, mid-high level cloud cover in the area, and frequent heavy rain.

26. PS(A) is required to conduct this task as soon as possible. PS(A) will ideally provide continuous monitoring of the activity of the vessel, including whether any smaller vessels are deployed from the research vessel.

27. It is desirable that the PS(A) conducts this search and monitoring while minimising detection opportunities by the vessel's crew.

28. It is also desirable that the PS(A) can provide a visible presence when specifically requested.

29. All data collected during the PS(A) operation will be processed by NZDF intelligence personnel and may be shared with partner nations.

PS(A) VIGNETTE 3: SOUTHERN OCEAN CONSERVATION

Context

30. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was established by international convention in 1982 with the objective of conserving Antarctic marine life through the implementation of a comprehensive set of conservation measures, including fishing seasons, closed areas, prohibition of fishing and by-catch limits. The CCAMLR Commission have raised concerns about the increasing number of vessels repeatedly fishing in the Convention Area in a manner that could constitute Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. IUU fishing can severely damage ecosystems through unsustainable exploitation of fish stocks, the capture of non-fish bycatch like seabirds and marine mammals and the use of destructive fishing gear and methods.

Overview

31. This vignette describes how a routine PS(A) Broad Area Surveillance task detects a potential IUU fishing threat within the CCAMLR Convention Area. This information, along with other information and intelligence sources, is used by MPI to quantify the threat and make a decision on the most appropriate response option.

Threat or Hazard:

a. Exploitation of Antarctic marine living resources due to IUU fishing.

PS(A) Areas of Interest Covered:

a. Southern Ocean

PS(A) Capabilities:

a. Broad Area Surveillance
b. Wide Area Surveillance
c. Endurance
d. Data/evidence collection
e. Presence

Vignette 3 Narrative



32. Based on historical trends and current intelligence, a request is submitted to the NZDF for Broad Area Surveillance (BAS) in specific areas of the CCAMLR Convention Area. While this is an uncongested maritime traffic environment (i.e. low contact density), there is a significant amount of sea ice in the area.

33. Over a period of days PS(A) provides UNCLASSIFIED information (through NZDF) to the relevant authority detailing the contacts that are present in the tasked area of interest.

34. Using PS(A)'s Broad Area Surveillance intelligence and other sources, New Zealand Authorities identify a potential IUU fishing threat. PS(A) is tasked with providing as much monitoring (e.g. position, course, speed, activity on board etc.) as possible of the Vessel of Interest (VOI) over a period of 72 hours.

35. New Zealand Authorities continue to analyse the threat based on its pattern of behaviour. PS(A) is tasked to collect evidential standard information on the VOI's suspected IUU fishing activities.

36. All data collected during the PS(A) operation must be able to be shared with NZ Government agencies (with the relevant permissions).

PS(A) VIGNETTE 4: SEABORNE DRUG SMUGGLING

Overview

37. This vignette describes how PS(A) could be tasked by NZDF to assist relevant Other Government Agencies in tracking a Vessel of Interest (VOI) with known links to drug smuggling and to monitor its interaction with other vessels including the exchange of cargo. The PS(A) supports relevant Authorities in interdicting all vessels suspected of attempting to smuggle drugs into NZ and provides evidence to support their prosecution in a court of law.

Threat or Hazard:

a. Commercial Vessel of Interest
b. Additional illegal drug carriers including:
    i. Pleasure craft
    ii. Fast small craft
    iii. Semi-submersed 'narcotics subs'

PS(A) Areas of Interest Covered:

a. Adjacent High Seas
b. Extended High Seas
c. SW Pacific EEZ

PS(A) Capabilities:

a. Wide Area Surveillance
b. Narrow Area Surveillance
c. Data/Evidence Collection
d. Tracking Multiple targets
e. Endurance
f. Overwatch
g. Command, Control and Communication

Vignette 4 Narrative



38. Intelligence from a friendly nation has identified that an unknown vessel is transiting west-ward through the South Pacific. The vessel is believed to be involved in illegal drug smuggling. The vessel type is unknown, but is likely a pleasure craft, or a semi-submersed 'narcotics sub'. The last known position is over 3 days old.

39. A request is submitted to the NZDF for Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) to search, find, identify and shadow the VOI in the Extended High Seas AOI. The search area is approximately 800NM2.

40. PS(A) conducts a search based on the worst-case parameters of the vessel and locates the VOI (a semi-submersed de-masted yacht) South East of Niue. Stand-off classification and identification is carried out.

41. PS(A) provides continuous monitoring of the vessel's Position, Course and Speed (PCS) and limits the VOI crew's ability to detect the PS(A) platform.

42. As the VOI approaches the Niue EEZ, a lone Fishing Vessel (FV), outside of the known fishing grounds, rendezvous with the VOI. FV and VOI's PCS are passed to both NZ authorities. Stand-off shadowing is maintained as evidential data is

gathered through longer-range sensors showing the transfer of cargo from the VOI to the FV.

43. On completion of the rendezvous, the VOI continues its passage to the west.

44. The FV is observed departing South West into international waters. Tracking of both the VOI and the FV is maintained until the limits of sensor capability.

45. A Pacific Island nation's patrol vessel is tasked to intercept the VOI. PS(A) is required to vector the patrol vessel to intercept the VOI. The Pacific Island nation have requested that NZDF provide over-watch during the boarding operations.

46. Data collected during the PS(A) operation will be able to be shared with relevant NZ Government and foreign government agencies (with the relevant permissions).

Annex A: Definition of Surveillance

1. In the context of this document, 'surveillance' is used to refer to the actions associated with both surveillance and reconnaissance:

a. **Surveillance (PS(A) definition)**. The systematic observation of the air, maritime, land, space or cyberspace domains by visual, aural, electromagnetic, photographic or other means, including the gathering of detailed information about actual or perceived threats over extended periods of time.

2. Surveillance plays a key role in ensuring that decision makers are adequately informed about their operational area of responsibility, including the provision of information to assist in defining and assessing potential response options to security, safety or emergency events.

3. In recognition of the need to adopt a layered approach, the PS(A) project uses three types of surveillance where the coverage area decreases as the level of detail collected on a potential threat increases. These three types of surveillance are defined below and illustrated in Figure 1:

a. **Broad Area Surveillance (BAS)**. The ability to detect or locate all entities across a large coverage area, with some limited ability to classify and track entities for a defined period of time;

b. **Wide Area Surveillance (WAS)**. The ability to detect, locate, classify and track all entities across a medium coverage area or be able to gather this information on a specific threat for a defined period of time, with some limited ability to identify entities; and

c. **Narrow Area Surveillance (NAS)**. The ability to detect, locate, classify, identify, confirm the activity and gather data on all entities across a small coverage area, or be able to gather this information on a specific threat for a defined period of time.



Figure 1: Types of Surveillance

4. Once a potential threat has been detected, decision makers are presented with response options. A response option could also include additional surveillance, or non-surveillance activities, such as air dropping emergency supplies, communicating with the entity, coordinating a security operation, or providing a physical presence to deter or halt an activity from being conducted. This relationship between surveillance capability and a response option is illustrated in *Figure 2*.



Figure 2: Relationship between Surveillance Capability and Response Options

Annex B: New Zealand Maritime Area of Interest