

HON Judith Collins KC, MINISTER OF DEFENCE

New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: Military Options 2025/2026

June 2025

This paper seeks a Cabinet decision, subject to sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025, on the future of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployments to Europe in support of Ukraine (Operation TĪEKE).

The pack comprises the following document:

- the Cabinet paper and associated Minute of Decision *New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: Military Options 2025/2026* [FPS-25-MIN-0001 and FPS-25-SUB-0001].

This pack has been released on the Ministry of Defence website, available at:

www.defence.govt.nz/publications.

It has been necessary to withhold certain information in accordance with the following provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Where information is withheld, the relevant sections of the Act are indicated in the body of the document

Information is withheld where making it available would be likely to prejudice:

- the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand [section 6(a)]
- the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the Government of any other country or any agency of such a Government [section 6(b)(i)]

Further information is withheld to:

- protect the free and frank expression of opinions [section 9(2)(g)(i)]



Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee

Minute of Decision

This document contains information for the New Zealand Cabinet. It must be treated in confidence and handled in accordance with any security classification, or other endorsement. The information can only be released, including under the Official Information Act 1982, by persons with the appropriate authority.

New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: Military Options 2025-2026

Portfolios Foreign Affairs / Defence

On 11 February 2025, the Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee:

- 1 **noted** that the mandates for existing New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence (Operation TIEKE) expire on 30 June 2025 [CAB-24-MIN-0040];
- 2 **noted** that the threat to NZDF personnel operating throughout Europe is considered to be s6(a)
- 3 **agreed** to the strategic objectives proposed for NZDF deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence, as outlined in the paper under FPS-25-SUB-0001;
- 4 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
- 5 **noted** that:
 - 5.1 s6(a)
 - 5.2
- 6 **noted** that the Chief of Defence Force will inform the Minister of Defence of significant changes to the composition of deployed personnel;
- 7 **noted** that should the nature of the conflict change significantly, Cabinet will be provided with advice to change or conclude the deployment ahead of the mandate's expiry;
- 8 **noted** that funding in the NZDF deployments appropriation is fully committed in 2025/26, and that the Minister of Defence has submitted a Budget 2025 initiative seeking additional funding for deployments;
- 9 **agreed in principle**, subject to sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025, to the deployment of up to 100 NZDF personnel in support of Ukraine, within the themes of training support, staff augmentation, and command, liaison and support, from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026;

- 10 **noted** that at no time would NZDF personnel deployed under this mandate enter the territories of Russia, Belarus or Ukraine;
- 11 **authorised** the Chief of Defence Force to manage the employment of up to 100 personnel deployed in support of Ukraine's self-defence across the Cabinet-approved themes of training support, staff augmentation, and command, liaison and support;
- 12 **authorised** the Chief of Defence Force to approve new opportunities across the Cabinet-approved themes referred to above inside Europe (but not in Ukraine, Belarus, or Russia), subject to the Chief of Defence Force ensuring that any new opportunity:
- 12.1 is consistent with NZDF's policy and relationship settings;
- 12.2 would not cause Operation TIEKE to exceed its personnel cap of 100; and
- 12.3 would remain with the allocated budget for the deployment;
- 13 **noted** that the total estimated cost of the deployment is \$12.688 million in financial year 2025/26 and \$6.240 million in financial year 2026/27.

Jenny Vickers
Committee Secretary

Present:

Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Rt Hon Winston Peters (Chair)
Hon David Seymour
Hon Nicola Willis
Hon Judith Collins KC
Hon Mark Mitchell
Hon Todd McClay
Hon Nicola Grigg

Officials present from:

Office of the Prime Minister
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Officials Committee for FPS

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Office of the Minister of Defence

Chair, Foreign Policy and National Security Committee

New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: Military Options 2025/2026

Proposal

- 1 This paper seeks a Cabinet decision, subject to sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025, on the future of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployments to Europe in support of Ukraine (Operation TĪEKE).

Relation to Government Priorities

- 2 Continuing to support Ukraine through military deployments aligns with NZ Defence policy settings by contributing to collective security efforts that protect, and promote, New Zealand's interests and values.
- 3 The deployment supports New Zealand's foreign policy goal for "a safe, secure, and just future" as one of the most tangible actions we can take to help Ukraine defend its territorial sovereignty. This is a fundamental element of the international rules-based system. It also aligns with the Foreign Policy Reset objective to apply "renewed attentiveness to traditional likeminded partnerships".

Executive Summary

- 4 This paper recommends, subject to sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025, that Cabinet agree to maintain a deployment of up to 100 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel, to continue to support Ukraine's self-defence. This covers an 18 month period from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026 (Option One).

s9(2)(g)(i)

- 5 Option One would see NZDF personnel providing support across three deployment themes, namely: training support; staff augmentation; and command, liaison and support. This spread balances the benefit of signalling New Zealand's steadfast commitment to Ukraine, with the flexibility and a sufficiently long (18 month) planning window to adapt New Zealand's support as Ukraine's needs evolve. The deployment would be reviewed ahead of its expiry if there was a fundamental change to the nature of the conflict or an end to the fighting.
- 6 Taking this flexible and multifaceted approach would support New Zealand's relationships with close Defence partners, provide the NZDF with useful experience, and would contribute to upholding the rules-based international order with greater impact. There are no significant risks associated with this option.
- 7 The recommended option is estimated to cost \$12.688 million in 2025/26 and \$6.240 million in FY 2026/27. This option can be partially funded in 2025/26 within the Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA. This however leaves a funding shortfall of \$10.797 million in 2025/26. There would be sufficient funding available to fully fund this operation in 2026/27.
- 8 The Minister of Defence has submitted a Budget 2025 initiative seeking a funding uplift to meet the costs of additional deployments, including Operation TĪEKE. Therefore while the Minister of Defence is not seeking out of cycle funding through this paper, the recommended deployment option is subject to sufficient funding being

made available through the Budget 2025 process.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

- 9 This paper also presents two alternative options: Option Two, reducing the NZDF's support to Ukraine to 70 personnel (which would also be subject to additional funding being made available through Budget 2025); or Option Three, concluding the deployment following 30 June 2025.

Background

Current NZDF deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence

- 10 The NZDF has had personnel deployed to Europe in support of Ukraine for nearly three years under Operation TĪEKE. During this time, NZDF contributions have developed and matured as Ukraine's needs have evolved. The deployments have been highly valued by Ukraine and likeminded partners.
- 11 On 19 February 2024, Cabinet agreed to continue NZDF support to Ukraine through the deployment of up to 97 personnel across the themes of intelligence, liaison, logistics, training, command and administration. The mandate for this deployment will expire on 30 June 2025.

Ukraine still has a pressing need for international support

12

s6(a)

- 13 The proposed extension to NZDF's deployment to Europe would form the centrepiece of New Zealand's assistance to Ukraine in FY 2025/26 and 2026/27.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

The humanitarian assistance provision was announced in July 2024; the reconstruction assistance will be ready to be announced in February 2025 around the three-year anniversary of Russia's invasion.² Since February 2022, New Zealand has pledged assistance for Ukraine valued at over NZ\$130 million.

- 14 Since 2022, in addition to the value of the NZDF deployments, New Zealand has provided on average around NZ\$10 million per year in military assistance to Ukraine primarily through contributions to multi-national funds such as the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package, the International Fund for Ukraine, and the Drone

1

s6(b)(i)

² Advice will be provided to Ministers on plans to mark the three year anniversary in early-February 2025.

Coalition for Ukraine. The last such contribution was announced in July 2024, [REDACTED]
s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i) .³

The NZDF will need to be flexible to respond effectively to Ukrainian needs

- 15 It is crucial that Ukraine receives timely support to ensure that it remains effective on the battlefield. Some of New Zealand's key defence partners, including the UK and NATO, are working hard to ensure that the states supporting Ukraine are able to respond expeditiously to Ukrainian requests for assistance.
- 16 Continuing to deliver training support is the best option for NZDF assistance to Ukraine, as it is a particularly impactful and cost-effective way of improving the combat ability of the AFU. It is more sustainable for New Zealand to deliver training support to Ukraine than to provide other forms of military assistance such as weapons or equipment donations.

17 [REDACTED] s6(a)

Proposed Strategic Objectives

- 18 Officials have proposed the following strategic objectives for further military deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence:⁴
- 18.1 New Zealand contributes to efforts to uphold the international rules-based system through the provision of military contributions in support of Ukraine's self-defence efforts.
- 18.2 New Zealand assists Ukraine to better defend itself against aggression and, as a result, makes it harder for Russia to achieve its invasion objectives.
- 18.3 New Zealand strengthens and enhances relationships with likeminded partners by demonstrating commitment to addressing global security challenges, through military contributions.
- 18.4 The NZDF provides its personnel with valuable international deployment experience which supports our military activities domestically and in our near region by gaining and applying operational experience.

Proposed mandate period – 18 months

- 19 The last two mandates for Operation TĪEKE have been for 12 months. However, an 18 month mandate period has been recommended if a deployment is continued. This is to ensure that the NZDF's contribution aligns with the UK's schedule for Operation INTERFLEX training, which operates by calendar year. This will make planning easier for both New Zealand and the UK. A longer mandate also enables the NZDF to better plan and adapt activities to account for Ukraine's evolving needs.

3

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

⁴ The proposed strategic objective at paragraph 18.2 is a new addition following a review of the Operation TĪEKE deployment. All other objectives have been carried over from the 2024/2025 Operation TĪEKE mandate.

20 Should the nature of the conflict change significantly, or the fighting end, over this mandate period, Cabinet would be provided with advice to change or conclude the deployment ahead of the mandate's expiry.

21 s6(a)

Criteria for Options Analysis

22 When evaluating options for the future of NZDF support to Ukraine, options were assessed against the criteria of alignment with Ukrainian needs, value to partnerships, sustainability of delivery, flexibility of support, and fiscal impact.

	Alignment with UKR needs	Value to partnerships	Sustainability of delivery	Flexibility of support	Fiscal Impact
Option One – Maintain					
Option Two – Reduce					
Option Three – Conclude			N/A	N/A	

Option One: Maintain NZDF support of up to 100 personnel (recommended)

23 Option One proposes that Cabinet agree to maintain the deployment of up to 100 NZDF personnel from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026.⁵ Officials recommend these personnel undertake activities across a simplified set of deployment themes: training support; staff augmentation; and command, liaison, and support. This is the preferred proposal.

Training Support

24 It is recommended that the NZDF continue to support UK-led training operations, in particular Operation INTERFLEX. This support will be centred around continuing the NZDF's contribution of a five person Training Headquarters, and an 18 person Training Support Platoon, based s6(a) in the UK. The platoon will support a range of training courses.⁶

25 s6(a). The NZDF's contribution to Operation INTERLEX is very highly valued by the UK. s9(2)(g)(i)

26 Officials recommend that the NZDF also continues to offer specialist training programmes coordinated by other European partners and expands the types of specialist training it is delivering. Option One recommends that the below specialist training support be delivered in the following locations:

Specialist training support to continue	Additional specialist training support proposed
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (UK)	s6(a)
Engineering/Sapper Training (Germany)	

⁵ This is a three person increase from the current personnel cap for Operation TIEKE, proposed to make a round number.

⁶ This may include training on basic infantry/recruit courses, basic instructor training courses, junior leadership courses and other courses s6(b)(i)

Maritime Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training (Denmark)	
Sniper Training (Norway)	

- 27 The NZDF's delivery of these episodic specialist training support programmes has proven to be an effective and sustainable way of providing credible contributions to the training of the AFU. These training support programmes have been selected as they are sustainable for the NZDF to deliver, provide NZDF personnel with useful experience, and provide value to the AFU.

Staff Augmentation

- 28 It is recommended that Cabinet authorise the deployment of NZDF personnel to support the headquarters of key organisations involved in support to Ukraine, to ensure that New Zealand Defence continues to benefit from the enhanced access, understanding, and influence that these roles provide. These staff integrate into these organisations and undertake valuable, highly-regarded work that has tangible benefits for Ukraine. Specifically, Option One proposes the maintenance of roles in the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) initiative (Germany), Headquarters Operation INTERFLEX (UK), [REDACTED] s6(a)

Command, Liaison and Support

- 29 Option One proposes increasing the NZDF's UK-based combined National Command Element (NCE) and Joint National Support Element (JNSE) by one additional staff member, to a total of eight personnel. This will ensure the movements of personnel are well coordinated and the operation runs effectively and efficiently on a day-to-day basis. This option also proposes the maintenance of liaison roles in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium [REDACTED] s6(a). These positions will provide helpful insights on the ongoing work of these organisations and on potential future support opportunities that the NZDF can explore.

Managing changes to NZDF personnel and training support across the themes of Option One

- 30 The constantly evolving nature of the conflict, and the pressure on AFU resources, means requests for training support and other opportunities will be received throughout the mandate period. Similarly, it is possible that the locations for the above activities may change over the course of the mandate period.
- 31 To ensure that the NZDF is able to respond quickly to these requests for additional support, **Cabinet is asked to delegate authority to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) to approve new support and manage the deployment of personnel within themes of training support, staff augmentation, and command, liaison and support opportunities inside Europe (but not in Ukraine, Belarus, or Russia), with a core focus on the UK.** This would include changes to the numbers of personnel deployed across each of the themes if developments in the conflict increase or decrease their level of utility.
- 32 Before approving any new training support opportunity, CDF will ensure: that any new opportunity is consistent with New Zealand Defence's policy and relationship settings; and would not cause Operation TIEKE to exceed its personnel cap of 100. The NZDF would consult the Ministry of Defence and MFAT on proposed changes and notify the Minister of Defence.

Risks of Option One

Risk	Analysis
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⁸ The number of personnel deployed in each of these roles can be found in Annex A, [REDACTED] s6(a)

Pacific response	This option would not impact the NZDF's operational ability to respond to domestic or regional contingencies in the Pacific, and would not impact current regional plans or commitments.
The conflict changes significantly or concludes	Should the conflict change significantly, or conclude, over the mandate, Cabinet would be provided with advice to change or conclude the deployment ahead of the mandate's expiry.
Training human rights assessment	Should officials be made aware of specific or substantial information which indicates a human rights breach may occur as a consequence of our training support, the training would be suspended and if the resulting risk was substantiated, officials would revert to Cabinet before training resumed.

Option Two: Reduce NZDF support to up to 70 personnel (not recommended)⁹

- 33 Cabinet may decide to reduce the total number of personnel deployed on Operation TĪEKE to 70 personnel from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026. The same simplified set of themes for the deployment are proposed under Option Two: Training Support; Staff Augmentation; and Command, Liaison and Support. This option is similar to Option One, but is smaller in scope and scale.

There are a number of risks to Option Two over and above those in Option One...

Risk	Analysis
A lack of flexibility in the NZDF's support	Constraining the NZDF's deployed personnel will limit New Zealand's ability to be responsive to Ukrainian requests for assistance and evolutions in international support for Ukraine; a feature of our current deployment that has been valued by partners.
Reputational damage	A reduction in our Operation TĪEKE mandate from the current up to 97 personnel limit, to up to 70 personnel, will be noted by our close partners. A perceived reduction in our support to Ukraine would be inconsistent with the actions and expectations of our close partners, and may be poorly received.
Less effective training support	Option Two would limit the NZDF to its current level of support to Operation INTERFLEX and a core set of specialist training opportunities – namely Field Engineer and Maritime Explosive Ordnance Disposal, s6(a). However, the NZDF would not be able to deliver these specialist training courses to the same extent as under Option One: one fewer sapper training course would be delivered, s6(a).
Reduced situational awareness	The NZDF would limit its contribution to s6(a) NSATU to a smaller number of key roles (up to eight personnel across both organisations) s6(a). This would constrain the NZDF's situational awareness of developments on the battlefield and Ukraine's needs.

...however, there would be financial benefits

- 34 Option Two costs \$5.127 million less than Option One. It would cost the NZDF \$3.408 million less in FY 2025/26 and \$1.719 million less in FY 2026/27. However, while a reduced cost, Option Two remains unable to be funded through existing baselines and is also subject to additional funding being agreed through Budget 2025.

Managing changes to NZDF personnel and training support across the themes of Option Two

- 35 If Cabinet agrees to Option Two, officials propose that the CDF, as in Option One, be delegated authority to approve new support and manage the employment of personnel within the Cabinet-agreed themes. The consultation and notification requirements outlined in paragraph 32 would also apply if Cabinet agrees to Option Two.

Option Three: Conclude NZDF support to Ukraine (not recommended)

⁹ Annex A provides an overview of what can be delivered under Option Two, compared to Option One.

- 36 Cabinet may decide to conclude all of the NZDF's contributions in support of Ukraine after 30 June 2025. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Risks of Option Three

Risk	Analysis
Reputational damage	Withdrawal of military assistance may undermine our credibility and reputation with likeminded countries. s9(2)(g)(i)
Supports Russian narratives	Option Three may be interpreted by some countries as a shift in New Zealand's foreign policy position of condemning Russia's aggression. A withdrawal would play into Russian propaganda that Western fatigue is growing, and the war is justified.
Detriments to the NZDF	Conclusion of our support would also remove the benefits and operational experience that the NZDF derives from the Operation TIEKE deployment to Europe.

Financial Implications

Option 1: Maintain NZDF support of up to 100 personnel until 31 December 2026 (Recommended)

- 37 The recommended option to maintain NZDF support of up to 100 New Zealand Defence Force personnel deployed in support of Ukraine from 1 July 2025 until 31 December 2026 is estimated to cost \$12.688 million in 2025/26 and \$6.240 million 2026/27. This option can only partially be funded in 2025/26 within the Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA. There is a funding shortfall of \$10.797 million in 2025/26, however there is sufficient funding available to fully fund this operation in 2026/27.
- 38 The Minister of Defence has submitted a Budget 2025 initiative seeking an uplift in operating funding for Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests to increase NZDF's baseline funding for deployments, including Operation TIEKE. Therefore, the selection of Option One would be contingent on sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025.

- 39 s6(a)

Option 2: Reduce NZDF support to up to 70 personnel from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026 (not recommended)

- 40 The option to reduce NZDF support to 70 New Zealand Defence Force personnel deployed in support of Ukraine from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026 is estimated to cost \$9.280 million in 2025/26 and \$4.521 million in 2026/27. This option can be partially funded in 2025/26 within the Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA. There is a funding shortfall of \$7.389 million in 2025/26, however there is sufficient funding available to fully fund this operation in 2026/27. As with Option One, the selection of Option Two would be contingent on sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025.

- 41 s6(a)

Option 3: Conclude support (Not Recommended)

41. This option has no additional financial implications over and above that required to repatriate currently deployed personnel.

Legal Considerations

- 42 The options discussed in this paper are consistent with international law, and with state practice in the wider international community. As Cabinet has previously noted, under the UN Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression.¹⁰ [REDACTED] s6(a)
- 43 The legal basis for the presence of NZDF personnel across Europe in support of Operation TĪEKE is with the permission of the respective Host Nations. Some arrangements, such as the one between Germany and New Zealand, will need to be reviewed to account for any extension of personnel and ensure their enduring permission to remain in country until the end of any mandate.
- 44 Should it be approved, Operation TĪEKE is an operational activity as defined by section 7(4)(a)(ii) of the Health and Safety at Work At 2015 (the Act), and as such the provisions of the Act will not apply. Notwithstanding, members of the NZDF on Operation TĪEKE are to uphold the objectives of Defence Force Order 9 which includes taking reasonably practicable steps to ensure their place of work, and manner of carrying out work, is safe.

s6(a)

Threat Assessment

- 47 New Zealand Defence Intelligence is responsible for maintaining strategic military threat assessments for all NZDF operations. The overall operational threat level for Operation TĪEKE's current locations is [REDACTED] s6(a)

Consultation

- 48 This paper was jointly prepared by the Ministry of Defence, the NZDF, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Treasury, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet's National Security Group, Veterans' Affairs, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, and the Government Communications Security Bureau were consulted. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet's Policy Advisory Group was informed.

Next Steps, Communications and Proactive Release

- 49 This paper will be proactively released in due course.
- 50 Officials recommend that the new mandate and its 18 month timeframe be announced before its commencement on 1 July 2025, provided that additional funding is approved

¹⁰ CBC-22-MIN-0503 refers.

¹¹ [REDACTED] s6(a)

in Budget 2025. Defence will work with Ministers' offices to identify an announcement date that accounts for financial, diplomatic, and operational considerations.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Recommendations

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence recommend that Cabinet:

- 1 **Note** that the mandates for existing New Zealand Defence Force deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence expire on 30 June 2025.
- 2 **Note** that the threat to New Zealand Defence Force personnel operating throughout Europe is considered to be s6(a)
- 3 **Agree** the strategic objectives proposed for New Zealand Defence Force deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence.
- 4 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
- 5 s6(a)
- 6 **Note** that the Minister of Defence will be informed of significant changes to the composition of deployed personnel by the Chief of Defence Force.
- 7 **Note** should the nature of the conflict change significantly, Cabinet would be provided with advice to change or conclude the deployment ahead of the mandate's expiry.
- 8 **Note** that funding in the NZDF deployments appropriation is fully committed in 2025/26, and the Minister of Defence has submitted a Budget 2025 initiative seeking additional funding for deployments.

Option One – Maintain NZDF support of up to 100 personnel (recommended)

- 9 **Agree**, subject to sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025, to the deployment of up to 100 New Zealand Defence Force personnel, in support of Ukraine, within the themes of: training support; staff augmentation; and command, liaison and support from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026.
- 10 **Note** that at no time would NZDF personnel deployed under this mandate enter the territories of Russia, Belarus or Ukraine.
- 11 **Agree** to delegate authority to the Chief of Defence Force to manage the employment of up to 100 personnel deployed in support of Ukraine's self-defence across the Cabinet-approved themes of: training support; staff augmentation; and command, liaison and support.
- 12 **Agree** to delegate authority to the Chief of Defence Force to approve new opportunities across the Cabinet-approved themes inside Europe (but not in Ukraine, Belarus, or Russia). The Chief of Defence Force will ensure: that any new opportunity is consistent with New Zealand Defence's policy and relationship settings; would not cause Operation TĪEKE to exceed its personnel cap of 100; and would remain within the allocated budget for the deployment.
- 13 **Note** the total estimated cost of the deployment is \$12.688 million in Financial Year 2025/26 and \$6.240 million in Financial Year 2026/27.

OR

Option Two – Reduce NZDF support to up to 70 personnel (not recommended)

- 14 **Agree**, subject to sufficient funding being made available through Budget 2025, to reduce the deployment of New Zealand Defence Force deployed in support of Ukraine to 70 personnel, within the themes of: training support; staff augmentation; and command, liaison and support from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026.
- 15 **Agree** to delegate authority to the Chief of Defence Force to manage the employment of up to 70 personnel deployed in support of Ukraine's self-defence across the Cabinet-approved themes of: training support; staff augmentation; and command, liaison and support.
- 16 **Note** that at no time would NZDF personnel deployed under this mandate enter the territories of Russia, Belarus or Ukraine.
- 17 **Agree** to delegate authority to the Chief of Defence Force to approve new opportunities across the Cabinet-approved themes inside Europe (but not in Ukraine, Belarus, or Russia). The Chief of Defence Force will ensure: that any new opportunity is consistent with New Zealand Defence's policy and relationship settings; would not cause Operation TĪEKE to exceed its personnel cap of 70; and would remain within the allocated budget for the deployment.
- 18 **Note** the total estimated cost of the deployment is \$9.280 million in Financial Year 2025/26 and \$4.521 million in Financial Year 2026/27.

OR

Option Three – Conclude NZDF support to Ukraine (not recommended)

- 19 **Agree** to conclude all New Zealand Defence Force contributions in support of Ukraine after 30 June 2025.
- 20 **Note** that Option Three has no additional financial implications.

Authorised for lodgement

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Judith Collins KC
Minister of Defence

Annex A – Overview of activities under each proposed option

Annex B  s6(a)

Overview of activities under each proposed option

	Training Support					Staff Augmentation							Command, Liaison, and Support			
	Training Support Platoon	Combat Casualty Care	Sapper Training	Sniper Training	Maritime EOD Training	s6(a)	Surge Training Staff	NSATU (GER)	s6(a)	HQ INTERFLEX Embed (UK)	Specialist Intelligence (UK)	s6(a)	Surge Embedded Staff	SHAPE Liaison Officer (BEL)	National Command/Support Elements (UK)	s6(a)
Option One – Maintain Up to 100 personnel (18 Months)	✓ 18 pers	✓ 2 pers 6x courses	✓ 12 pers 3x courses	✓ 6 pers 2x courses	✓ 8 pers		✓ Up to 10 pers as required	✓ 6 pers		✓ 1 pers	s6(a)		✓ Up to 4 pers as required	✓ 1 pers	✓ 8 pers	
Option Two – Reduce Up to 70 personnel (18 Months)	✓ 18 pers	✓ 2 pers 6x courses	✓ 12 pers 2x courses		✓ 8 pers		✓ Up to 4 pers as required	Either NSATU or s6(a) 8 pers		✓ 1 pers				✓ 1 pers	✓ 6 pers	
Option Three – Withdraw (18 Months)																

Released by the Minister of Defence